-
Don't Lie to Me about Fictional Characters: Meinongian Incomplete Objects to the Rescue of Truth in Fiction
- Philosophy and Literature
- Johns Hopkins University Press
- Volume 46, Number 1, April 2022
- pp. 162-180
- 10.1353/phl.2022.0009
- Article
- Additional Information
- Purchase/rental options available:
Abstract:
Can the claim "Sherlock Holmes is a detective" be true if no object exists that has this property? Is it true that he is a fictional character and that he does not exist? My answers are based on Alexius Meinong's theory of objects. In contrast to other Meinongians, I argue that employing other possible worlds poses ontological problems and that existence is not a property of objects. Since we think of objects by means of only some, but not all, of their properties, incomplete objects function as auxiliaries. Holmes can thus be both, detective and fictional character, while not existing.