Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

Sustainability, Justice and Corporate Law: Redistributing Corporate Rights and Duties to Meet the Challenge of Sustainability

  • Article
  • Published:
European Business Organization Law Review Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Sustainability is the main challenge for humanity. The current climate crisis and growing inequality are both the direct consequence of human choices and activities, particularly through the corporation. Addressing these challenges requires clarity on what we mean by sustainability and justice and precisely how the corporation contributes to the situation. Both sustainability and justice have geographic and time dimensions. Law, however, is limited because it is largely jurisdictionally based and corporate law is heavily short-term orientated. This set of circumstances creates an imperative to consider how the issue can be resolved including changes to the long-standing institutions of corporate law. This paper considers the sustainability challenges and places them in the context of justice. It argues for corporate reforms of board and shareholder structures such that rights and duties are redistributed to parties with greater interests in sustainability and justice. It then explores how that could be done and the corporation re-normed to better serve society.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Green (1977). See further development in Barry (1997).

  2. Rouch (2020).

  3. Micheler (2021).

  4. Chiu (2021).

  5. Federal Constitutional Court (2021).

  6. Sjåfjell and Bruner (2020).

  7. Arfken and Yen (2014).

  8. Steensma and Vermunt (2013), Vermunt and Steensma (1991).

  9. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-10-23/china-climate-change-security-water-renewables-carbon-neutrality/12772034?utm_source=abc_news_web&utm_medium=content_shared&utm_content=mail&utm_campaign=abc_news_web (accessed 9 December 2021).

  10. See, for example, the dialogue in Plato (360 BCE), Bk 1.

  11. Quoted in Berry (1971).

  12. Gómez-Baggethun and Naredo (2015), p 385.

  13. Sjåfjell et al. (2015).

  14. Sheehy (2017a).

  15. Heede (2014).

  16. Vitali et al. (2011).

  17. Heede (2014).

  18. Griffin (2017).

  19. Fuchs (2007), Sapinski (2016).

  20. Consider, for example, Chevron and Exxon-Mobil’s concerted disinformation campaign supporting the climate change denial industry, Dunlap and McCright (2011).

  21. Greenfield (2005), p 39.

  22. See, for example, Eckersley (1992).

  23. Boulding (1966).

  24. Meadows et al. (1972).

  25. Norton and Toman (1997), p 555, Daly and Cobb Jr. (1989). Ecological and other heterodox economists make an important contribution. See Røpke (2005). Barry explains the rationale sharply in Barry (1997), pp 51-4. McAfee (2019) offers an optimistic case and method for reconciling aspects of this discourse.

  26. Lozano et al. (2015).

  27. See discussion in Bañon Gomis et al. (2011).

  28. Barry (1997), p 54.

  29. Bañon Gomis et al. (2011).

  30. See discussion in Bañon Gomis et al. (2011).

  31. Bañon Gomis et al. (2011), p 176.

  32. Sjåfjell and Bruner (2020), p 11.

  33. Barry (1997), p 44.

  34. Caney (2009), p 164.

  35. For justification, I am using Scanlon’s contractarian test. Contractarianism describes as just those actions and policies which are justifiable to another person on grounds to which the latter could not reasonably object. It places two criteria for justice: first, a person must be harmed by an action or policy, and second, the complaint about the harm must be unanswerable. Scanlon (1998).

  36. Sheehy (2004a).

  37. Weisbach and Sunstein (2008).

  38. Rawls (1999), p 3.

  39. Lamont and Favor (2017).

  40. As opposed to ‘universally’ which has been the quest of philosophers over the millennia.

  41. Initially identified in Aristotle, Book V, paras. 3:1131a-4:1132b. See Lamont (1941).

  42. Scanlon (1998).

  43. Rokeach (1973).

  44. Page (1999).

  45. Rawls (1958).

  46. Sheehy (2004a, b-5).

  47. Contractarianism has its roots in Hobbes, whose account is based on mutual self-interest, whereas Rousseau saw contractualism as being based on egalitarianism.

