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In Defense of Jñānalakṣaṇā Pratyāsatti

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Abstract

In Nyāya philosophy, a special kind of extraordinary sensory connection is admitted named jñānalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti or jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa. It is held that sometimes our sense-organ can be connected to such an object which is not amenable to the operating sense-organ. In such cases, cognition (jñāna) plays the role of sensory connection and connects the content of itself to the operating sense-organ. The paradigmatic example of jñānalakṣaṇa perception is to ‘see’ fragrant sandal through visual sense from non-smellable distance. This hypothesis of jñānalakṣaṇa has been criticized by the opponents being considered as counterintuitive, mysterious and theoretically overloaded. This paper tries to demystify the notion. It shows that although it seems to be metaphysically mysterious phenomenon at first sight, it is not so at all. The paper explores the psychological process involved in this sensory connection. The hypothesis is shown to have sufficient explanatory power, because the Naiyāyikas have used this hypothesis to explain five different epistemic situations. Hence, this paper argues that it is not a theoretical overload. The opponents counter-argue that all those five cognitive situations can be explained without admitting jñānalakṣaṇa. Moreover, if we admit jñānalakṣaṇa, then a particular kind of inference will become redundant. The paper answers all those objections and defends the hypothesis. The second part of the paper presents an empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis. The arguments leveled against the hypothesis of jñānalakṣaṇa can be contested on the ground that they try to disprove something which is supported on experimental ground. Experiments represent universally acceptable objective facts supported by experience—denying which amounts to anubhavavirodha, which philosophers would want to avoid. Hence, supporting jñānalakṣaṇa on the ground of scientific experiments can be considered as a philosophical stand. Now, there is a clinically recognized and neurophysiologically proved condition, called synaesthesia, where stimulation of a particular sensory modality automatically and involuntarily activates a different sensory modality simultaneously without a direct stimulation of the second modality. As for example, when a sound → colour synaesthete listens to a particular tone such as C-sharp, she visualizes particular colour, such as blue, in her mind’s eye; for a grapheme → colour synaesthete a particular number or alphabet is always tinged with a particular colour. This paper shows that the cognitive process involved in synaesthesia lends support to the hypothesis of jñānalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti. It has been proved through several experiments that it is a genuine perceptual phenomenon and is not a confabulation of memory. There are several alternative theories which explain the phenomenon neurophysiologically. The paper discusses the most popular one: the cross-activation hypothesis. There are two major objections against the project of comparing jñānalakṣaṇa with synaesthesia. First, synaesthesia is a neurological condition present in a few numbers of people whereas jñānalakṣaṇa is claimed to be universal phenomenon. Second, syneasthesia is a sensory experience whereas jñānalakṣaṇa involves application of concepts. The paper answers these questions. Firstly, multimodal processing in the brain is a universal phenomenon; secondly, there is a form of synaesthesia where top-down processing is involved. In those cases, concepts play important role for having synaesthetic experience.

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Notes

  1. na ca anyathākhyāti sambhavati, rajatapratyakṣakāraṇasya rajatendriyasannikarṣabhāvāt raṅge rajatabuddheranupapatteriti cenna.—Siddhāntamuktāvali, Bhāṣā-Pariccheda—Kārikā //136//, Viśvanātha, KV, pp. 485–486.

  2. NKS., pp. 369–372.

  3. gṛhītyā vastusadbhāvaṁ smṛtvā ca pratiyoginam/

    mānasaṁ nāstitājñānaṁ jāyate’kṣā’napekṣanāt//27.5//—Ślokavārtika (Abhāvaparicchedaḥ), Kumārīla Bhaṭṭa, SVNR., p. 482.

  4. Goswami, 1984: 355–361.

  5. AS., pp. 342–343.

  6. na ca jñānaṁ tatra pratyāsattiḥ, jñānasya pratyāsattitve tata eva vahnyādeḥ pratyakṣatvāpattāvanumānādyucchedāpatteḥ.—Vedānta Paribhāsā, Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, VP., p.92.

    etena— ‘surabhi candana’ mityādiviśiṣṭajñānāya kalpitā jñānalakṣaṇa pratyāsattirapi—nirastāḥ candanatvena surabhitvānumānopapatteḥ, anyathā sādhyaviśiṣṭapakṣapratyakṣopapatteranumānamātrocchedaprasaṅgāt. —Advaitasiddhiḥ, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, AS., pp. 342-343.

