Executive discretion over policy outcomes is an inevitable feature of our political system. However, in recent years, the President has sought to expand his discretion through a variety of controversial and legally questionable tactics. Through a series of simple separation of powers models, we study one such tactic, employed by both Democratic and Republican presidents: the use of signing statements, which purport to have status in the interpretation of statutory meaning. Our models also show that signing statements upset the constitutional vision of lawmaking and, in a wide range of cases, exacerbate legislative gridlock. We argue that courts should not legally credit signing statements; we conclude by discussing executive opportunism broadly.

中文翻译：

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行政机会主义，总统签署声明和三权分立

行政人员对政策结果的自由裁量权是我们政治制度的必然特征。但是，近年来，总统通过各种有争议的和在法律上可疑的策略，寻求扩大其自由裁量权。通过一系列简单的权力分离模型，我们研究了民主党总统和共和党总统都采用的一种这样的策略：使用签名声明，声称该声明在法定含义的解释中具有地位。我们的模型还表明，签署声明破坏了宪法的立法视野，并且在许多情况下加剧了立法僵局。我们认为，法院不应在法律上认可签署声明；最后，我们将广泛讨论行政机会主义。