Elsevier

Poetics

Volume 97, April 2023, 101766
Poetics

The origins of hits: Cumulative advantage vs. multiplicative returns in cultural markets

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.poetic.2023.101766Get rights and content

Highlights

  • Provides a new generative model for the origins of “hit” or “superstar” cultural objects.

  • Theorizes how durable esthetic dispositions, “tastes,” influence popularity of cultural objects.

  • Analyzes the popularity of baby girls’ names.

Abstract

The popularity of cultural objects is often distributed as many unpopular “flops” alongside a few “hits.” Hits can be several orders of magnitude more popular than typical objects but are difficult to predict ex-ante. Most explanations focus on cumulative advantage (CA): rich-get-richer processes wherein the success of cultural objects breeds future success, creating high inequality in popularity and decoupling popularity from the properties of objects. I present an additional formal model, multiplicative returns (MR), which assumes that cultural objects are judged as interdependent ensembles of their properties. Like CA, the MR model produces “hit” objects whose popularity is difficult to predict before the fact. I show that the MR model generates popularity distributions consistent with that of US baby girls’ names. I conclude that highly unequal popularity distributions of cultural objects are over-determined: they can arise from MR, CA, or both.

Introduction

Two stylized facts characterize the careers of many cultural objects: (1) popularity is highly unequal—often a few hits are orders of magnitude more popular than the typical object (Salganik & Watts, 2006), and (2) popularity is very difficult to predict, even for experts (Bielby & Bielby, 1994). Beginning with Adler (1985), social scientists have explained cultural object popularity through cumulative advantage (CA) processes wherein the popularity of cultural objects increases the likelihood that additional adopters will flock to them. CA is a theoretically appealing model since it can parsimoniously generate both high inequality and unpredictability, and has extensive empirical support (Godart & Mears, 2009; van de Rijt et al., 2013; Rossman et al., 2010; Salganik & Watts, 2006). CA has powerful implications for the study of culture and cultural objects, in part because it implies that the public reception of cultural objects is only loosely coupled with the personal tastes of individuals (Lizardo, 2016), and because it shows how the endogenous spread of cultural objects can generate high inequality in reception (Kaufman, 2004). Recent work, however, suggests that CA cannot entirely account for the dramatic inequality in the careers of cultural objects, particularly for the biggest hits (e.g., Lynn et al. 2016, van de Rijt 2019), suggesting the need for additional models.

Other work on cultural object adoption stresses the role of durable aesthetic dispositions or “tastes” (Bourdieu, 1984; Lieberson, 2000). Although tastes form through social processes, once formed they allow individuals to ascertain the intended meaning of cultural objects and form aesthetic judgements independently rather than from contemporaneous reactions of others to the object (Cerulo, 2018; Lieberson & Mikelson, 1995; Wohl, 2015). Theories of taste give us accounts of how the properties of objects influence how objects are perceived and whether they are adopted. Yet we still lack a sociological account of how tastes and the properties of objects produce skewed popularity distributions. Indeed many studies are motivated by the difficulty of predicting the emergence of hits based on their properties alone (e.g., Salganik et al. 2006).

If CA were the only model capable of generating the unpredictability and inequality of cultural markets, then the role of taste-based mechanisms in explaining the adoption and popularity of cultural objects would be highly circumscribed—when we observe a hit cultural object, we must assume that it resulted from CA. Here, however, I introduce a formal model of cultural object adoption based on taste that also reproduces the high inequality and unpredictability characteristic of CA processes. This model captures the intuition that cultural objects are judged as ensembles of interdependent properties, such as when a book cover is carefully chosen in the hopes of matching the “core essence” of the writing in a book (Childress, 2017:133), or, in other words, that their appeal is more than the sum of their parts (Taylor et al., 2019:8). I call this model “multiplicative returns” (MR). MR assumes that cultural objects will be judged and adopted according to a multiplicative function, or the interaction, of several underlying properties. In this model, hits are “perfect storms” of complementary qualities, which interact to form an object's overall appeal.

