Abstract
Trust plays an important role in human society. However, how does trust evolve is a huge challenge. The trust game is a well-known paradigm to measure the evolution of trust in a population. Reward and punishment as the common types of incentives can be used to improve the trustworthiness. However, it remains unclear how reward and punishment actually influence the evolutionary dynamics of trust. Here, we introduce individual reward and punishment into the N-player trust game model in an infinite well-mixed population, where investors use a part of the returned fund to reward trustworthy trustees and meanwhile punish untrustworthy trustees. We then investigate the evolutionary dynamics of trust by means of replicator equations. We show that the introduction of reward and punishment can lead to the stable coexistence state of investors and trustworthy trustees, which indicates that the evolution of trust can be greatly promoted. We reveal that the attraction domain of the coexistence state becomes larger as investors increase the incentive strength from the returned fund for reward and punishment. In addition, we find that the increase of the reward coefficient can enlarge the attraction domain of the coexistence state, which implies that reward can better promote the evolution of trust than punishment.
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Data Availability Statement
This manuscript has no associated data or the data will not be deposited. [Authors’ comment: The data that support the results of this study are available from the corresponding authors upon request.]
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant nos. 61976048, 62036002) and the Fundamental Research Funds of the Central Universities of China.
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XC and XF designed the research, XF performed the research, and XF and XC wrote the manuscript.
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Fang, X., Chen, X. Evolutionary dynamics of trust in the N-player trust game with individual reward and punishment. Eur. Phys. J. B 94, 176 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1140/epjb/s10051-021-00185-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1140/epjb/s10051-021-00185-w