  48. An emerging third camp, in which differentiated application is justified depending on the nature of the issue under examination, appears to be underway. This paper does not need to address it given the clear global nature of the problem.

  49. Eckersley (2016), p 358, Meyer and Roser (2006).

  50. Barry (1997), p 49.

  51. Kant (1983), p 119.

  52. Della Porta et al. (2015), pp 6-7.

  53. Valentini (2011), p 2.

  54. Brock (2017).

  55. Understanding the differences between these concepts of sustainability and sustainable development is important, Sheehy and Farneti (2021).

  56. Chiu and Donovan (2017).

  57. Green (1977). See further development in Barry (1997).

  58. Green (1977).

  59. Ibid.

  60. Ibid.

  61. Page (1999).

  62. Ibid., p 55.

  63. Shelley’s Case 1579-81 1 Co. Rep. 88b, 76 ER 199. For scholarly treatment, see Smith (2009).

  64. Duke of Norfolk’s Case 1682 3 Ch Cas 1; 22 ER 931. For scholarly treatment, see Haskins (1977) and, of course, the classic tome Gray (2003), originally published in 1915.

  65. Writing on the Duke’s case, Haskins stated: ‘[The] case marked the climax of a long struggle between the conveyancers, who wanted more freedom for the landed classes to control their estates, and the royal judges who had stood firm against those efforts for centuries. The conclusion seems inescapable that the conveyancers and their clients, not the judges, were the ultimate victors’, Haskins (1977), p 21.

  66. de Sadeleer (2002), Gaines (1991). See also Larson (2005).

  67. Barry (1997), p 51.

  68. Sheehy (2019), p 275.

  69. de Sadeleer (2002), p 61.

  70. Meadows et al. (1972).

  71. Sheehy (2019), p 276.

  72. Easterbrook and Fischel (1991).

  73. Milieudefensie v Royal Dutch Shell RDS, 25 May 2021, The Hague, at para. 2.4.2. ECLI:NL:RBDHA: 2021:5339.

  74. Translated by the BBC.

  75. Amelang et al. (2021).

  76. Kanbur (2019).

  77. McAfee (2019).

  78. Maitland (1893).

  79. Wormser (1931).

  80. A better view is the real person theory. Micheler (2021).

  81. Horwitz (1977), Ireland (2001).

  82. Stout et al. (2016).

  83. Sheehy (2017a).

  84. Bottomley (2007), chapter 5.

  85. Set out in Sheehy (2016).

  86. Hansmann and Kraakman (2004). See argument in Cary (1974).

  87. Jones and Felps (2013).

  88. Sheehy (2017a).

  89. Ireland (2005), Smith (1997).

  90. See Abstract in Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers (European Commission) (2020), p i.

  91. Bratton (1989), Bratton and Wachter (2008).

  92. Piketty (2014).

  93. Sheehy (2004a).

  94. Arrow (1963).

  95. Greenwood (2005).

  96. Hilling and Ostas (2017).

  97. See, for example, Sheehy et al. (2021).

  98. Laufer (2006), Ostas (2004).

  99. See discussion in Hilling and Ostas (2017).

  100. There exists a whole literature on the topic and this empowerment of the corporation as a political actor has been to a large degree the work of the courts attributing the rights developed for human citizens to corporate citizens.

  101. Galanter (1974).

  102. Carpenter and Moss (2013).

  103. Milieudefensie v Royal Dutch Shell RDS, 25 May 2021, The Hague, at para. 2.4.2. ECLI:NL:RBDHA: 2021:5339., para. 4.4.16

  104. Heede (2014), Vitali et al. (2011), Sheehy (2017b).

  105. Mac Sheoin (2014).

  106. Soule (2009).

  107. This view opposes the economic explanation of the corporation as being the natural and logical outcome of efficient allocation of risk and reward. Ireland (2017).

