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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 September 2021
Time for the European Court of Human Rights to interpret Article 6 ECHR to encompasses a subjective right for domestic judges to their own independence – Overview of the existing case law on the principle of judicial independence – Such a right currently not present in case law – Judges are obliged to frame their complaints, while at their heart independence-related, in terms of other substantive Convention rights – Court cannot properly address one of the fundamental aspects of these cases – Lower protection for the domestic judges – Other international legal orders do include such a subjective right to a judge’s independence – Several arguments for the European Court of Human Rights to similarly acknowledge such a right under the Convention – Few difficulties in integrating such a right into the existing case law
I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful comments on this article, as well as Ane Aranguiz for reading an earlier version of the text. The usual disclaimers apply.
1 N. Garoupa and T. Ginsburg, ‘Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence’, 57 AJIL (2009) p. 103.
2 Among others: D. Piana, Judicial Accountabilities in New Europe: From Rule of Law to Quality of Justice (Routledge 2010); F. Contini and R. Mohr, ‘Reconciling Independence and Accountability of Judicial Systems’, 2 Utrecht Law Review (2007) p. 26.
3 See for example in Venezuela, J.M. Casal, ‘The Constitutional Chamber and the Erosion of Democracy in Venezuela’, 80 Heidelberg Journal of International Law (2020) p. 913.
4 One of the first sources on the issue of rule of law backsliding: see L. Pech and K.L. Scheppele, ‘Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU’, 19 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2017) p. 3.
5 This has happened in Hungary and more recently in Poland. The latter has given rise to two infringement proceedings before the ECJ. See ECJ 24 June 2019, Case C-619/18, Commission v Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court); ECJ 5 November 2019, Case C-192/18, Commission v Poland (Independence of ordinary courts).
6 On this issue see D. Kosař and K. Šipulová, ‘How to fight court-packing’, 6 Constitutional Studies (2020) p. 133.
7 On this issue see K. Gajda-Roszczynialska and K. Markiewicz, ‘Disciplinary Proceedings as an Instrument for Breaking the Rule of Law in Poland’, 12 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (2020) p. 451.
8 See, for example, EP Resolution of 13 November 2018, OJ 2020 C 363/8. See also ECJ 18 May 2021, Cases C-83/19 a.o., Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’ a.o. v Inspecţia Judiciară a.o.
9 See, for example, EP Resolution of 18 December 2019, not yet in Official Journal, available at ⟨https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2019-0103_EN.html⟩, visited 9 August 2021 See also ECJ 20 April 2021, Case C-896/19, Repubblika v Il-Prim Ministru.
10 See also P. Ducoulombier, ‘Le droit subjectif du juge à la protection de son indépendance: chaînon manquant de la protection de l’État de droit en Europe?’, in L. Branko et al. (eds.), Procès équitable: perspectives régionales et internationales (Anthemis 2020) p. 153; L.-A. Sicilianos, ‘The Subjective Right of Judges to Independence: Some Reflexions on the Interpretation of Article 6, Para. 1 of the ECHR’, in P. Pinto de Albuquerque and K. Wojtyczek (eds.), Judicial Power in a Globalized World. Liber Amicorum Vincent De Gaetano (Springer 2019) p. 547. That article by judge Sicilianos is based heavily on an earlier concurring opinion by him in the case of ECtHR (GC) 23 June 2016, No. 20261/12, Baka v Hungary.
11 R. Macdonald and H. Kong, ‘Judicial Independence as a Constitutional Virtue’, in M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajó (eds.), Oxford Handbook on Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press 2012) p. 831 at p. 832.
12 G. Di Federico, ‘Judicial Independence in Italy’, in A. Seibert-Fohr (ed.), Judicial Independence in Transition (Springer 2012) p. 357 at p. 399.
