1 Introduction

The texts of the speeches made by delegates at the United Nations climate change conference COP26 (Conference Of the Parties) in Glasgow, November 2021, constitute a significant body of public policy argumentation concerned with perhaps the most pressing political issue human society has ever had to face. It seems reasonable to expect, therefore, that these statements would contain a variety of clear and well-supported arguments showing both the necessity for action on climate change and describing the proper form and direction of that action. In addition to this, however, it should be remembered that conference delegates, like a great many, and perhaps most, speakers in public life, do not appear on stage as individuals, but as representatives of interested groups. It might also be expected, therefore, that arguments specific to those groups, and displaying the perspective adopted by their members, would be employed. Given the very brief nature of these speeches—just a few hundred words each—delegates were unable to raise large numbers of issues and were instead forced to focus on those which they considered most important, thus revealing the priorities of the represented groups. These are not calls for a specific direction of action on climate change, but may be considered identity-affirming arguments, designed primarily as demonstrative speech acts (see Corredor 2019). It is arguments of this type which form the focus of this study.

It is not immediately apparent how the argumentation theorist should deal with such arguments and, specifically, whether they can usefully be evaluated against standard norms. It is taken as a premise of this study that the appropriateness of a normative approach might be doubted, and that there is some need, therefore, to explore the issue. This paper sets out to examine a number of arguments found in the short addresses given at the High-Level segment of the Cop26 conference, and to evaluate their adhesion to norms of public argumentation, while also attempting to highlight the purposes of the delegates in addressing the conference. Ultimately, the goal is to assess the suitability of these norms and the tool through which they are applied—the Comprehensive Assessment Procedure for Natural Argumentation (CAPNA)—for the evaluation of such arguments. It is understood that non-normative approaches would certainly have an important role to play when considering how identity is expressed through argumentation, but this falls outside the scope of the current work.

The study is of a qualitative nature: examples of identity-affirming arguments are selected for analysis in order to examine both the kinds of argument structures which can be employed in this fashion, and to test the ability of norm-based evaluative processes to provide a relevant and meaningful assessment of such structures. No attempt will be made to provide an over-arching description of all the techniques and argument schemes used within the conference session, much less of all the strategies which might be employed in arguments of political representation.

The first stage involves the search within the texts for arguments, understood as logically related statements with an implied or explicit premise to conclusion inference relation (see Wagemans 2020). The role which the supposed aims of the arguers and the wider context of their words play in the perceived success of their argumentation is accounted for thanks to the Argument Mode Identification Procedure (Hinton 2021a, Forthcoming) which determines eight characteristics of an argument’s presentational circumstances. Selected arguments are then subjected to full analysis using the CAPNA (Hinton 2021a), which is described in Sect. 3.1 below.

The concept of arguments as expressions of identity was discussed by Hazen and Wiliams (1997) and further elaborated by Robert Asen (2005), but has since received relatively little attention, particularly in the sphere of public policy argument. In this paper, however, the analysis of arguments considered to be primarily identity-confirming and their role in policy debate is informed by the work of Hample & Irions (2015), Hinton (2016), and Mohammed (2016). This analysis leads to a discussion of how such argumentation can be accommodated within the wider scope of public argument norms, and, in particular, whether the over-riding desiderata of maximised correctness and participation (see Zenker et al. Forthcoming—this issue) can both be supported by the evaluation process.

The results of the analysis should, therefore, not only show how norms can be applied to public argumentation, but also provide insight into how argument norms may need to be flexible—not tied to one standard function of argument—in order to provide a basis for the evaluation of all contributions to public debate, many of which may seek to establish an identity or raise a voice on behalf of those who should not be forgotten in the deliberations, rather than give direct reasons in support of specific policy solutions.

2 Identity and Argumentation

In an earlier paper (Hinton 2016), I argued that there is a two-way relationship between identity and argumentation. In one direction, the assertion of an identity can abrogate the need for any arguments: in announcing that one is a Christian, in much of the world, for instance, a whole mass of standpoints and commitments are immediately made apparent to one’s interlocutors. If they happen to be well-educated, much of the complexity of the reasoning behind those positions will also be known, and, thus, one is saved the trouble of having to explain what exactly one believes or why one believes it. This process may be reversed when a protagonist puts forwards arguments which by their very design are intended rather to express the identity of that individual than to persuade an audience or establish a truth. This is a complex kind of speech act in which those who hear the arguments put forth are expected to draw inferences about the speaker, not the subject matter. When I argue at meetings that students ought to be examined in a more rigorous manner because otherwise the value of the qualifications we offer will be seriously undermined, I do not do so with any hope or expectation that the authorities in my faculty will act upon my words, indeed, I should be very surprised if they considered them at all; rather I look to identify myself as an old-school (old-fashioned?) believer in a ‘real’, demanding education, uninfluenced by the commercial interest of increasing student numbers and departmental budgets.

In the first case, we can see clear analogies with Macagno’s account of emotive language in arguments. He describes terms which carry emotional or evaluative content within them as ‘condensed arguments’. As he puts it, ‘emotive words can be short-cuts, simplifications of chains of arguments’ (Macagno 2014: 118). This is very much how identity statements work, as short-cuts to structures of argument which others have erected. Naturally, if the identity one claims is little-known or ambiguous, this attempt at simplification may lead to greater complication; it may also lead to disengagement from one’s audience: Emerson’s ‘If I know your sect, I anticipate your argument’ (1841) was meant as a complaint, not an expression of relief at cutting short a debate.