I illustrate the MR model empirically on the popularity of baby girls’ names in the United States. Girls’ names present a puzzle for CA models in that parents often choose novel or rare names to express individuality (e.g., Lieberson 2000), yet many names still become extremely popular. The MR model helps to make sense of this. Baby names must simultaneously satisfy many conditions for parents, such as sounding pleasing or having particular gender, race, and class connotations. The MR model shows how skewed distributions can arise without CA when objects such as names are judged as ensembles of properties. That is, names can become hits based on the reception of their properties (sound, gender connotation, associated imagery, etc.) rather than because popularity begets further popularity. Both CA and MR models are generative models of inequality: mathematical and simulation models that seek to generate the patterns they explain (Epstein & Axtell, 1996). To compare the models empirically, I show that the popularity distributions generated by the MR model are closer than those generated by canonical CA models to the empirical popularity distribution of baby girls’ names. I conclude that, in general, extreme inequality in cultural object popularity is likely due to both CA and MR processes and theorize three ways that CA and MR processes may intersect.

Section snippets

Cumulative advantage and cultural objects

A CA process is one in which “current levels of accumulation have a direct [positive] causal relationship with future levels1” (DiPrete & Eirich, 2006:272). Because the “rich get richer,” CA leads to high inequality among the units subject to the process (DiPrete & Eirich, 2006). In Merton's classic study of the Mathew effect, for instance, scientists who are already well-known and respected in their field tend to

Multiplicative returns and cultural objects

In contrast to CA models, the MR model focuses on how the properties of cultural objects influence their popularity. Although sociologists of culture have long demonstrated that the properties—symbolic or physical—of cultural objects influence their reception, they have not shown if or how this explains the emergence of skewed distributions of popularity. Instead, it is clear that there is no simple or obvious relationship between the popularity of objects and their properties, and the appeal

The contexts of cumulative advantage and multiplicative returns

Although we are unlikely to find either CA or MR in pure form, features of social environments and cultural objects may favor one process over the other. Key features of the social context include aspects of network topology and contexts affecting individuals’ “taste for popularity.” Key features of cultural objects are their cost structure, how their materiality affects their durability and diffusion, as well as their social durability and visibility.

The puzzle of baby girl names

Baby names have been treated as a “model case” (Krause, 2021) for the analysis of cultural objects, in part because they are free to adopt and are not promoted by business or other organized interests (Lieberson, 2000). Yet, baby girls’ names present a puzzle from the standpoint of CA. On the one hand, the popularity of baby girls’ names is massively unequal, as we would expect from a CA process. Data from the US Social Security Administration containing the popularity distribution of all US

Testing MR against CA

In this section, I formalize the MR model and argue that, although both MR and CA generate high inequality among cultural objects, which may be indistinguishable in a substantive sense, the popularity distributions generated by MR and CA are statistically distinguishable. Unlike regression modeling, I am not seeking to parameterize the MR model, or show which specific properties of cultural objects lead to great popularity. Rather I follow a “generative” logic (Epstein & Axtell, 1996), testing

Discussion and conclusion

To explain hit cultural objects social scientists have generally invoked a cumulative advantage (CA) process wherein popularity begets popularity in a virtuous cycle. In this paper, I suggested a multiplicative returns (MR) model, wherein individuals judge cultural objects through how the (multiplicative) interaction of their many properties form an overall “gestalt” of an object. Despite having similar consequences, these processes imply very different theories of cultural consumption. In a

Acknowledgments

I thank Alison Appling, Shawn Bauldry, Philip Cohen, Daniel DellaPosta, Brandon Gorman, Omar Lizardo, Andrew Perrin, Kyle Puetz, Ashton Verdery, participants at the Culture and Politics Workshop at UNC Chapel Hill, the Duke Networks Analysis Center Seminar, the Culture and Politics seminar at Penn State, and the editors and anonymous reviewers at Poetics, for their help in various ways on this project.

Charles Seguin is an associate professor of sociology and social data analytics at the Pennsylvania State University. He studies culture, politics, and history using a variety of methods.

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    Charles Seguin is an associate professor of sociology and social data analytics at the Pennsylvania State University. He studies culture, politics, and history using a variety of methods.

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