13 P. Lemmens, ‘L’indépendance du juge national vue depuis Strasbourg’, 31 RTDH (2020) p. 785 at p. 786.
14 ECtHR 28 June 1984, Nos. 7891/77 and 7878/77, Campbell and Fell v the United Kingdom, para. 78.
15 See for some recent high-profile examples, ECtHR 9 February 2021, No. 15227/19, Xhoxhaj v Albania, para. 289; ECtHR 21 April 2020, No. 36093/13, Anželika Šimaitienė v Lithuania, para. 78; ECtHR 3 March 2020, No. 66448/17, Baş v Turkey, para. 267; ECtHR (GC) 6 November 2018, Nos. 55391/13, 57728/13 and 74041/13, Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v Portugal, para. 144; ECtHR (GC) 25 September 2018, No. 76639/11, Denisov v Ukraine, para. 60.
16 ECtHR 26 August 2003, No. 10526/02, Filippini v San Marino.
17 In the same sense: concurring opinion of judge Sicilianos in Baka, supra n. 10, para. 3. S. Shetreet, ‘Reflections on Contemporary Issues of Judicial Independence’, in Pinto de Albuquerque and Wojtyczek, supra n. 10, p. 511 at p. 514.
18 See for the first express reference in the case law: ECtHR (GC) 28 May 2002, No. 46295/99, Stafford v the United Kingdom, para. 78.
19 Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá, supra n. 15, para. 144; ECtHR 12 January 2016, No. 57774/13, Miracle Europe KFT v Hungary, para. 52; Stafford, supra n. 18, para. 78.
20 Anželika Šimaitienė, supra n. 15, para. 78; ECtHR 18 October 2018, No. 80018/12, Thiam v France, para. 62; ECtHR (GC) 18 July 2013, Nos. 2312/08 and 34179/08, Maktouf and Damjanović v Bosnia and Herzegovina, para. 78.
21 See in such a sense M. Leloup, ‘The Concept of Structural Human Rights in the European Convention on Human Rights’, 20 Human Rights Law Review (2020) p. 480 at p. 491.
22 D. Kosař et al., ‘The Twin Challenges to Separation of Powers in Central Europe: Technocratic Governance and Populism’, 15 EuConst (2019) p. 427 at p. 446.
23 S. Benvenuti, ‘The Politics of Judicial Accountability in Italy: Shifting the Balance’, 14 EuConst (2018) p. 369.
24 ECtHR 5 February 2009, No. 22330/05, Olujić v Croatia.
25 The most important examples are: Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá, supra n. 15; Denisov, supra n. 15; ECtHR 9 January 2013, No. 21722/11, Oleksandr Volkov v Ukraine. See also Thiam, supra n. 20.
26 See more extensively on the topic, J. Sillen, ‘The Concept of “Internal Judicial Independence” in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’, 15 EuConst (2019) p. 104.
27 Shetreet, supra n. 17, at p. 515.
28 See Art. 1.4 of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002); Art. 9 of the Mt. Scopus International Standards of Judicial Independence (2008).
29 ECtHR 22 December 2009, No. 24/10/06, Parlov-Tkalčić v Croatia, para. 86. These principles have been confirmed in subsequent judgments: ECtHR 23 January 2020, No. 35121/09, Yuriy Koval v Ukraine, para. 138; ECtHR 6 October 2011, No. 23465/13, Agrokompleks v Ukraine, para. 137; ECtHR 19 April 2011, No. 33186/08, Khrykin v Russia, para. 29.
30 See for example ECtHR 30 January 2020, No. 29295/16, Franz v Germany; ECtHR 19 April 2011, No. 33188/08, Baturlova v Russia; ECtHR 15 July 2010, No. 16695/04, Gazeta Ukraina-Tsentr v Ukraine.
31 In the same sense see P. Paczolay, ‘The Notion of Judicial Independence: Impartiality and Effectiveness of Judges’, in Pinto de Albuquerque and Wojtyczek, supra n. 10, p. 331 at p. 339.
32 Sicilianos, supra n. 10, at p. 550.
33 For example: Parlov-Tkalčić, supra n. 29, para. 86.
34 Lemmens, supra n. 13, at p. 799.
35 One can think of ECtHR 19 October 2010, No. 20999/04, Özpinar v Turkey. In this case, the judge in question received a disciplinary sanction on account of her being late for work and her having close relationships with certain lawyers who apparently benefited from this relationship.