As interesting as such short-cuts may be, one can hardly set out to evaluate arguments which are only alluded to, and so the focus of this paper is on the use of arguments to express an identity. At this point, some brief explanation is required of what is meant by identity and identity forming arguments, and how these concepts are linked to other important aspects of argumentation theory such as speaker ethos. Hample & Irions claim that: ‘Identity display is undertaken to establish or reinforce some aspect of a person’s public persona’ (2015: 391), while O’Keefe writes of how arguing ‘enacts an identity’ as ‘individuals seek to portray themselves well within the assigned role’ (1995: 786). Robert Asen notes that the whole concept of identity is a difficult one but states that ‘To recognize the identity formation function of argument is to recognize that discourse situates people in social relations’ (2005: 132). Identity arguments, then, are understood in this work not just as expressions of one’s identity, but also as enactments of a role as well as attempts to reinforce one’s social relations.

As the special issue of which this paper is part is concerned specifically with public argument, the emphasis in the examples here is on political and national identity expression, rather than more personal issues. The speakers in the studied texts have a specified role as representatives of a particular groups: it is to be expected, therefore, that their speeches will in some way seek to enhance their own standing as representatives as well as boosting or helping to form the sense of a shared identity amongst those they represent.

Since arguments of this type are clearly designed to influence the way in which the speaker is perceived, there are certainly links to be explored with character judgments (Walton 2006) and the recently invigorated field of study into ethotic arguments (Koszowy et al. 2022; Pereira-Fariña et al. 2022). This would require a full treatment of its own, not least because the need to differentiate character and identity, and the use of arguments to reduce the ethos of others, rather than to build our own identities, would add levels of great complexity. What can be said here, however, is that arguments designed to boost ethos or influence character judgments are clearly related in their function and what applies to identity arguments in terms of normative assessment most likely applies to them equally.

This brings us to one other issue with which we shall have to deal, albeit briefly, that concerning the function of argument (or lack of it (see Goodwin 2007)). Robert Asen suggests a number of functions of argument beyond the act of the persuasion of others, one of which is identity formation. This is considered particularly important for disadvantaged groups: ‘Argument takes on a performative dimension as the articulation of a viewpoint bolsters the identity conveyed in one's propositional statement’ (Asen 2005: 132). In response, J. Anthony Blair notes that if this is a function of argument, it is an incidental one: ‘The identity-formation consequence was a derivative result of the inherent use of argument to persuade, although that result could well have been the arguer's primary objective’ (Blair 2005: 148). The point is a good one in that the identity forming function only works because argument has a normal, standard function of persuading in much the same way as an infelicitous speech act derives much of its meaning by piggy-backing on a felicitous one ‘in ways parasitic upon its normal use’ (Austin 1962: 22). The point in both cases being that, in order to have their intended effect, the words are used in a way which is reliant on a convention – what Lumer calls the ‘standard function’ of argument (Lumer 2005) and Mohammed refers to as its ‘intrinsic goal’ (Mohammed 2016). As Blair admits, that parasitic use may be the objective of the arguer, but it cannot be considered the objective of argument itself. Since we are concerned here with certain arguments rather than a grander conception of ‘argument’, the objective of the arguer will suffice for us.

This ‘standard’ type of arguing has been discussed very extensively in the literature, to the exclusion of other forms. Barbara O’Keefe suggests a reason for this:

much of the work on argumentation appears to presume that the prototypical argument situation is one in which identity and relationship issues are suspended or ignored. This creates a stance in which the relational significance of messages is viewed as fundamentally irrelevant to the core questions of argumentation, and in fact as an intrusion of nonrational processes into rational decision making. (O’Keefe 1995: 786).

Her view was supported by Hazen and Williams, who believed it was common practice: ‘to separate argument forms and structures from the individuals involved when inspecting and critiquing public argumentation’ (Hazen &Williams 1997: 5).

More recently, however, interest has been growing in arguers and their identities. Dale Hample and Amanda Irions published an empirical study of occasions where ‘arguments whose essential purpose is to project or defend identity’ (2015: 390) were used. They found more than 400 participants who claimed to be able to recall a time when ‘they had argued to display their own identity’ (Hample & Irions 2015: 389), which suggests that it may be a rather common phenomenon. Their analysis showed that such arguments were largely expressed in a polite and unemotional fashion and employed by individuals with a range of personality types. Hample has also conducted a wide range of studies into the link between argument styles and national cultures (Demir & Hample 2019; Hample & Anagondahalli 2015; Khomenko & Hample 2019). There is, of course, a world of difference between one’s individual background or culture affecting the arguments one employs, and one’s argumentation actually being designed to express that identity.

3 Argument and Evaluation Norms

In order to be able to give a normative evaluation of any activity, we must first have a normative framework within which to make it. Such frameworks, however, are heavily dependent on context and intention: what is good behaviour for a boxer is not acceptable in an ice hockey player, although a casual spectator might think the two sports rather closely related. Public policy arguments must, then, be evaluated according to norms fitting the particular characteristics of their genre: that seems relatively uncontroversial. Exactly how those norms should be arrived at—which framework is best suited for the genre—is not so easy to define. The article in this issue discussing the range of possible norms (Zenker et al. Forthcoming) makes this abundantly clear, and there is no need to repeat here all the information and discussion contained in that work.

One way of deciding upon the right normative framework would be to look at the aims of the activity. Dima Mohammed (2016) provides an excellent overview of the literature on goals in argumentation and how they can be taken into account in the evaluation of political argument. She notes that public speakers will frequently have a range of goals, including the representation of constituents, and recommends treating such discourse as multi-layered and multi-purposive. Mohammed makes several distinctions to identify four types:

(i) goals that represent the intrinsic function of the act of arguing (convincing or rational persuasion); (ii) goals that represent the intrinsic function of the argumentative interaction (critically testing standpoints); (iii) goals that represent the uses of the act of arguing (when the extrinsic goal is individual) and (iv) goals that represent the purposes of argumentative interactions (when the extrinsic goal is a collective). (Mohammed 2016: 241, original emphasis).