  108. Sheehy (2004a).

  109. Eckersley (2016), p 346.

  110. Sheehy (2004a).

  111. Ireland (2018).

  112. Sheehy (2004–2005).

  113. Wormser (1931).

  114. Bakan (2004).

  115. Barry (1997), p 64.

  116. Polanyi (1944, 2001).

  117. Amstutz (2011).

  118. Sheehy (2017b).

  119. Greenfield (2005), p 39.

  120. Sheehy (2004–2005).

  121. Bottomley (2007).

  122. Barry (1997), p 50.

  123. Greenfield (2005).

  124. Ibid., p 17.

  125. Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers (European Commission) (2020).

  126. Ibid., p 40, along with market pressures and the shareholder primacy norm.

  127. Ibid., p 47, at 4.3.1 General and specific policy objectives.

  128. Ibid., p 61, at 5 Assessment of options.

  129. Ibid., p 142, at 5.6.4 Assessment of option C6, which entails the proposal made by the Commission.

  130. Financial Reporting Council (2018), p 5, at Board Leadership and Company Purpose, Provision 5. Sheehy (2004b).

  131. See, for examples, Pierson (2000a, 2000b), Schneiberg (2007), Schneiberg and Bartley (2008).

  132. See Greenfield (2005), p 158.

  133. Greenfield (2005).

  134. Bottomley (2007).

  135. Velasco (2009), see consideration in Reyes (2018), p 155.

  136. Sheehy (2006).

  137. The justice argument against investment in shares arises in political philosophy, most influentially put by Marx.

  138. Coffee (1991), McCahery et al. (2016).

  139. Smith (2007), p 574. See Anderson and Tollison (1982).

  140. Sheehy et al. (2021).

  141. Barry (1997), p 50.

  142. Sheehy et al. (2021).

  143. Sheehy et al. (forthcoming).

  144. Yahoo!Finance (2021).

  145. Crowley and Deveau (2021).

  146. Financial Reporting Council (2018), p 5, at Board Leadership and Company Purpose, Provision 5. Sheehy (2004b).

  147. Sheehy and Feaver (2014).

  148. Welling (2009).

  149. Sheehy (2012).

  150. Sheehy (2015), Sheehy and Farneti (2021), Sjåfjell and Bruner (2020).

  151. See discussion in Reyes (2018), pp 165-6.

  152. Sheehy (2017a, 2017b).

  153. I have argued elsewhere that these social contract principles include corporations. See Sheehy (2004–2005).

  154. Bakan (2004).

  155. Gatti and Ondersma (2020).

  156. Greenfield (2005).

  157. Ibid.

  158. Ibid.

  159. Roe (2006).

  160. Coase (1960).

  161. Ibid.

  162. Cooter (1982), Fischel (1992), Medema (2008).

  163. As, for example, Blair and Stout’s teamwork theory in Blair and Stout (2001) or Greenwood’s democratically informed vision in Greenwood (2005).

  164. Sheehy (2017a).

  165. Kwon and Salcido (2019). See also Throsby (2017).

  166. Sheehy (2004–2005).

  167. Crane and Matten (2016), Edward and Willmott (2008), Matten and Crane (2005), Néron (2016).

  168. Sheehy (2015).

  169. Ostas (2004), p 594.

  170. Hilling and Ostas (2017), p 20.

  171. Greenfield (2005), p 37.

References

  • Amelang S, Appunn K, Nijhuis C, Wettengel J (2021) ‘Top court rules German climate law falls short, in “historic” victory for youth’ 30 Apr 2021. https://www.climatechangenews.com/2021/04/30/top-court-rules-german-climate-law-falls-short-historic-victory-youth/. Accessed 15 May 2021

  • Amstutz M (2011) The double movement in global law: the case of European corporate social responsibility. In: Joerges C, Falke J (eds) Karl Polanyi, globalisation and the potential of law in transnational markets. Hart Publishing, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Anderson GM, Tollison RD (1982) Adam Smith’s analysis of joint-stock companies. J Polit Econ 90(6):1237–1256. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1830946. Accessed 2 Jun 2021

  • Arfken M, Yen J (2014) Psychology and social justice: theoretical and philosophical engagements. J Theor Philos Psychol 13(1):1–13