36 To a certain extent, one can see a connection between the issue that is described here and the principle in administrative law of détournement de pouvoir or misuse of power. Here as well, the legal purpose of the act in question is difficult to prove. The Court is faced with a similar problem in its case law concerning Art. 18 ECHR. In those cases, the Court applies the standard of proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, but allows that such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. See ECtHR (GC) 28 November 2017, No. 72508/13, Merabishvili v Georgia, para. 314. See further on the issue A. Tsampi, ‘The new doctrine on misuse of power under Article 18 ECHR: Is it about the system of contre-pouvoirs within the State after all?’, 38 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights (2020) p. 134 at p. 140-141.
37 Opinion of AG Bobek of 8 July 2021 in Case C-132/20, Getin Noble Bank, paras. 99-104; Opinion of AG Bobek of 20 May 2021 in Joined Cases C-748/19 to 754/19, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim v WB, para. 152.
38 Opinion of AG Bobek of 23 September 2020 in Joined Cases C-83/19, C-127/19 and C-195/19, Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor Din România’, paras. 242-248.
39 For example: ECJ 15 July 2021, Case C-791/19, Commission v Poland (Régime disciplinaire des juges), paras. 88-113; ECJ 2 March 2021, Case C-824/18, A.B. and Others (Nomination des juges à la Cour suprême - Recours); ECtHR 22 July 2021, No. 43447/19, Reczkowicz v Poland, para. 235; ECtHR 29 June 2021, No. 6158/18, Tercan v Turkey, para. 87; Baka, supra n. 10, paras. 143-152. It should be pointed out that the Court’s reasoning in this last case has been criticised: D. Kosař and K. Šipulová, ‘The Strasbourg Court Meets Abusive Constitutionalism: Baka v. Hungary and the Rule of Law’, 10 The Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (2018) p. 83.
40 Baka, supra n. 10.
41 See in particular: K. Aquilina, ‘The Independence of the Judiciary in Strasbourg Judicial Disciplinary Case Law: Judges as Applicants and National Judicial Councils as Factotums of Respondent States’, in Pinto de Albuquerque and Wojtyczek, supra n. 10, p. 1 at p. 28; Kosař and Šipulová, supra n. 39; A. Vincze, ‘Dismissal of the President of the Hungarian Supreme Court: ECtHR Judgment Baka v. Hungary’, 21 European Public Law (2015) p. 445.
42 A. Vincze, ‘Judicial Independence and its Guarantees beyond the Nation State – Some Recent Hungarian Experiences’, 56 Journal of the Indian Law Institute (2014) p. 202 at p. 211-212.
43 For the same conclusion see Ducoulombier, supra n. 10, at p. 156.
44 Concurring opinion of judge Sicilianos in Baka, supra n. 10, para. 6. In fact, the word independence appears 200 times in the entire judgment.
45 It should be noted that this practice of using international soft-law standards for the interpretation of the principle of judicial independence has been criticised in legal doctrine. For a good example see M. Bobek and D. Kosař, ‘“Euro-products” and Institutional Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: A Critical Study in Judicial Councils’, in M. Bobek (ed.), Central European Judges under the European Influence: the Transformative Power of the EU Revisited (Hart Publishing 2015) p. 165 at p. 175-180.
46 ECtHR 5 May 2020, No. 3594/19, Kövesi v Romania. See also more recently: ECtHR 9 March 2021, No. 76521/12, Eminağaoğlu v Turkey.
47 ECtHR 22 November 2016, No. 22254/14, Erményi v Hungary.
48 Erményi, supra n. 47, paras. 26-40. However, see the dissenting opinion of judge Kūris, who opposed the broad material scope that was given to Art. 8 ECHR in this judgment. See, for a recent acclaim of this dissenting opinion in a later case, Dissenting opinion of judge Wojtyczek in ECtHR 17 December 2020, No. 73544/14, Mile Novaković v Croatia.