She suggests, however, that ‘the goals that are relevant for the analysis are not necessarily relevant for the evaluation’ (2016: 235). This draws a clear line between analysis and evaluation, and means leaving out from the evaluation individual goals, which she also refers to as ‘political’. This certainly makes sense: we can analyse without making a value judgement and what is significant to the one may not be to the other. The CAPNA tool described below reflects this, but also uses the term ‘assessment’, coming between ‘analysis’ and ‘evaluation’. The reasons Mohammed gives for not taking into account individual goals, however, are somewhat vague and as a result, less convincing. Apparently, ‘focusing on the goals of argumentative interactions emphasises the agency of members of the general public’ and looking at individual goals would be ‘not necessarily beneficial for enhancing the emancipatory potential of political arguments’ (2016: 235). I am not sure what this means, but, in any case, I think there is a better reason to accept her statement and be wary of including ‘political’ goals in our evaluations: we can never know for certain what they are. Mohammed’s conclusion that: ‘Political considerations should not modify but just specify argumentative norms’ (2016: 235) sounds reasonable, but leads to the question of exactly how that should be done.

3.1 The CAPNA

The CAPNA is an assessment procedure designed to provide a basis for the evaluation of any argument, understood as a premise/conclusion set. It is not a normative system in itself, rather it looks to employ norms from a variety of perspectives to allow a comprehensive evaluation of any given argument, thus avoiding the necessity of choosing one set of norms as paramount. The procedure includes identification processes for both the type of argument and the mode of argument, and three main stages of analysis: the Process (Hinton Forthcoming), the Reasoning (Hinton and Wagemans 2022), and the Language (Hinton 2020, 2021a). These are based on the three parts of a broad definition of argumentation which is discussed and defended in a book-length treatment (Hinton 2021a) and states that: argumentation is the expression of reasoning within a process. These elements may be understood as reflecting the traditional approaches of argumentation theory: Process—Dialectic (pragma-dialectics), Reasoning—Logic, Language—Rhetoric. As Fig. 1 illustrates, they also provide a categorisation for fallacies which arise when a given argument is found to be unacceptable at a particular stage of the assessment. Each stage of the CAPNA contains a number of Procedural Questions (PQs) which the assessor must consider to be answered satisfactorily for the argument to be found acceptable.

Fig. 1
figure 1

The Comprehensive Assessment Procedure for Natural Argumentation (CAPNA)—adapted from Hinton (2021a: 169)

Full size image

The limited space available here does not allow for a full description of the CAPNA, much less a proper exposition of the principles upon which is founded, but some of the most relevant points can be raised, and the operation of the system, along with examples of PQs, is illustrated in the evaluations of example arguments given in Sect. 4.2 below.

Firstly, it should be noted (see Fig. 1) that the assessment begins with an ‘Apparent argument’, that is, a text containing what the assessor takes to be a conclusion and a premise (sometimes only implied) which supports it. In the Initial Analysis stage, this text is subjected to the ATIP which identifies not only the type of argument present, but also confirms that there is an argument of some type. This method of identification has the advantage of being systematic and containing clearly defined steps: it removes the need for the recipient of an argument to simply recognise the type. This is of great importance within the CAPNA framework as systematicity of evaluation is a key element of its design. The type of argument has a bearing on the later Reasoning assessment, but may also alert the assessor to likely problems at this early stage. This is a point of particular importance since there is no reason why the procedure has to be followed in the order set out here, and an experienced judge may wish to jump to a procedural question to which the given argument looks vulnerable. Along with argument types, the Initial Analysis stage also investigates the argument mode by employing the AMIP. Argument modes are contextual aspects which, to some extent, dictate the PQs to be asked, but to a larger extent qualify the way in which the answers to those questions are handled. For example, the PQs relating to the principle of Politeness in the Process stage can be ignored if the mode is Monological, while the acceptability judgements based upon them will be different if the mode is Public, rather than Private. Although some inferences may be made concerning the probable purposes of those putting forward arguments in particular modes, the AMIP does not directly take into account the intentions of arguers: even the Rhetorical mode is a matter of style and situation, not a definitive claim concerning the goal of the arguer.

The first main stage of analysis employs the Informal Argument Pragmatics (IAP) and deals with the Process aspect. This contains a range of PQs, based upon five normative principles of good Process: Productivity, Pertinence, Permissibility, Proof (burden of), and Politeness, as mentioned above. These represent a combination of normative frameworks: pertinence and politeness reflect speech act theory and the principle of relevance; permissibility relates to the rules of individual contexts, such as the courtroom; productivity and proof are dialectical norms, found in Aristotle and repeated in pragma-dialectics. As they pertain to the circumstances of the argument’s presentation, they also take into account aspects related to the audience which receives it: this is particularly the case with Pertinence and Politeness, since the argument should be pertinent and polite to them.

At the second stage, the Reasoning is assessed. This follows the principles of argument cogency, as set forth by authors within the field of Informal Logic. Where Johnson and Blair’s (2006) RSA criteria demand that an argument have premises which are relevant, acceptable, and sufficient to support the conclusion, the CAPNA, following the terminology of the ATIP, questions whether the premise is true/acceptable, and whether the lever (Toulmin’s warrant , 2003) allows the inference to the conclusion to be made; this second question testing both the relevance and sufficiency. The exact PQs asked as part of the lever analysis depend upon the type of the argument and are closely related to the Critical Questions of the relevant argument scheme.

