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Voluntary play increases cooperation in the presence of punishment: a lab in the field experiment

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Abstract

Problems of cooperation have often been simplified as the choice between defection and cooperation, although in many empirical situations it is also possible to walk away from the interaction. We present the results of two lab-in-the-field experiments with a diverse pool of subjects who play optional and compulsory public goods games both with and without punishment. We find that the most important institution to foster cooperation is punishment, which is more effective in a compulsory game. In contrast to Rand and Nowak (Nat Commun 2(1):1–7, 2011), we find that loners are not responsible for anti-social punishment, which is mostly imputable to low-contributors (free-riders). Loners neither totally free-ride nor they significantly punish cooperators (or other types of players): they simply avoid all forms of participation whenever possible.

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Data availability statement

The dataset generated and analysed in the current study is available from the corresponding author upon request.

Notes

  1. We however report results for E1 and E2 separately in supplementary material, with qualitatively equivalent results.

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Funding

Funding for the experiment was received by Università Degli Studi di Modena e Reggio Emila. SR gratefully acknowledges funding from “Fondi primo insediamento” of the Ca’Foscari University of Venice and from the Italian Minister of University and Research (MUR) under Research Projects of National Relevance (PRIN), project code 2020SKJSTF (“At the frontier of agent-based modelling: a new data driven framework for policy design toward sustainable and resilient economies”). KT acknowledges support of the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund, Grant Number FK 137765688 (PI: Dorottya Kisfalusi).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Departiment of Culture and Languages, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Modena, Italy

    Francesca Pancotto

  2. Department of Economics, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Venice, Italy

    Simone Righi

  3. Institute for Analytical Sociology, Linköping University, Norrköping, Sweden

    Károly Takács

  4. CSS-RECENS, Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest, Hungary

    Károly Takács

Authors
  1. Francesca Pancotto
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  2. Simone Righi
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  3. Károly Takács
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Correspondence to Francesca Pancotto.

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Partial financial support was received from University of Modena. All authors certify that they have no affiliations with or involvement in any organization or entity with any financial interest or non-financial interest in the subject matter or materials discussed in this manuscript.

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Pancotto, F., Righi, S. & Takács, K. Voluntary play increases cooperation in the presence of punishment: a lab in the field experiment. Theory Decis 95, 405–428 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09929-9

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