Abstract
In this article, I examine what Kant’s Formula of Universal Law requires of an individual agent in situations of great need, e.g.: if you can easily help a drowning child, or if you know of a famine situation in another country. I first explain why I do not simply apply the standard interpretation of how one can derive concrete duties from Kant’s Universal Law formulation of the Categorical Imperative. I then glean an alternative procedure from Kant’s texts and give the reasons for using that interpretation. Finally, I apply the alternative procedure to situations of great need. – According to the interpretation I glean from Kant’s texts, one (i) should not make an exception to (ii) laws that we believe to be objectively necessary, whereby we derive these rules from (iii) universal ends of humankind. Since we take survival as one of the universal ends of mankind, we deem helping someone whose life is in danger as objectively necessary (to achieve the end). The formal Categorical Imperative demands that one does not make an exception to this rule. Applying this interpretation to cases of great need depends on at least three factors: (i) how urgent the need is, (ii) how great the costs are to the one who helps, and (iii) how many people can help. But at one extreme, where you are the only one who can easily save an innocent person’s life, the Kantian procedure generates a strict duty to help the other in need.
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Notes
Unless stated otherwise, all translations refer to the Cambridge Edition of Kant’s work, general editors P. Guyer and A. Wood, and all references cite volume and page number of the Academy Edition of Kant’s works (de Gruyter 1912-) or the original pagination of the Critique of Pure Reason [KrV].
Interestingly, Kant should have been aware of this objection since it appears in Achenwall and Wernher, cf. Hruschka 1992.
Notice that throughout Kant’s writings maxims are not confined to general statements and come in all shapes and sizes.
Cf. Herman 1993, pp. 45–72. But it is not clear that she would endorse all that follows. One difference between our accounts seems to be that she restricts the relevant human needs to ones that support rationality, cf. pp. 55, 67.
I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
For a parallel structure see Pufendorf 1763, pp. 1–67.
Kant: “Remarks in the Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and Sublime”.
In this respect, we often read Kant through the lens of Marcus Singer (cf. Gillessen 2014, pp. 15–19).
“Announcement of the Programme of his Lectures for the Winter Semester 1765-66”.
However, a religious community might object to playing tennis during church time.
The alternative procedure meets the charge that the Categorical Imperative is empty as Kant can grant this point, cf. again Vigil 27:578.
I thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point.
This, I take it, follows from Kant’s starting point that I would want to be helped in the situation (cf. MS 6:393).
And there will be others, e.g., how close someone is to you (cf. MS 6:451-2). We believe that you are more obligated towards your own child than the child of a stranger (other things being equal).
I am again referring to Kant’s and Pufendorf’s starting point of moral considerations, see above.
The Categorical Imperative will demand that what is valid for one is valid for all in like circumstances, cf. Kant: On the Common Saying: That May Ce Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice 8:297n.
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Acknowledgements
For their helpful written comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I would like to thank Violetta Igneski, Martin Sticker, Garrath Williams, Ariel Zylberman, as well as two anonymous reviewers for this journal. I am also grateful to the audiences of two conferences at the University of Bochum, Germany, as well as an online conference hosted in Bristol, UK. This research was supported from the Russian Federal Academic Leadership Program Priority 2030 at the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University.
Funding
This research was supported from the Russian Federal Academic Leadership Program Priority 2030 at the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University.
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Sensen, O. Universal Law and Poverty Relief. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 26, 177–190 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10281-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10281-0