The final stage of assessment is that of Language, or the expression of the argument. This is based upon the principles set out in the Informal Argument Semantics (IAS). The five Cs of the IAS are: Clarity, Consistency, Coherence, Completeness, and Conceptualisation. The first four of these might be considered semanto-dialectic linguistic norms: language should be clear enough to be understood; meanings should be used consistently, avoiding equivocation; premises and conclusions should express propositions which are semantically coherent; while Completeness means that all the statements in the argument should be understood in the fullness of their relevant implicatures, as expressing not just what is said, but also what can be inferred from it. The final principle, that of Conceptualisation, describes a philosophical norm which delimits what language can and cannot be used to express, based on an understanding of its relationship to reality. This principle relates, in the main, to philosophical texts and neither its foundation nor its utilisation will be entered into here.Footnote 1

As has been said, at every stage the assessment proceeds by way of Procedural Questions which should be answered satisfactorily. Where they are not, a negative evaluation may be made and the argument labelled fallacious. The fallacy name is determined by the point of assessment at which a question could not be answered, thus there is a general category of Fallacies of Process, and a more particular category within it of Fallacy of Productivity (where an argument is found to be circular). Where all PQs are navigated and no fallacy is found, an argument is deemed acceptable. This is, of course, a defeasible evaluation and the possibility of stronger counter-arguments is not negated.

The example evaluations carried out in Sect. 4 below, will make things clearer by providing both a range of specific PQs and illustrating how the assessment of arguments with the CAPNA looks in practice.Footnote 2

4 Analysis of Speeches from COP 26

Reading the short speeches given by delegates at the COP 26 UN Climate change conference in Glasgow, one is immediately struck by several characteristics which may be surprising for those unfamiliar with events of this type. Firstly, and perhaps this is to be expected as these speakers are not scientists, the speeches do not attempt to argue for or against the proposed causes, processes, or results of climate change. There is complete agreement about the danger posed and the necessity for immediate action. Secondly, considering that everyone in the room is apparently committed to taking that action, rather little is said about the details: certainly, arguments supporting particular strategies are rare. Thirdly, a very large amount of what is said seems to have only the most tangential relationship to the theme of the conference. National leaders are keen to stress what has already been done by their own countries, and representatives from NGOs most commonly visit the topos of ‘justice’, with particular reference to justice for those whom they represent. Examples of this are given below, but the guiding principle of climate justice appears to be that sharing the burden of transition equally is at least as important as making that transition fast and effective.

All of these points, together with the fact that the delegates were offered extremely short timeslots, tend towards the conclusion that the purpose of the delegates in general, and, indeed, the organisers who gave them their platform, was to ensure that every voice was heard, every nation and every identity represented. The rhetorical situation is, then, a little unusual: rather than trying to convince the audience that certain actions are prudent or certain propositions true, many speakers use their brief time at the podium to express their existence and to remind others of what their identity is. Faith-based Organisations stress that they ‘see today that climate change is an ethical and spiritual matter’; the International Development Law Organisation considers it to be ‘inextricably linked to issues of fairness, justice and the rule of law’; whilst the International Trade Union Confederation, unsurprisingly, believes we ‘need a Just Transition based on full employment, high-quality public services, and unionised jobs’.

The purpose of this study is not to examine all of the arguments contained in the speeches of delegates at the COP event, but rather to identify some of the arguments employed where the motivation might potentially be considered identity expression more than persuasion or truth-seeking and consider what types of arguments these are and how relevant a normative evaluation of them may be. To that end, several arguments are examined in Sect. 4.1 below, with three subjected to full assessment and evaluation in Sect. 4.2.

4.1 Argument Identification and Categorisation

In this section, fragments from a number of speeches are cited and the type of arguments they contain identified using the ATIP and the Periodic Table of Arguments (PTA) (Wagemans 2016). This procedure first puts the text into a standard form of conclusion because premise, then uses its structure to label the argument as a first or second order subject or premise argument, before adding a description of the two parts as statements of fact, value, or policy (Wagemans 2020). Naturally, due to the need for reconstruction of texts into standardised forms, differing interpretations are possible. For each argument a formula containing the technical description generated by the ATIP is given. The formula identifies a particular column within one of four quadrants of the Periodic Table of Arguments. Some columns contain more than one type of argument and these are distinguished using more familiar names of argument types. These traditional names given to the types in the PTA correspond to well known argument patterns, but the process of identification which results in their naming is based in a systematic procedure rather than an intuitive feeling of similarity to a previously learnt form.


Example 1: Trade Union RepresentativeFootnote 3


‘40 years of privatisation and marketisation has led to broken communities, economy inequality, and environmental injustice on a planetary scale.’


Standardised form:

There are broken communities, economy inequality, and environmental injustice on a planetary scale, because there has been 40 years of privatisation and marketisation.

This argument has the form ‘a is x, because a is y’, making it a first order predicate argument, and is based on two factual statements. The short form description is thus 1 pre FF. The privatisation and marketisation are said to be the cause of these problems, so it has the traditional name of argument from cause.

The strength and acceptability of this argument are assessed below, however, what is striking at first glance is that, despite the reference to ‘environmental injustice’, this argument does not appear to refer to the main themes of the conference. It is not a call for action and does not argue for any specific measures to be taken. That said, there is an implied conclusion that nationalisation of industry, the reversal of privatisation, would be good for society. This might be standardised as:

Privatisation should be reversed because a reversal of privatisation would bring social benefits.

The conclusion is a policy statement and this policy is one closely associated with the represented group—Trade Unions—leading to a potential categorisation as an identity expressing argument. The formulaic description would be 1 Pre PF, identified in the PTA as a pragmatic argument.

Although it is not the purpose of this paper to delve into the way in which identity arguments cement or advance certain identities or assumed values, it is worth noting that one possible interpretation of the speakers true intention is that he wishes to make the argument:

I associate with and represent the Trade Union movement because I argue for the reversal of privatisation.

This would be categorised as a 1 Pre FF argument from sign. It seems reasonable to speculate that identity-affirming arguments generally function in this way when made explicit—that advancing certain standpoints in certain ways is a sign of belonging to or associating with a particular group or culture. That, however, is a question for a separate study.