    Google Scholar 

  • Aristotle (2009) The Nicomachean ethics. In: Brown L, Ross D (eds) Oxford World’s Classics. OUP, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Arrow K (1963) Social choice and individual values, 2nd edn. John Wiley & Sons Inc, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Bakan J (2004) The corporation: the pathological pursuit of profit and power. Simon and Schuster, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Bañon Gomis AJ, Guillén Parra M, Hoffman WM, McNulty RE (2011) Rethinking the concept of sustainability. Bus Soc Rev 116(2):171–191

    Google Scholar 

  • Barry B (1997) Sustainability and intergenerational justice. Theoria 44(89):43–64

    Google Scholar 

  • BBC (2021) ‘German climate change law violates rights, court rules’, BBC News, 1 May 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56927010. Accessed 5 May 2021

  • Berry W (1971) The unforeseen wilderness: an essay on Kentucky’s Red River Gorge. The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington

    Google Scholar 

  • Blair M, Stout L (2001) A team production theory of corporate law. Va Law Rev 85:247–328

    Google Scholar 

  • Bottomley S (2007) Constitutional corporation: rethinking corporate governance. Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot

    Google Scholar 

  • Boulding K (1966) The economics of the coming spaceship earth. In: Jarrett H (ed) Environmental quality in a growing economy. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp 3–14

    Google Scholar 

  • Bratton W (1989) The new economic theory of the firm: critical perspectives from history. Stanf Law Rev 41:1471–1527

    Google Scholar 

  • Bratton WW, Wachter ML (2008) Shareholder primacy’s corporatist origins: Adolf Berle and ‘the modern corporation’. J Corp Law 34:99–152

    Google Scholar 

  • Brock G (2017) Global justice. In: Zalta EN (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 edn)

  • Caney S (2009) Climate change and the future: discounting for time, wealth, and risk. J Soc Philos 40(2):163–186

    Google Scholar 

  • Carpenter D, Moss DA (2013) Preventing regulatory capture: special interest influence and how to limit it. Cambridge University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Cary WL (1974) Federalism and corporate law: reflections upon Delaware. Yale Law J 83(4):663–705

    Google Scholar 

  • Chiu IHY (2021) The EU sustainable finance agenda—developing governance for double materiality in sustainability metrics. European Business Organization Law Review, this volume

  • Chiu IHY, Donovan A (2017) A new milestone in corporate regulation: procedural legalisation, standards of transnational corporate behaviour and lessons from financial regulation and anti-bribery regulation. J Corp Law Stud 17(2):427–467. https://doi.org/10.1080/14735970.2017.1312061

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coase R (1960) The problem of social cost. J Law Econ 3(1):1–44

    Google Scholar 

  • Coffee JC (1991) Liquidity versus control: the institutional investor as corporate monitor. Columbia Law Rev 91(6):1277–1368

    Google Scholar 

  • Cooter R (1982) The cost of Coase. J Leg Stud 11(1):1–33

    Google Scholar 

  • Crane A, Matten D (2016) Business ethics: managing corporate citizenship and sustainability in the age of globalization. Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Crowley K, Deveau S (2021) ‘Exxon CEO is dealt stinging setback at hands of new activist’, Bloomberg Green, 27 May 2021. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-26/tiny-exxon-investor-notches-climate-win-with-two-board-seats. Accessed 5 Jun 2021

  • Daly H, Cobb J Jr (1989) For the common good: redirecting the economy toward community, the environment, and a sustainable future. Beacon Press, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • de Sadeleer N (2002) Environmental principles: from political slogans to legal rules (S. Leubusher, Trans). Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Della Porta D, Andretta M, Calle A, Combes H, Eggert N, Giugni MG, Hadden JJ, M, Marchetti, R, (2015) Global justice movement: cross-national and transnational perspectives. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers (European Commission) (2020) Study on directors’ duties and sustainable corporate governance. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e47928a2-d20b-11ea-adf7-01aa75ed71a1/language-en#document-info. Accessed 6 May 2021