  7. evam hi na kaścidsarvajño’bhavet, sarvasya tathāvidhasannikarṣāvyabhicārāt.—Kāśikā ṭīkā (114) of Sucarita Miśra on Ślokavārttika (Śloka: 114) of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa on Mīmāṁsāsūtra (2: Codanāsūtram) of Jaimini, SVK., p.121.

  8. Wundt, 1907: 257–264; Dutta, 1997: 108.

  9. Stout, 2002: 26–27; Dutta, 1997: 108.

  10. Ward, 1982: 37–85; Dutta, 1997: 108.

  11. Stout, 2002: 26; Dutta, 1997: 109.

  12. Bandyopadhyaya, 1986: 105–109.

  13. atha kaḥ sannikarṣaḥ? jñānena saṁyukta-samavāyaḥ, tadarthena saṁyukta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatvam iti—yāyakusumānjaliḥ (4/4th Stavaka), Udayana, NKS., p.369.

  14. tasyaiva jñānasya apekṣanāt—Nyāyakusumānjaliḥ (4/4th Stavaka), Udayana, NKS., p. 369.

  15. We have mentioned that it is difficult for a direct realist to explain illusion. Another face of the difficulty is to explain illusion without admitting the difference between object and content. Normally we explain illusion in terms of the mismatch between the object (substratum) of the cognition with its content (that which the cognition shows us). In one sense it leads us to some form of representative realism where the content of cognition is supposed to have ideational component. But in Nyāya such intermediate level of representation has not been approved. Apramā or false cognition has been defined here as a cognition in which such a characterization (prakāra) qualifies the substratum (tat) of the cognition that actually is absent in that substratum. Here the prakāra is not ideational in nature. It is a real component—only having a different spatio-temporal dimension. But how do we directly perceive such deśāntarīya/kālāntarīya real characterization in illusion? The answer is—through jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa. But the psychological process of jñānalakṣaṇa indicates that there the object-content distinction has already been admitted tacitly; because it involves memory and previous effect. We can remember a thing (such as a pot) even when it has been destroyed. Hence, pot is not the real substratum of the memory cognition—it rather is content of memory. It was present in saṁskāra as a seed (as content) even after the real substratum is destroyed. Moreover, the Naiyāyikas acknowledges that bhūtale ghaṭābhāva and ghaṭābhāvavat bhūtalam are two different cognitions having two different contents, although the object of those cognitions is the same. Hence, object-content distinction has been admitted by the later Naiyāyikas, although it kept direct realism unharmed. They hold that when we know an object, the object is not represented in our ideas; rather a property called viṣayatā is produced in the object on account of being known. For the Naiyāyikas there is no ideational component suspending as a level of representation in between the subject and the external world. However, this issue should be discussed elaborately. Within this article there is little scope to discuss it fully.

  16. Chatterjee, 1978: 218–227.

  17. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) technique and Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scanning are used to see which areas of brain are activated during any cognitive or motor event. They are used to see the reality of synaesthetic experience also. When a particular brain area is activated, that brain-part requires extra glucose and oxygen. Oxygen is transported to the brain by hemoglobin carried by blood. So, at that brain-part blood overflows beyond requirement and blood oxygenation level becomes greater than normal. When oxygen is absorbed in that part, hemoglobin is deoxygenated. Now, this deoxygenated hemoglobin is more sensitive to magnetic field. The ratio of oxygenated hemoglobin over deoxygenated hemoglobin (which we call BOLD effect) increases in activated brain-part (where regional cerebral blood flow or rCBF increases). The MRI machine can trace this magnetic activity of brain from outside skull (in a non-invasive way), creating a great magnetic field surrounding the skull. It can create a 3D picture of live brain showing the brain’s activity on the monitor. The TMS or Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation device is an insulated coil of wire. When current is sent through the coil a magnetic field is created. Our brain produces small amount of magnetic field due to its neuronal activity. If TMS coil is placed near the skull from outside, it disrupts normal brain activity. It creates a virtual and temporary lesion in that part of the brain. Using TMS we can stimulate/deactivate areas of brain those are postulated to be required for synaesthetic experiences. It helps us to determine whether such experiences can be temporarily removed or altered. It establishes direct causal connection between brain-part activation and synaesthetic experience.