Example 2: Faith Based Groups


‘Fixated on profit, our extractive and ultimately unsustainable systems of production and consumption have led us today to this climate emergency’


Standardised form:

We have today a climate emergency because we have unsustainable systems of production consumption fixated on profit.


Although the original linguistic structure is different, this is a similar argument to example 1, both in terms of content and structure. Again, the notation would be 1 Pre FF, and the claim is of a causal nature. Whilst this text does not argue for specific measures either, it also contains an implied argument which differs subtly from the previous one: that our systems of production and consumption are unsustainable because profit-led and should, therefore, be changed.


Standardised form:

Our profit-led system of consumption should be changed because our profit-led system of consumption is unsustainable.

This focuses on the motivation rather than the ownership of industry, thus representing a view more based in morality than politics, as one might expect from faith groups. Since the conclusion is a policy statement and the premise better considered a value judgement than a statement of fact, the description would be 1 Pre PV, and the name argument from evaluation. Naturally, when the analyst discovers what appears to be an implied argument, that argument can be processed through the CAPNA along with the original.


Example 3: Government of Liechtenstein


‘Some of us have argued that reducing greenhouse gas emissions while achieving economic and social well-being is incompatible. Liechtenstein can serve as an example to prove the opposite’.


Standardised form:

Other countries can reduce greenhouse gas emissions while achieving economic and social well-being because Liechtenstein has reduced greenhouse gas emissions while achieving economic and social well-being.

This argument has the form ‘a is x, because b is x’, and is identified as a first order subject argument, containing two factual statements, 1 sub FF. The traditional label, as indicated in the original text, is argument from example.

The choice of evidence offered for an argument is one area which could be affected by identity issues. When an example is offered and that example is oneself, there is a clear possibility that some form of self-promotion or self-praise is being undertaken. At the same time, arguments from example are common and quite respectable, so it isn’t clear to what degree this argument is a serious attempt to persuade and to what degree it’s merely a boast to the international community.


Example 4: Government of Vietnam


‘President Ho Chi Minh, the hero of national liberation and world’s man of culture, once said: “Unity, unity, great unity. Success, success, great success.” If we are to succeed in the global fight against climate change, global solidarity is the only way.’


Standardised form:

Global solidarity is necessary for success in fighting climate change, because solidarity is necessary for success was said by Ho Chi Minh.

In this type of argument, the whole conclusion is the subject of the premise. This means that further reconstruction is needed to find a common term, here a subject, and the type is categorised as a second order predicate argument.

Global solidarity is necessary for success in fighting climate change (q) is true (T), because solidarity is necessary for success (q) was said by Ho Chi Minh (Z)

The argument, therefore, has the form ‘q is T because q is Z’, where the conclusion is a value statement (because a truth judgement) and the premise is factual, yielding the systematic name 2 pre VF. Since the basis for the inference is the support of Ho Chi Minh, this is an argument from authority.

Even more so than with examples, the choice of authority one cites is revealing about oneself. Given that the authority in this case is introduced by the epithet ‘hero of national liberation’, it may be suspected that the choice here is based on national promotion rather than a belief in serious epistemic authority. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the conclusion of the argument is of a vague and general kind, that unity is important, and the argument may, therefore, have been designed to say more about Ho Chi Minh and his status in Vietnam than climate change action policy.


Example 5: OPEC


At a conference about action on climate change, it may be a little surprising to find the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries present at all. Less surprising is that the points made by their representative differ somewhat from those of other delegates and are put in such a way that work is needed to draw out the full nature of the argument. The first apparent argument can be recognised as an appeal to authority:

‘The science tells us that tackling emissions has many paths. There is no one-size-fits-all solution, for countries or industries.’


Standardised form:

Tackling emissions has many paths is true, because tackling emissions has many paths is said by the science.

The choice of authority here reveals a wish to be seen to be scientific, but its vagueness is obviously problematic.

The same paragraph continues with another argument, which is hard to discern:


‘The narrative that the energy transition is from oil and other fossil fuels to renewables is misleading and potentially dangerous to a world that will continue to be thirsty for all energy sources… The adverse socio-economic impacts on developing countries due to mitigation activities should be considered’ (original emphasis).


Standardised form:

The narrative that the energy transition is from oil and other fossil fuels to renewables is dangerous because the narrative that the energy transition is from oil and other fossil fuels to renewables will have adverse socio-economic impacts on developing countries.

This reconstruction is extensive and, as a corollary, controversial. However, the form appears to be that of ‘a is x because a is y’, making it a first order predicate argument. As the premise is factual and the conclusion of value, the common name would be argument from criterion. However, that analysis leaves a sense of something’s having been missed. The narrative was also described as misleading, which might be considered a euphemism for false. If so, there is a second order argument here as well. We might also consider whether the premise is really factual rather than also evaluative:

The narrative that the energy transition is from oil and other fossil fuels to renewables is not true because the narrative that the energy transition is from oil and other fossil fuels to renewables will have socio-economic impacts on developing countries which are adverse.

This yields the form ‘q is T because q is Z’, where both parts are value statements, so 2 pre VV. The PTA has in this position the argument from utility; this instance argues from utility in reverse: the narrative is not true because the narrative lowers utility.

This example illustrates the difficulty with reaching a definitive reconstruction of a real world argument, and shows how differences in that reconstruction can lead not just to differing valuations but to differing identifications of what exactly the argument is. Without standardised reconstructions, however, it is hard to see how evaluation of any sort can take place as far as the reasoning itself is concerned.