  • Dunlap RE, McCright AM (2011) Organized climate change denial. Oxf Handb Clim Chang Soc 1:144–160

    Google Scholar 

  • Easterbrook F, Fischel D (1991) The economic structure of corporate law. Harvard Univ Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Eckersley R (1992) Environmentalism and political theory: toward an ecocentric approach. Suny Press, Albany

    Google Scholar 

  • Eckersley R (2016) Responsibility for climate change as a structural injustice. In: Gabrielson T, Hall C, Meyer JM, Schlosberg D (eds) The Oxford handbook of environmental political theory. OUP, pp 346-361

  • Edward P, Willmott H (2008) Corporate citizenship: rise or demise of a myth? Acad Manag Rev 33:771–775

    Google Scholar 

  • Federal Constitutional Court. (2021) ‘Constitutional complaints against the Federal Climate Change Act partially successful’ [Press release]. https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2021/bvg21-031.html. Accessed 21 Jun 2021

  • Financial Reporting Council (2018) The UK Corporate Governance Code. https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-FINAL.PDF. Accessed 5 Jun 2021

  • Fischel DR (1992) Review: Dr. Pangloss meets the Coase theorem. The economic structure of corporate law by Frank H. Easterbrook. Harvard Law Rev 105(6):1408–1413

    Google Scholar 

  • Fuchs DA (2007) Business power in global governance. Lynne Rienner, Boulder

    Google Scholar 

  • Gaines SE (1991) The polluter-pays principle: from economic equity to environmental ethos. Tex Int’l LJ 26:463–496

    Google Scholar 

  • Galanter M (1974) Why the ‘haves’ come out ahead: speculations on the limits of legal change. Law Soc Rev 9(1):95–160

    Google Scholar 

  • Gatti M, Ondersma CD (2020) Can a broader corporate purpose redress inequality? The stakeholder approach chimera. 46 J Corp L 1 (2020)

  • Gómez-Baggethun E, Naredo JM (2015) In search of lost time: the rise and fall of limits to growth in international sustainability policy. Sustain Sci 10(3):385–395. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-015-0308-6

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gray JC (2003) The rule against perpetuities. The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.

  • Green RM (1977) Intergenerational distributive justice and environmental responsibility. Bioscience 27(4):260–265

    Google Scholar 

  • Greenfield K (2005) The failure of corporate law: fundamental flaws and progressive possibilities. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  • Greenwood DJ (2005) Markets and democracy: the illegitimacy of corporate law. UMKC l. Rev. 74:41–104

    Google Scholar 

  • Griffin P (2017) The Carbon Majors Database: CDP Carbon Majors Report 2017. https://b8f65cb373b1b7b15feb-c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/002/327/original/Carbon-Majors-Report-2017.pdf?1499691240. Accessed 12 Apr 2019

  • Hansmann H, Kraakman R (2004) What is corporate law? Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 300

  • Haskins GL (1977) Extending the grasp of the dead hand: reflections on the origins of the rule against perpetuities. Univ Pa Law Rev 126:19–46

    Google Scholar 

  • Heede R (2014) Tracing anthropogenic carbon dioxide and methane emissions to fossil fuel and cement producers, 1854–2010. Clim Change 122(1–2):229–241. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0986-y

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hilling A, Ostas DT (2017) Corporate taxation and social responsibility. Wolters Kluwer Sverige AB, Stockholm

    Google Scholar 

  • Horwitz MJ (1977) The transformation of American law, 1780–1860. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Ireland P (2001) Defending the rentier: corporate theory and the reprivatization of the public company. In: Parkinson J, Gamble A, Kelly G (eds) The political economy of the company. Hart, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Ireland P (2005) Shareholder primacy and the distribution of wealth. Mod Law Rev 68(1):49–81

    Google Scholar 

  • Ireland P (2017) Finance and the origins of modern company law. In: Baars G, Spicer A (eds) The corporation: a critical, multi-disciplinary handbook. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Ireland P (2018) From Lonrho to BHS: the changing character of corporate governance in contemporary capitalism. King’s Law J 29:3–35