  18. We can know the synaesthetic Stroop effect from the experiments of Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001), Dixon et al. (2000), Mills et al. (1999), Mattingly et al. (2001), Odgard et al. (1999) etc.

  19. The involvement of PIT cortex in the mechanism proves that cross-modal object-recognition also can be explained in the same vein. The Naiyāyikas have explained recognition (pratyabhijñā) through the hypothesis of jñānalakṣaṇa.

  20. In the stein technology retrograde tracers are those that are injected at axon terminals and transported back to their cell bodies. Anterograde tracers are injected near (and taken up by) cell soma. They then travel along the axon and label it with a tracer.

  21. Smilek et al. (2005) conducted similar experiments.

  22. Some of the experiments on synaesthesia and multisensory processes, depicted above, have been previously mentioned in two of my following articles—1. Mainak Pal, Dana Sugu & Amita Chatterjee, “A Model of ‘Creative’ Perceptual Experience,” In Cognition, Experience and Creativity, eds. Jaison A. Manjaly & Bipin Indurkhya (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan Private Limited, 2015), 35–62. 2. Mainak Pal, “Synaesthesia: A Window to Neurophysiological Model of Creativity,” Sandhan (Journal of Centre for Studies in Civilizations) 18 (1&2) (January-December 2018): 1–40. In those two articles these (and many other experiments) were presented to establish the connection between synaesthesia and creativity. However, they have been presented, paraphrased and further developed here for a different purpose—in order to defend the thesis of jñānalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti.

  23. indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṁ pratyakṣam //4//—Nyāyasūtra, Maharṣi Gautama, NS., p. 10.

Abbreviations

AS:

Advaitasiddhi of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. 1988. Edited by Pt. N.S. Ananta Krishna Shastri with the Commentaries Gauḍabrahmānandī, Viṭṭhaleśopādhyāyī and Siddhivyākhyā of Balabhadra and Ananta Krishna Shastri’s critical summary Caturgraṇthikā. Delhi: Parimal Publications.

KV:

Kārikāvalī of Viśvanātha. 1988. Edited with footnotes and Commentaries Muktāvalī, Dinakarī and Rāmarudrī by Atmaram Narayana Jere. Varanasi: Krishnadas Academy.

NKS:

Nyāyakusumāñjaliḥ of Udayanācārya. 2015. Edited, translated and elucidated by Srimohan Bhattacharya. Calcutta: Paschimbanga Rajya Pustak Parshat.

NS:

Nyāyasūtra of Gautama. 1997. Edited by Anantalal Thakur. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.

SVK:

Mīmāṁsāślokavārttikam of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. 1926. Part 1. Edited with the Commentary Kāśikā of Sucarita Miśra by K. Sāmbaśiva Śāstrī. Trivandrum: University of Travancore.

SVNR:

Ślokavārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. 1894. Edited with Pārthasārathi Miśra’s Commentary Nyāyaratnākaratīkā by Ramashastri. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Granthamala. Granthasamkhya 3. Vārānasī: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series.

VP:

Vedānta Paribhāṣā of Dharmarājādhvarīndra. 1971. Edited, translated, and elucidated in Bengali by Panchanan Bhattacharya Sastri. Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, Jadavpur, Kolkata, West Bengal, 700032, India

    Mainak Pal

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This article aspires to defend jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa and provide a new analysis of it with reference to some scientific experiments already conducted on multisensory perception and synaesthesia. Proper references of those experiments are given in the article accordingly.

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Pal, M. In Defense of Jñānalakṣaṇā Pratyāsatti. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 40, 81–113 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-023-00298-w

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