4.2 Argument Evaluation with CAPNA

In this section, three of the arguments identified above are subjected to an assessment using the CAPNA procedure in order to arrive at an evaluation. The number is limited due to considerations of space: example 2 is not evaluated because of its similarity to example 1, and example 5 is also excluded due to the high degree of reconstruction necessary. As part of the Initial Analysis stage, as well as the identification of argument type, there is also an identification of what I refer to as argument mode. This process is not discussed in depth here, however the key features are explained.Footnote 4 Argument modes are characteristics of an argument which describe both the context and the form of its expression. The degree to which the identification of modes affects the evaluation process is largely for the individual analyst to decide: there is no guarantee that modal considerations will be relevant in the evaluation process. It is also the case that the identification of modes is in the hands of the analyst through a series of procedural questions relating to aspect of the argument’s presentation. Since modal aspects are connected largely with the situation in which the argument is put forward, the modal analysis for all the speeches in this study might be expected to be the same, but this cannot be taken for granted. There are eight pairs of modal characteristics and each assessed argument is given a binary categorisation; e.g. between public and private modes. Certain of these distinctions would apply uncontroversially to all the texts in this study: they are Dialogical, Formal, Public, Assertive, Persuasive (rhetorical), and Epistemological (not Explanatory). To a large extent, they are Collaborative, not Antagonistic, although the analyst must always be aware that this may be only true on the surface. The final distinction is between Demonstrative and Justificatory arguments. Demonstrative arguments are understood as those ‘where the act of engaging in argument is itself a demonstration of a fact: of an ability or willingness to argue in that way’ (Hinton 2021a: 76). The claim being made here is that many of the arguments found in the speeches are largely, or at least partly, demonstrative acts designed to express and represent an identity rather than justify support for a particular standpoint.

Identity-affirming arguments are labelled Demonstrative because the act of making them has the effect of demonstrating a truth – that one associates oneself with some identity or value group – rather than, or as well as, providing a justification for the truth of the argument’s conclusion. This categorisation must take into account the intended audience: if one knows that all of one’s audience is already in agreement with one’s position or that they are all vehemently opposed to one’s basic premises, then the making of the argument takes on the nature of a demonstration, rather than an attempt to persuade or enlighten.

Although the distinction between the opposite characteristics is presented as a binary one, there is no reason why analysis cannot proceed with a question mark hanging over part of the modal description. The description is designed to assist the analyst, not to provide a definitive and definite characterisation of the argument. Just as with the identification of type, the identification of mode can aid in both the selection of questions and the interpretation of answers: an argument which is Private and Monological need not be held to norms of Politeness, for instance; an argument which is Erotetic should be treated differently in terms of norms of Completeness since by necessity it relies on implication rather than direct statement of propositions.

The CAPNA, then, does recognise demonstrative arguments, and is, theoretically, adaptable to accommodate them. The question remains, however, whether the norms upon which the procedure is based are flexible enough to be applied meaningfully to arguments of this type. The discussion in Sect. 4.3, coming after the evaluations in this section, will attempt to provide an answer.

One of the key points to stress about the practical application of the CAPNA is that the analyst is not duty-bound to doggedly progress through every possible question in a fixed order, although an inexperienced person may find that the best way to proceed. Rather, in using the procedure one is free to first put the PQs to which one suspects the argument is most vulnerable. If a fallacy is discovered, one may choose whether to reject the argument and cease analysis or continue to look at other aspects for a fuller understanding. If no fallacy is found, one may concede that the argument is indeed acceptable, or continue to probe to find a weakness which was not immediately apparent. In the analyses below, only certain key PQs are raised: it can be stated at once that none of the samples contains impolite language, and that there were no rules of permissibility in operation, for instance.

It should also be noted that while reconstruction into a standardised form was necessary for the ATIP and remains useful in the Reasoning analysis stage, it is the original form of the argument which is under analysis during the Process and Language stages.


Example 1

‘40 years of privatisation and marketisation has led to broken communities, economy inequality, and environmental injustice on a planetary scale.’


Process Analysis:

Pertinence:

PQ: Does the argument address the topic at issue?—No.

PQ: Does the argument introduce new topics to change the subject?—Yes.

PQ: Does the argument fulfil the role assigned to the arguer?—Yes?

If the topic at issue is understood to be action to address climate change, then this argument commits a fallacy of pertinence. However, if the mode is Demonstrative, the change in topic may be justified, particularly if the role assigned is understood to be representative.


Reasoning Analysis:

Premise:

PQ: Is it true/acceptable that there has been 40 years of privatisation and marketisation?

Within the UK context it is true that Margaret Thatcher’s government began a major privatisation programme with the partial sale of British Aerospace in 1981, followed by utilities such as British Telecom and British Gas. It is also true that successive governments have introduced ‘market forces’ to areas of public service such as health and education. It is far less clear whether this claim can be maintained on a global scale, but, since the period cited includes the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the move towards a form of capitalism in China, the premise can probably be allowed.

Lever:

PQ: Is 40 years of privatisation and marketisation a cause of broken communities, economy inequality, and environmental injustice on a planetary scale?

This is, clearly, a complex question. Not only is the answer not obvious, it may well not exist in any verifiable form. Without strong backing, it is hard to accept that this lever has sufficient force to deliver an acceptable conclusion. However, if we employ the concept of ‘condensed arguments’ and their acknowledgement within certain communities, we may conclude that for a particular audience the linking of privatisation and marketisation with economic ills, and perhaps environmental ones, does not require further support.


Language Analysis:

Clarity:

PQ: Is the language precise enough to be meaningful?—Yes

PQ: Is the language precise enough for the purposes of the argument?—Yes?

The argument can certainly be understood, but the second question poses a problem. If the argument is assumed to be contributing to the debate on action on climate change, then the vagueness of the terms ‘broken communities’ and ‘environmental injustice’, plus the lack of detail on the privatisation and marketisation being referred to, would suggest that more precision was required. However, if the purpose is taken to be one of identity expression, then language in the form of vague slogans may be considered acceptable.