    Google Scholar 

  • Jones TM, Felps W (2013) Shareholder wealth maximization and social welfare: a utilitarian critique. Bus Ethics Q 23(2):207–238

    Google Scholar 

  • Kanbur R (2019) Inequality in a global perspective. Oxf Rev Econ Policy 35(3):431–444. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grz010

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kant I (1983) Perpetual peace and other essays. Hackett Publishing

  • Katelouzou D, Micheler E (2021) Investor capitalism, sustainable business and the role of tax relief. European Business Organization Law Review, this volume

  • Kwon R, Salcido B (2019) Does a rising tide lift all boats? Liberalization and real incomes in advanced industrial societies. Soc Sci Res 79:127–140. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2019.01.006

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lamont W (1941) Justice: distributive and corrective. Philosophy 16(61):3–18

    Google Scholar 

  • Lamont J, Favor C (2017) Distributive justice. In: Zalta EN (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 edn)

  • Larson ET (2005) Why environmental liability regimes in the United States, the European Community, and Japan have grown synonymous with the polluter pays principle. Vanderbilt J Transnatl Law 38:541–575

    Google Scholar 

  • Laufer WS (2006) Corporate bodies and guilty minds: the failure of corporate criminal liability. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  • Lozano R, Carpenter A, Huisingh D (2015) A review of ‘theories of the firm’ and their contributions to corporate sustainability. J Clean Prod 106:430–442. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2014.05.007

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mac Sheoin T (2014) Transnational anti-corporate campaigns: fail often, fail better. Soc Just 41(1/2 (135-136)):198–226. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24361598. Accessed 2 Aug 2019

  • Maitland F (1893) The corporation aggregate: the history of a legal idea. Cambridge

  • Matten D, Crane A (2005) Corporate citizenship: toward an extended theoretical conceptualization. Acad Manag Rev 30(1):166–179. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20159101. Accessed 9 Sept 2016

  • McAfee A (2019) More from less. Simon & Schuster, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • McCahery JA, Sautner Z, Starks LT (2016) Behind the scenes: the corporate governance preferences of institutional investors. J Financ 71(6):2905–2932

    Google Scholar 

  • Meadows DH, Meadows DH, Randers J, Behrens III WW (1972) The limits to growth. https://donellameadows.org/wp-content/userfiles/Limits-to-Growth-digital-scan-version.pdf. Accessed 4 May 2021

  • Medema S (2008) Ronald Coase as a dissenting economist. Studi e Note Di Economia 13:427–448

    Google Scholar 

  • Meyer LH, Roser D (2006) Distributive justice and climate change. The allocation of emission rights. Analyse & Kritik 28(2):223–249

    Google Scholar 

  • Micheler E (2021) Company law—a real entity theory, 14 April 2021. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3783696 or https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3783696. Accessed 9 Dec 2021

  • Néron P-Y (2016) Rethinking the ethics of corporate political activities in a post-citizens united era: political equality, corporate citizenship, and market failures. J Bus Ethics 136(4):715–728. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-015-2867-y

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Norton BG, Toman MA (1997) Sustainability: ecological and economic perspectives. Land Econ 73(4):553–568

    Google Scholar 

  • Ostas DT (2004) Cooperate, comply, or evade? A corporate executive’s social responsibilities with regard to law. Am Bus Law J 41(4):559–594. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-1714.2004.04104004.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Page E (1999) Intergenerational justice and climate change. Polit Stud 47(1):53–66

    Google Scholar 

  • Pierson P (2000a) The limits of design: explaining institutional origins and change. Gov Lnt J Policy Adm 13(4):475–499

    Google Scholar 

  • Pierson P (2000b) Path dependence, increasing returns, and the study of politics. Am Polit Sci Rev 94(2):251–267

    Google Scholar 

  • Piketty T (2014) Capital in the twenty-first century. Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Plato (1894) (360 BCE) The Republic (B. Jowett, Trans.). (1894 edn). Oxford Clarendon Press