49 ECtHR (dec.) 27 November 2018, Nos. 45434/12, 45438/12 and 375/13, J.B. a.o. v Hungary.
50 J.B., supra n. 49, para. 113
51 Several authors have criticised this point: P. Bárd and A. Śledzińska-Simon, ‘On the Principle of Irremovability of Judges beyond Age Discrimination: Commission v. Poland’, 57 CMLR (2020) p. 1555 at p. 1571; R. Uitz, ‘The Perils of Defending the Rule of Law Through Dialogue’, 15 EuConst (2019) p. 1 at p. 6-7.
52 Besides the judgments of Broda and Bojara, Bilgen and Eminağaoğlu, which are mentioned below, one could think of the Court’s case law concerning the reduction of a judge’s salary or pension. It is commonly accepted that the remuneration of judges is a central aspect of their independence. Yet, in its limited case law on the matter, the Court has never examined claims on this issue via Art. 6 ECHR, even when the applicant judges expressly mention that the lowering of their salary or pension was incompatible with the principle of judicial independence. See ECtHR 19 June 2012, No. 17767/08, Khoniakina v Georgia, para. 68 and paras. 72-80. In one decision, the Court did make a connection between a lowering of the wages of judges and the principle of independence, without, however, examining the case through the lens of Art. 6 ECHR. See ECtHR (dec.) 15 October 2013, Nos. 66365/09 a.o., Savickas a.o. v Lithuania, paras. 93-94. In the absence of any protection via Art. 6(1) ECHR, judges need to fall back on the general protection offered by the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions, enshrined in Art. 1 of the First Additional Protocol, a provision that grants the Contracting Parties a very wide margin of appreciation when it comes to the implementation of economic and social policies. The ECJ, by contrast, does protect the remuneration of judges via the right to judicial independence. See below, text at n. 87.
53 ECtHR (GC) 19 April 2007, No. 63235/00, Vilho Eskelinen a.o. v Finland, para. 62.
54 ECtHR 22 July 2021, No. 11423/19, Gumenyuk a.o. v Ukraine; ECtHR 29 June 2021, Nos. 26691/18 and 27367/18, Broda and Bojara v Poland; ECtHR 9 March 2021, No. 1571/07, Bilgen v Turkey; Eminağaoğlu, supra n. 46.
55 Broda and Bojara, supra n. 54, para. 148; Bilgen, supra n. 54, para. 96.
56 Recently also in the context of the right to liberty of judges: Tercan, supra n. 39, para. 141.
57 See also Kövesi, supra n. 46, para. 124.
58 Gumenyuk, supra n. 54, paras. 60-67; Broda and Bojara, supra n. 54, paras. 117-124; Bilgen, supra n. 54, paras. 69-81; Eminağaoğlu, supra n. 46, paras. 69-80.
59 See in this regard also recently ECtHR 20 July 2021, Nos. 79089/13, 13805/14 and 54534/14, Loquifer v Belgium, para. 40. See also the concurring opinion of judge Pavli attached to that judgment, specifically para. 7.
60 Denisov, supra n. 15.
61 For a recent example: Mile Novaković, supra n. 48, paras. 42-50.
62 Denisov, supra n. 15, paras. 92-117.
63 See for a similar conclusion M. Leloup, ‘Kroniek van een aangekondigde verdragsschending: het onderzoek van de geloofsbrieven getoetst aan de Europese mensenrechtenstandaarden’, 75 Tijdschrift voor Bestuurswetenschappen en Publiekrecht (2020) p. 383 at p. 403 fn 187; H. Collins, ‘An Emerging Human Right to Protection against Unjustified Dismissal’, 50(1) Industrial Law Journal (2021) p. 36.
64 Though it must be noted that in the judgments in Gumenyuk, Broda and Bojara, and Bilgen, the Court has been rather flexible in accepting the existence of such rights.