Evaluation: In the Justificatory mode, this argument violates norms of language and dialectic by committing Pertinence and Clarity fallacies, it also has a weak inference lever, casting doubt on its compliance with norms of cogency. In the Demonstrative mode, however, these problems may be ignored in the interests of political norms of representation. The argument qualifies as an identity argument as it both supports the position of the speaker in his role as representative and appeals to a principle around which the identity of those he represents is formed.


Example 3

‘Some of us have argued that reducing greenhouse gas emissions while achieving economic and social well-being is incompatible. Liechtenstein can serve as an example to prove the opposite’.


Process Analysis:

Pertinence:

PQ: Does the argument address the topic at issue?—Yes.

As the argument directly address the issue of greenhouse gas emissions, there is no doubt as to its pertinence in terms of topic relevance. However, the second sub-section is that of discourse relevance.

  • PQ: If the argument is a response, does it accurately characterise the original argument?—Yes?

The phrase ‘some of us have argued’ is vague, however, even without looking through the course of the whole debate, it seems quite reasonable to assume that the incompatibility referred to was a real problem at the meeting. Certainly, the contribution from OPEC cited above warned of the economic dangers of the shift away from fossil fuels.


Reasoning Analysis:

Premise:

PQ: Is it true/acceptable that Liechtenstein has reduced greenhouse gas emissions while achieving economic and social well-being?

This is an empirical claim which can easily be checked. At this point we may take His Serene Highness’s word for it; our eventual acceptance of the argument, however, may be conditional on the production of evidence to support the claim.

Lever:

PQ: Is Liechtenstein’s reduction of greenhouse gas emissions while achieving economic and social well-being an example showing that other countries can reduce greenhouse gases while achieving economic and social well-being?.

Examples are useful to show possibility. If Liechtenstein has done something, that shows the possibility that a state can do it. The question here is over the relevance of the example to the representatives of other countries. Liechtenstein is atypical in both size and wealth. Crucially, social and economic well-being were already in place before the movement to reduce emissions began. Poorer countries would find an example of a country which reduced emissions while lifting its people out of poverty more relevant. This is a point which is brought out more clearly in the language analysis.


Language Analysis:

The phrasing of this argument leaves it exposed to doubt on a number of semantic points. The same issues might be identified by an analysis of clarity or consistency:

Clarity:

PQ: Have words been used outside of their accepted semantic range?—Yes.

Consistency:

PQ: Does any term feature more than once in the argument?—Yes.

PQ: Is the meaning of the term exactly the same in all instances?—No?

There is a need to look more closely at the meaning of the phrase ‘achieving economic and social well-being’. In the case of Liechtenstein, the word ‘achieving’ seems to be used in the sense of ‘maintaining’, which is somewhat unusual. If the conclusion is to be applied to poorer states who do not have that well-being currently, then ‘achieving’ takes on its more familiar meaning of ‘gaining’. A clearer rephrase of the argument then would say that it is possible to gain such well-being while reducing emissions because Liechtenstein maintained well-being while doing so. The Prince, therefore, has either committed a fallacy of consistency or argued only that rich countries with high levels of well-being can reduce their emissions without losing those advantages. In any case, the use of ‘achieving’ here is odd enough to arouse suspicions.

Evaluation: Again, if we assume a ‘standard’ function, this argument has a weak lever because it provides a largely irrelevant example, and that weakness is exposed further by close examination at the language level, which shows that an equivocation is necessary to make it seem more relevant. However, from a rhetorical, representational perspective, the argument is successful in making it known that Liechtenstein has reduced emissions and is still rich. The question we have to consider, however, is does that make it an acceptable argument or just a clever boast?

In any case, the argument may be seen as an attempt at boosting national pride and proclaiming a distinct national identity for a small nation. By referring to the achievements of his own nation, rather than the global problem at hand, His Serene Highness reinforces both his position as a leader and representative of his country, and the identity of Liechtensteiners within the world community. The argument can be judged as acceptable for the role of the speaker, particularly if we consider his target audience to be the citizens of his own country.


Example 4

‘President Ho Chi Minh, the hero of national liberation and world’s man of culture, once said: “Unity, unity, great unity. Success, success, great success.” If we are to succeed in the global fight against climate change, global solidarity is the only way.’


Process Analysis:

An experienced analyst will suspect that arguments from authority are unlikely to be fallacies of proof—because an authority is given as proof—or of productivity—because they cite a fact which is not logically related to the conclusion. The argument concerns the fight against climate change, and does not refer to any other part of the general discourse, so there is no problem with pertinence, and there is nothing which might be considered impolite or inadmissible. We can, therefore, move on to the next stage.


Reasoning Analysis:

Premise:

PQ: Is it true that Ho Chi Minh once said that solidarity is necessary for success?

There are two elements to the answer to this question. Did Ho Chi Minh say the quotation being ascribed to him, and does that statement say or imply that solidarity is necessary for success? The first presumably could be answered, but not easily, given that we are not told when or where this statement was made: it is possible that it is well known in Vietnam. There is a sense, however, in which citations from legendary or heroic figures do not actually need to be genuine: the force comes from the wisdom in the words and the supposed speaker of them is only there to lend that air.Footnote 5 The second is a matter of interpretation. The citation is, presumably, a translation. We can only analyse what is before us, and there is only an implied relationship between the unity and the success. Let us assume for the moment, however, that Ho Chi Minh did say something to the effect suggested by the speaker.

Lever:

PQ: Is Ho Chi Minh’s saying that solidarity is necessary for success authoritative evidence that global solidarity is necessary for success in the fight against climate change?