  • Polanyi K (1944) The great transformation. Beacon Press, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls J (1958) Justice as fairness. Philos Rev 67(2):164–194

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls J (1999) A theory of justice, revised. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Reyes J (2018) Reframing corporate governance: company law beyond law and economics. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham

    Google Scholar 

  • Roe MJ (2006) Political determinants of corporate governance: political context, corporate impact. Oxford University Press on Demand

  • Rokeach M (1973) The nature of human values. The Free Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Røpke I (2005) Trends in the development of ecological economics from the late 1980s to the early 2000s. Ecol Econ 55(2):262–290

    Google Scholar 

  • Rouch D (2020) The social licence for financial markets: reaching for the end and why it counts. Palgrave Macmillan

    Google Scholar 

  • Sapinski JP (2016) Constructing climate capitalism: corporate power and the global climate policy-planning network. Glob Netw 16(1):89–111

    Google Scholar 

  • Scanlon T (1998) What we owe to each other. Harvard University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Schneiberg M (2007) What’s on the path? Path dependence, organizational diversity and the problem of institutional change in the US economy, 1900–1950. Soc Econ Rev 5(1):47–80. https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwl006

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schneiberg M, Bartley T (2008) Organizations, regulation, and economic behavior: regulatory dynamics and forms from the nineteenth to twenty-first century. Ann Rev Law Soc Sci 4:31–61

    Google Scholar 

  • Sheehy B (2004a) Corporations and social costs: the Wal-Mart case study. J Law Commer 24:1–55

    Google Scholar 

  • Sheehy B (2004b) The importance of corporate models: economic and jurisprudential values and the future of corporate law. DePaul Bus Commer Law J 2(3):463–513

    Google Scholar 

  • Sheehy B (2004–2005) Corporation and the lateral obligations of the social contract. Newctle Law Rev 8(2):29-42

  • Sheehy B (2006) Shareholders, unicorns and stilts: an analysis of shareholder property rights. J Corp Law Stud 6(1):165–212

    Google Scholar 

  • Sheehy B (2012) Understanding CSR: an empirical study of private self-regulation. Monash Univ Law Rev 38(2):103–127

    Google Scholar 

  • Sheehy B (2015) Defining CSR: problems and solutions. J Bus Ethics 131(3):625–648. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2281-x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sheehy B (2016) Explaining the corporation to non-specialists: a graphic approach. Univ West Aust 40(2):69–84

    Google Scholar 

  • Sheehy B (2017a) Conceptual and institutional interfaces among CSR, corporate law and the problem of social costs. Va Law Bus J 12(1):95–145

    Google Scholar 

  • Sheehy B (2017b) Private and public corporate regulatory systems: does CSR provide a systemic alternative to public law? Univ Calif Davis Bus Law J 17:1–55

    Google Scholar 

  • Sheehy B (2019) CSR and environmental law: concepts, intersections, and limitations. In: McWilliams A, Rupp DE, Siegel DS, Stahl GK, Waldman DA (eds) The Oxford handbook of corporate social responsibility, 2nd edn. OUP, Oxford, pp 261–282

    Google Scholar 

  • Sheehy B, Farneti F (2021) Corporate social responsibility, sustainability, sustainable development and corporate sustainability: what is the difference, and does it matter? Sustainability 13(11):5965. https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/11/5965. Accessed 7 Jun 2021

  • Sheehy B, Feaver DP (2014) Anglo-American directors’ legal duties and CSR: prohibited, permitted or prescribed? Dalhousie Law J 37(1):347–395

    Google Scholar 

  • Sheehy B, Pender H, Diaz-Granados J (forthcoming) Restraint of shareholder voice in Australia: corporate governance, corporate law and politics. Aust J Corp Law

  • Sheehy B, Pender H, Jacobson B (2021) Corporate social responsibility/ESG shareholder activism in Australia: a case study of the Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility (ACCR). Australian Journal of Corporate Law 36(2):156–177