65 Denisov, supra n. 15, paras. 118-134.
66 J.B., supra n. 49, paras. 130-138.
67 Gumenyuk, supra n. 54, para. 88 (Art. 8 ECHR applicable since the judges in question were no longer allowed to exercise their function); Xhoxhaj, supra n. 15, paras. 362-364 (Art. 8 ECHR applicable since the judge in question was dismissed); ECtHR 20 October 2020, No. 36889/18, Camelia Bogdan v Romania, paras. 83-92 (Art. 8 ECHR inapplicable since the judge in question was only temporarily suspended); ECtHR 25 June 2020, Nos. 81024/12 and 28198/15, Bagirov v Azerbaijan, paras. 87-88 (Art. 8 ECHR applicable since the lawyer in question was disbarred); ECtHR (dec.) 11 February 2020, No. 526/18, Platini v Switzerland, paras. 52-58 (Art. 8 ECHR applicable since the applicant, a person whose entire career had been built around football, was no longer allowed to exercise any professional activity linked to football); ECtHR 30 January 2020, No. 74354/13, Namazov v Azerbaijan, paras. 34-35 (Art. 8 ECHR applicable since the lawyer in question was disbarred); ECtHR 17 October 2019, Nos. 58812/15 a.o., Polyakh a.o. v Ukraine, paras. 203-211 (Art. 8 ECHR applicable since the civil servants in questions had been dismissed).
68 Part of the case law that will be discussed here is also mentioned in the Baka judgment, see Baka, supra n. 10, paras. 73-76 and 84-85.
69 HRC (dec.) 24 July 2008, CCPR/C/93/D/1376/2005, Bandaranayake v Sri Lanka, para. 7.3.
70 See also HRC (dec.) 31 July 2003, CCPR/C/78/D/933/2000, Mundyo Busyo et al. v Democratic Republic of the Congo, para. 5.2; HRC (dec.) 5 August 2003, CCPR/C/78/D/814/1998, Pastukhov v Belarus, para. 7.3. See also P. Taylor, A Commentary on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The UN Human Rights Committee’s Monitoring of ICCPR Rights (Cambridge University Press 2020) p. 724.
71 IACtHR 23 August 2013, Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v Ecuador, para. 153.
72 Supreme Court of Justice, supra n. 71, para. 155.
73 IACtHR 28 August 2013, Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et al.) v Ecuador, paras. 188-99; IACtHR 5 October 2015, López Lone et al. v Honduras, paras. 190-202 and 239-40.
74 Joint dissenting opinion of judges Manuel E. Ventura Robles and Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot in IACtHR, 29 May 2014, Norín Catrimán a.o. (Leaders, Members and Activist of The Mapuche Indigenous People) v Chile, paras. 13-14.
75 C. Medina, The American Convention on Human Rights: Crucial Rights and their Theory and Practice, 2nd edn. (Intersentia 2017) p. 273.
76 ECJ 27 February 2018, Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses.
77 The Court’s reasoning in the ASJP judgment and its innovative understanding of Art. 19(1)(2) TEU have been set out in detail by many others and will not be revisited here. See in particular: C. Rizcallah and V. Davio, ‘L’article 19 du Traité sur l’Union européenne : sésame de l’Union de droit’, 30 RTDH (2019) p. 156; L. Pech and S. Platon, ‘Judicial independence under threat: The Court of Justice to the rescue in the ASJP case’, 55 CMLR (2018) p. 1827; M. Bonelli and M. Claes, ‘Judicial Serendipity: How Portuguese Judges Came to the Rescue of the Polish Judiciary: ECJ 27 February 2018, Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses.’, 14 EuConst (2018) p. 622. For one of the most recent judgments, with references to the most important case law, see ECJ (order) 14 July 2021, Case C-204/21 R, Commission v Poland.
78 ECJ 3 October 2013, Case C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami a.o. v Parliament and Council, para. 90.
79 ASJP, supra n. 76, paras. 33, 34 and 37.
80 M. Leloup, ‘The appointment of judges and the right to a tribunal established by law: The ECJ tightens its grip on issues of domestic judicial organization: Review Simpson’, 57 CMLR (2020) p. 1139 at p. 1154.