The critical questions to be asked of arguments from authority are well-known and much studied. Walton’s questions for expert opinions could be employed, but it makes little sense here to ask if Ho Chi Minh’s opinion was based on evidence and in agreement with other experts. We might point out that fighting climate change was not his field, that he had no qualifications in climate science. More generously, we might note that Ho Chi Minh was a successful military and political leader who achieved an unlikely victory over the USA through great sacrifice and, presumably, unity.

This all seems to rather miss the point though. Whenever one cites an authority, one is putting one’s faith in that authority in a public way—a link is made between that person and oneself as much as the issue at hand. From an epistemic point of view, we want our authority to be the best expert possible; from a rhetorical view, we want them to be the most persuasive; but from an identity expression or representational stance, we want them to say as much as possible about our own attitudes. The Vietnamese delegate would have been well aware that being a ‘hero of national liberation’ or indeed ‘world’s man of culture’ did not make Ho Chi Minh an expert on climate change. He would also have been aware that the global audience, in particular the capitalist West, was unlikely to be much persuaded by what the former president had to say. His appeal to the authority of his country’s national hero then may either be seen as an uncomfortable reminder to its former colonial oppressors, or an invocation to national pride for the audience at home.


Language Analysis:

Given the nature of the citation, it is difficult to know whether there may be equivocations on the words ‘unity’ and ‘success’: we don’t know the original context, or the original language. There is no other obvious problem with the linguistic expression though.

Evaluation: This is an example of the interesting type of argument which appears to be strong simply because few would doubt the conclusion anyway. It isn’t quite a tautology to say that for the world to succeed, the world must work together, but when it comes to a borderless climate, it’s fairly obvious. Does Ho Chi Minh’s having said so make it more obvious? No. In a more serious policy discussion, this may bring us back to doubts about the process—is the argument pertinent, is it productive?—but here we may characterise it as a strong claim being made with weak reasoning. The true goal of the arguer, then, is to link that reasoning, the authority of Ho Chi Minh, with the truth of the conclusion—something which it achieves.

Similarly to example 3, there appears to be a goal here of enhancing national pride and identity, but the reference to Ho Chi Minh also allows the speaker to identify with the political movement of which he was a part and the historical events which he influenced. The image of Vietnam as a distinct culture with its own heroes and history is established, as is the position of the speaker as a representative of that society and that political heritage.

4.3 Discussion

Some theorists may feel that these examples don’t qualify as arguments at all if they are not intended to persuade or to resolve a dispute. They certainly involve the expression of reasoning, however, which brings them firmly into the scope of the CAPNA procedure. That procedure is, however, mainly designed according to more traditional norms and I would suggest that there is always a point in evaluating arguments according to ‘standard’ function norms. They tell us much about the type of argumentation the speaker has chosen to use, whatever ends they may have.

The evaluations all bring out one crucial aspect which has not been mentioned so far—the audience. When the mode of arguing is rhetorical, the audience is always crucial, and in political discourse particularly, it cannot be assumed. The speeches in this study were delivered to a live audience, but we may doubt whether those present constituted the true audience. Much of the conference was also televised, meaning that the audience could be understood as the world at large, or perhaps the words were addressed only to a certain consistency—unionists, religious believers, or the citizens of one country. At every level of analysis, the CAPNA needs to keep in mind the identity of the likely audience as this will affect the acceptability of all aspects of the argument.

The necessity to promote both correctness and participation means that arguments designed to ensure that a broad range of views and interests are seen to participate in the discussion cannot be simply dismissed. The most important asset a system of evaluation can possess in this situation is flexibility. The procedure should be capable of adapting itself to provide a range of assessments depending on how the argument’s mode, audience, and objective are characterised. It should also be remembered that the analyst becomes a recipient of the text when addressing the argument, even if not part of the intended audience.

Any evaluation is always contingent on the evaluator. We may not be able to know the intentions of the arguer, but we do know our own intentions when we come to analyse, assess and pass judgement on what they have produced. It makes little sense to ask which normative framework is best or proper for the evaluation of public policy argument, or indeed any other type of argument. The best framework will depend on the goals of the evaluator. In fact, we may come to believe that as much can be learnt about the attitudes and identity of the evaluator as of the arguer: just as choice of argument form and evidence presented reveal much about those making the arguments, so the choice of norms applied in their evaluation speaks eloquently of the nature of the judge.

5 Conclusion

The questions of identity and self-image in relation to arguments offered and argumentation strategies employed require an extended research project of their own. Within this work it was simply assumed that arguments are used in some way to express identity and represent groups, on the basis of the theoretical and experimental work discussed in Sect. 2. The task here was to consider whether an analysis and evaluation of such arguments according to the normative frameworks usually applied to argumentation in the ‘standard’ function is in any way meaningful, practicable, and informative.

A good deal of the argumentation used in the texts analysed herein appears to be based on an intention, and thus to have a function, which is non-standard, although the difficulty in making judgements on these matters is recognised. This made these passages interesting instances for study and for testing how norms can be applied in such cases.

I believe that the analyses and evaluations carried out on the arguments found in speeches at the COP 26 climate conference show that even when reasoning is expressed with a purpose more representational than persuasive and to an audience both uncertain and remote, the sensitive application of standard norms can be revealing and allow us to understand the nature of the argument and its inferential strength. The flexibility which is inherent in the CAPNA tool allows for evaluations to be tailored somewhat to the mode of arguing employed, without drawing the analyst into making definitive claims about the intentions of the arguer.

Doubtless, there is a good deal of the rhetorical and representational force of these speeches which is not captured and evaluated by this procedure. Doubtless too, the CAPNA can be further developed and improved to make evaluations of increasing subtlety and greater relevance. Most importantly of all, better understanding of the identity/argument relation will yield better comprehension of the value, success, and acceptability of instances of argumentation which are motivated by it. Nonetheless, the evaluations given in Sect. 4 were informative and there is, I believe, reason to think this work is worth pursuing.