    Google Scholar 

  • Sjåfjell B, Bruner CM (2020) Corporations and sustainability. In: Sjåfjell B, Bruner CM (eds) The Cambridge handbook of corporate law, corporate governance and sustainability. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 1–12

    Google Scholar 

  • Sjåfjell B, Johnston A, Anker-Sørensen L, Millon D (2015) Shareholder primacy: the main barrier to sustainable companies. In: Sjåfjell B, Richardson BJ (eds) Company law and sustainability. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 79–147

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith A (2007) An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations (Soares SM, ed). Metalibri Digital Library, Amsterdam, Lausanne, Melbourne, Milan, New York, São Paulo

  • Smith DA (2009) Was there a rule in Shelley’s Case? J Legal Hist 30(1):53–70

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith DG (1997) The shareholder primacy norm. J CorP l 23:277–322

    Google Scholar 

  • Soule S (2009) Contention and corporate social responsibility. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Steensma H, Vermunt R (2013) Social justice in human relations. Volume 2: societal and psychological consequences of justice and injustice. Springer Science & Business Media

  • Stout LA, Robé J-P, Ireland P, Deakin SF, Greenfield K, Johnston A, Schepel H, Blair MM, Talbot LE, Dignam AJ, Dine J, Millon DK, Sjåfjell B, Villiers CL, Williams CA, Koutsias M, Pendleton A, Davis GF, Galanis M, Chandler D, Keay AR, Moore MT, Du Plessis J, Bather AJ, Lefler BL, Bradshaw C, Bruner CM, Joo TW, Greenwood DJH, Clarke T, Johnson L, Mulazzi F, Lipton M, Liao C, Johnson R, Alon-Beck A, Markel G, Currie W, Partnoy F, Peklar LF, Di Miceli da Silveira A, Sitbon O, González-Cantón C, Chanteau J-P, Franco Donaggio AR, Esser I-M, North G, Gramitto Ricci SA, Tomasic RA, Pillay RG, O'Kelly C, Keating C, Willmott HC, Veldman J, Morrow P (2016) The modern corporation statement on company law. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2848833 or https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2848833. Accessed 8 Dec 2021

  • Throsby D (2017) A rising tide raises all boats. In: Frey BS, Iselin D (eds) Economic ideas you should forget. Springer, pp 149–150

  • Valentini L (2011) Justice in a globalized world: a normative framework. Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Velasco J (2009) How many fiduciary duties are there in corporate law? S Cal l Rev 83:1231–1318

    Google Scholar 

  • Vermunt R, Steensma H (eds) (1991) Social justice in human relations. Societal and psychological origins of justice, vol 1

  • Vitali S, Glattfelder JB, Battiston S (2011) The network of global corporate control. PLoS ONE 6(10):e25995. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0025995

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weisbach D, Sunstein CR (2008) Climate change and discounting the future: a guide for the perplexed. Yale L Pol’y Rev 27:433–457

    Google Scholar 

  • Welling B (2009) Corporate social responsibility—a well-meaning but unworkable concept. Corporate Governance eJournal. http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgej/15. Accessed 25 Mar 2019

  • Wormser I (1931) Frankenstein, incorporated. McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Yahoo!Finance (2021) ‘UPDATE 2-Chevron investors back proposal for more emissions cuts’. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/1-chevron-shareholders-approve-proposal-171654107.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYmluZy5jb20v&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAABFySPH6KSNkaB6iIjPrb1UP9Qy7jLp6BiSoWkmLZgiDB_mD40ier55-Kzmi5Ky7Z4hhYExb8_5sLsgw36jkzJG_0KqWN4Gipwf0jApjzPJCJd3LR5NTFx32YKN_EnHupIUEEMTNAfgkB227UYm6RLrh6l6A-Y8jq45hNizzmJDV. Accessed 1 Jun 2021

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Benedict Sheehy.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Sheehy, B. Sustainability, Justice and Corporate Law: Redistributing Corporate Rights and Duties to Meet the Challenge of Sustainability. Eur Bus Org Law Rev 23, 273–312 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-021-00235-x

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-021-00235-x

Keywords

Navigation