81 ASJP, supra n. 76, para. 37.
82 For example: Pech and Platon, supra n. 77, p. 1840.
83 Subsequent case law has made clear that the two provisions may have a different material scope, but have an identical understanding of the notion of judicial independence. See in particular: ECJ 19 November 2019, Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, A.K., CP and DO, para. 169. See further K. Lenaerts, ‘De twee dimensies van de onafhankelijkheid van de rechterlijke macht in de rechtsorde van de Europese Unie’, in R. Leysen et al. (eds.), Semper Perseverans – Liber amicorum André Alen (Intersentia 2020) p. 897 at p. 906; M. Leloup, ‘An Uncertain First Step in the Field of Judicial Self-government: ECJ 19 November 2019, Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, A.K., CP and DO’, 16 EuConst (2020) p. 145 at p. 164.
84 Two of the most notable examples are Commission v Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court), supra n. 5, Commission v Poland (Independence of ordinary courts), supra n. 5.
85 To borrow a term of the Opinion of AG Bobek, Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor Din România’, supra n. 38, para. 222.
86 ECJ 7 February 2019, Case C-49/18, Escribano Vindel.
87 Escribano Vindel, supra n. 86, para. 66; ASJP, supra n. 76, para. 45. As mentioned above, the ECtHR does not offer such a level of protection to the remuneration of judges.
88 A.K., CP and DO, supra n. 83. See further on this judgment: M. Kraweski and M. Ziółkowski, ‘EU judicial independence decentralized: A.K.’, 57 CMLR (2020) p. 1107.
89 ECJ (order) 12 February 2019, Case C-8/19 PPU, RH.
90 RH, supra n. 89, paras. 46-47. These principles have subsequently been confirmed by the Grand Chamber: ECJ 26 March 2020, Joined Cases C-558/18 and C-563/18, Miasto Łowicz, paras. 58-59.
91 This duality is also implicitly present in S. Platon, ‘Preliminary references and rule of law: Another case of mixed signals from the Court of Justice regarding the independence of national courts: Miasto Łowicz’, 57 CMLR (2020) p. 1843.
92 See the Opinion of AG Bobek, Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor Din România’, supra n. 38, para. 209. He confirms the very broad scope of Art. 19(1)(2) TEU and states that at present the only limiting condition pertains to admissibility.
93 Miasto Łowicz, supra n. 90.
94 Miasto Łowicz, supra n. 90, paras. 48-52. See, for the same reasoning in two later cases, ECJ (order) 6 October 2020, Case C-623/18, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Słubicach, paras. 22-37; ECJ (order) 2 July 2020, Case C-256/19, S.A.D. Maler und Anstreicher, paras. 45-50.
95 F. Gremmelprez, ‘Het arrest Miasto Łowicz (C-558/18 en C-563/18): de onafhankelijkheid van de Poolse rechterlijke macht – onontvankelijk maar gegrond’, Tijdschrift voor Europees en economisch recht (2020) p. 633 at p. 635.
96 M. Leloup, ‘De waarborg van een Europese prejudiciële procedure: internationale bescherming tegen een nationale bedreiging’, 75 Tijdschrift voor Bestuurswetenschappen en Publiekrecht (2020) p. 275 at p. 279. In this regard, one author argues that the Court appears to take a bolder stance in infringement proceedings than it does in preliminary rulings and raises doubts about the usefulness of the preliminary rulings mechanism for judges to enforce their own independence. See Platon, supra n. 91, p. 1843.
97 The Court has moreover proven to be increasingly protective of this judicial lifeline. See recently Commission v Poland, supra n. 39, paras. 222-234; A.B. and Others, supra n. 39, paras. 90-107.
98 For example, P. Terry, ‘Judicial Independence in Germany’, Law and the World (2015) p. 33 at p. 36; A. Seibert-Fohr, ‘Constitutional Guarantees of Judicial Independence in Germany’, in E. Riedel and R. Wolfrum (eds.), Recent Trends in German and European Constitutional Law (Springer 2006) p. 269.
99 The Court itself has contributed to this blurriness, since people exercising state authority, like judges or members of parliament, are increasingly relying on fundamental rights. For an example involving a member of parliament see ECtHR 8 November 2016, No. 35493/13, Szanyi v Hungary. In this regard, one can also think of the abovementioned consequence-based approach set out in the Denisov judgment.
