Abstract
For the theist, human knowledge of God’s nature is, at best, partial, and this implies that there are characteristics of God beyond our ken which I call ‘the unknown attributes’. However, this confessed ignorance, I argue, has largely unappreciated skeptical consequences for determining the scope of God’s power. Consider some mundane future state of affairs normally considered to be within the scope of God’s power. If it lies within the scope of God’s power, then it is consistent with God’s nature, and hence the unknown attributes. However, what grounds does the theist have for making this claim? More generally, we can ask: how do we know what God can do, if we don’t know what God is? I call this question The Problem of the Unknown Attributes, and take up and evaluate four plausible answers. I argue that the each of these answers fails, but close the paper by gesturing toward a partial reply. The overall aim of the paper is to draw out some of the skeptical consequences of human ignorance of God’s nature, and to thereby highlight an unrecognized tension in theistic thought.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Data availability
Not applicable.
Code availability
Not applicable.
Notes
For a recent summary of the ways ignorance informs thinking in the philosophy of religion see McBrayer (2016).
See e.g. Schellenberg (2007). Focusing on the view he calls ‘Ultimism’, Schellenberg develops a related argument in Chapter 2. He begins from the observation that we should be in doubt about whether we can fully grasp the Ultimate, and builds a case on this basis for skepticism about its reality.
See also Adams (2002: p. 52): “in thinking about the divine perfection, or the attributes of the being that is the standard of value, we should suppose that God’s superiority exceeds our cognitive grasp in a positive direction, and is not exhausted by negative or universalizing operations on properties familiar to us.” In addition, William Alston (2005: p. 99) notes that despite contemporary Anglo-American philosophers’ confidence in their ability to determine how things are when it comes to God, “I do not suggest that anyone thinks we can attain a comprehensive knowledge of God’s nature and doings.”.
See also Swinburne (1994). After arguing that all the theistic God’s properties follow from God’s status as a being of “pure, unlimited, intentional power” he pauses to qualify this position saying, “It has been the unanimous theistic tradition that we do not know fully in what the divine nature consists…there is no doubt far, far more to being God than I have been able to understand—so that…far more is involved in pure, limitless, intentional power than I have been able to draw out from it” (1994: p. 157–158).
In using the term ‘attribute’ I do not mean to suggest that what is unknown is necessarily of the same order as something like omniscience, for example (though it might be), but instead to highlight that what is unknown is something related to the nature or essence of God, either insofar as it is constitutive of divinity or follows from it. In using ‘attribute’ in this way I follow, e.g. Morris (1984: p. 43).
For an influential discussion of the nature of God’s power see Wierenga (1989).
Cf. Nicholas Malebranche (1997: Dialogue IX). Malebranche holds that the perfection of God’s action lies in its simplicity, fecundity, and universality, and argues that God could not have prevented certain evils without acting in a less than perfect way.
References
Adams, R. M. (2002). Finite and Infinite Goods: A framework for ethics. Oxford University Press.
al-Ghazâlî, A. H. (2007). The ninety-nine beautiful names of god. The Islamic Texts Society.
Alston, W. (2005). Two cheers for mystery! In A. Dole & A. Chignell (Eds.), God and the ethics of belief. Cambridge University Press.
Aquinas, T. (1975). Summa contra gentiles, book one. University of Notre Dame Press.
Augustine of Hippo. (1992). The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century vol. 4, ed. John E. Rotelle; trans. Edmund Hill, Brooklyn: New City Press.
Hume, D. (2007). Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. In Coleman, D. (ed), Cambridge University Press.
Locke, J. (1975). An Essay Concerning Human Nature. In Niddich, P. (ed), Clarendon Press.
Maimonides, M. (1995). The Guide of the Perplexed. Trans. Chaim Rabin. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Malebranche, N. (1997). Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion. In Jolley, N., and Scott, D. (eds), Cambridge University Press.
Morris, T. (1984). Properties, modalities, and god. The Philosophical Review, 93, 35–55.
Morris, T. (1991). Our idea of god: An introduction to philosophical theology. Regent College Publishing.
McBrayer, J. (2016). Ignorance and the religious life. In R. Peels & M. Blaauw (Eds.), The epistemic dimensions of ignorance. Cambridge University Press.
Philo of Alexandria (1950). “On the Posterity and Exile of Cain.” in Philo vol. 2, ed. and trans. F. H. Colson and G.H. Whitaker, Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Schellenberg, J. L. (2007). The wisdom to doubt: A justification of religious skepticism. Cornell University Press.
Swinburne, R. (1994). The christian god. Oxford University Press.
van Inwagen, P. (1979). Review of Swinburne’s “The Coherence of Theism.” Philosophical Review, 88, 668–672.
van Inwagen, P. (1998). Modal epistemology. Philosophical Studies, 92, 67–84.
van Inwagen, P. (2008). The Problem of Evil. Oxford University Press.
Waller, J. (2020). Cosmological fine-tuning arguments. Routledge.
Wierenga, E. R. (1989). The nature of god: An inquiry into the divine attributes. Cornell University Press.
Yablo, S. (1993). Is conceivability a guide to possibility?”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53, 1–42.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Jason Waller for his thoughtful comments and encouragement on an early draft of this paper. In addition, I would like to thank the audience at the 2019 meeting of the Society for Philosophy of Religion, and Ben McCraw in particular, for helpful feedback.
Funding
None.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of interest
The author declares that they have no conflict of interest.
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Robinson, T. The problem of the unknown attributes. Int J Philos Relig 92, 3–14 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-021-09822-x
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-021-09822-x