100 See in particular the dissenting opinion of Judge Wojtyczek in Broda and Bojara, supra n. 54, with references to other dissenting opinions in which he made similar claims.
101 K. Lenaerts, ‘New Horizons for the Rule of Law Within the EU’, 21 German Law Journal (2020) p. 29 at p. 30. See also ECJ 9 July 2020, Case C-272/19, VQ v Land Hessen, para. 45.
102 Opinion of AG Bobek, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim v WB, supra n. 37, para. 138.
103 In this regard, one could object that the textual bases between the two legal orders differ, in the sense that Art. 19(1)(2) TEU provides a clearer legal basis for a structural requirement of judicial independence. Though it is true that the Convention does not contain a provision like Art. 19(1)(2) TEU, a combined reading of Arts. 1, 13 and 35 ECHR shows that the Convention just as well requires the Contracting Parties to provide for effective – and thus independent – remedies. Furthermore, the jurisprudence of the IACtHR and the HRC shows that this absence of a more structural provision does not necessarily preclude the reading of a subjective right to judicial independence in the right to a fair trial.
104 Art. 1 of Protocol 15, which entered into force on 1 August 2021.
105 See, with further references, P. Popelier and C. Van de Heyning, ‘Subsidiarity Post-Brighton: Procedural Rationality as an answer?’, 30 LJIL (2017) p. 5 at p. 7-8.
106 R. Kunz, ‘Judging International Judgments Anew? The Human Rights Courts before Domestic Courts’, 30 EJIL (2019) p. 1129.
107 I. Maher, ‘National Courts as European Community Courts’, 14 Legal Studies (1994) p. 226 at p. 242.
108 R. Spano, ‘The Future of the European Court of Human Rights – Subsidiarity, Process-Based Review and the Rule of Law’, 18 HRLR (2018) p. 473 at p. 492.
109 F. Krenc and F. Tulkens, ‘L’indépendance du juge. Retour aux fondements d’une garantie essentielle d’une société démocratique’, in R. Chenal et all. (eds.), Intersecting Views on National and International Human Rights Protection: Liber Amicorum Guido Raimondi (Wolf Legal Publishers 2019) p. 397; D. Kosař and L. Lixinski, ‘Domestic Judicial Design by International Human Rights Courts’, 109 AJIL (2015) p. 713 at p. 748.
110 Concurring opinion of judge Sicilianos in Baka, supra n. 10, para. 15. See in the same sense G. Yudkivska, ‘Between Scylla and Charybdis – Judicial Independence and Accountability in the Populist Era’ in Branko et al., supra n. 10, p. 757 at p. 767.
111 See in such sense R. Spano, ‘The rule of law as the lodestar of the European Convention on Human Rights: The Strasbourg Court and the independence of the judiciary’, ELJ (2021) at p. 13; A. Tsampi, ‘Separation of Powers and the Right to a Fair Trial under Article 6 ECHR: Empowering the Independence of the Judiciary in the Subsidiarity Epoch’, in Branko et al., supra n. 10, p. 693 at p. 706.
112 Concurring opinion of judge Sicilianos in Baka, supra n. 10, para. 15.
113 See in the same sense Ducoulombier, supra n. 10, p. 162.
114 See for some recent authorities: ECtHR (GC) 15 October 2020, No. 80982/12, Muhammad and Muhammad v Romania, para. 118; ECtHR (GC) 10 July 2020, No. 310/15, Mugemangango v Belgium, para. 109; Baka, supra n. 10, para. 117.
115 C. Guarnieri, ‘Judicial Independence in Europe: Threat or Resource for Democracy?’, 49 Representation (2013) p. 347 at p. 353.
116 See for an example S. Spáč et al., ‘Capturing the Judiciary from Inside: The Story of Judicial Self Governance in Slovakia’, 19 German Law Journal (2018) p. 1741, noting that the high level of autonomy of the judiciary chiefly led to the empowerment of judicial elites, who then abused their power.
117 In such sense see also D. Kosař, ‘Politics of Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability in Czechia: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law between Court Presidents and the Ministry of Justice’, 13 EuConst (2017) p. 96 at p. 114-121.
118 This was also pointed out by judge Sicilianos: Sicilianos, supra n. 10, p. 551-552.
119 In particular: Opinion of AG Bobek, Getin Noble Bank, supra n. 37, paras. 38-39; Opinion of AG Bobek, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim v WB, supra n. 37, paras. 146-151, warning of the dangers of an overly broad interpretation of Art. 19(1)(2) TEU and arguing that it is an extraordinary remedy for extraordinary situations, meant to catch issues of a certain gravity and/or systemic nature. Opinion of AG Tanchev of 20 June 2019 in Case C-192/18, Commission v Poland (Independence of ordinary courts), paras. 115-116, arguing that that same provision was confined to correcting problems with respect to a structural infirmity.
120 AG Bobek in his Opinion, supra n. 119, used the incorrect indexation of judicial salaries or the failure to approve end of year bonuses as examples.
121 For a recent example see N. Garoupa and P.C. Magelhães, ‘Public Trust in the European Legal Systems: Independence, Accountability and Awareness’, 44 West European Politics (2021) p. 690 at p. 692-694.
122 Xhoxhaj, supra n. 15, paras. 299-300; Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’, supra n. 8, para. 229.
123 Denisov, supra n. 15.
124 Recently, the Grand Chamber has emphasised the qualities of technical competence and moral integrity of judges and stressed the importance of rigorous merit-based appointment procedures for judges. See ECtHR (GC) 1 December 2020, No. 26374/18, Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v Iceland, paras. 221-222. Repeated in ECtHR 7 May 2021, No. 4907/18, Xero Flor w Polsce sp. z o.o. v Poland, para. 244; Reczkowicz, supra n. 39, para. 217.
125 ECtHR 13 February 2003, No. 49636/99, Chevrol v France, para. 78; ECtHR 24 November 1994, No. 15287/89, Beaumartin v France, para. 38; ECtHR 29 April 1988, No. 10328/83, Belilos v Switzerland, para. 64.
126 P.M. Van den Eijnden, ‘Onafhankelijk en Onpartijdig Gerecht’, in J. Gerards et al. (eds.), Sdu Commentaar EVRM: deel 1 (Sdu 2020) p. 383 at p. 430.
127 ECtHR 28 January 2020, Nos. 30226/10 and 5506/16, Ali Riza a.o. v Turkey, para. 173; ECtHR 2 October 2018, Nos. 40575/10 and 67474/10, Mutu and Pechtstein v Switzerland, para. 94; ECtHR (GC) 14 December 2010, No. 37575/04, Boulois v Switzerland, para. 73.
128 Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson, supra n. 124, para. 219; ECtHR 22 October 1984, No. 8790/79, Sramek v Austria, para. 36; Campbell and Fell, supra n. 14, para. 76.
129 This decision may moreover not be altered by a non-judicial authority: ECtHR 19 April 1994, No. 16034/90, Van de Hurk v the Netherlands, para. 45.
130 ECtHR 12 January 2021, No. 75614/14, Victor Laurențiu Marin v Romania, para. 148.
131 Apart from the cases concerning the Polish judicial reforms, one can think of ECtHR (communication) 12 November 2020, No. 25240/20, Gyulumyan a.o. v Armenia.
132 It is rather generally accepted that the ECJ developed this strand of case law in the ASJP case with a view to the pending cases concerning Poland. In such sense see Bárd and Śledzińska-Simon, supra n. 51, p. 1573; Bonelli and Claes, supra n. 77, p. 623.
133 Recent case law of both the ECJ and the ECtHR has made clear that a tribunal cannot be seen as ‘established by law’ if the relevant domestic legislative provisions were not complied with during the appointment procedure: ECJ 24 March 2020, Joined Cases C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, Review Simpson v Council and Review HG v Commission; Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson, supra n. 124. The Strasbourg Court subsequently applied this new principle to the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court: Xero Flor, supra n. 124; Reczkowicz, supra n. 39.
