Stealing thunder: The influence of confession specificity and transgression severity

Abstract

Revealing potentially damaging information about oneself before others reveal the same information is known as “stealing thunder”. The goal of this tactic is to elicit favorable evaluations from others, thus mitigating the damage that might otherwise occur if others were to reveal this negative information first. Although prior research has shown evaluative advantages to stealing thunder, research has not examined whether the specificity of the information provided by the confessor regarding their transgression matters. Thus, our goals were to identify (1) whether confessions at varying levels of specificity provided any benefit relative to when the negative information was revealed by a third party, and (2) whether the severity of the transgression moderated the efficacy of stealing thunder at different levels of specificity. Across 4 studies, stealing thunder was optimally effective when confessions were made at the greatest level of detail. Confessions made at moderately-specific or very general levels of detail provided comparatively weak and limited evaluative protection. In the final study, potential mechanisms underlying the role of confession specificity in the efficacy of stealing thunder were explored.

Introduction

Mistakes are an inevitability of life. However, when mistakes can potentially cause evaluative harm to oneself, the transgressor often faces the dilemma of remaining silent (hoping the mistake will remain undiscovered) or admitting to wrongdoing before it is discovered by others. This latter approach of proactively acknowledging responsibility for an error is referred to as “stealing thunder”. Stealing thunder reflects a strategic attempt at social influence through revealing potentially damaging information about oneself before a third party can reveal the same information (Williams, Bourgeois, & Croyle, 1993). Intuitively, if one's transgression is likely to be discovered, acknowledging responsibility by “coming clean” allows the transgressor to potentially mitigate the evaluative damage. Why might this be the case?

First, in accord with commodity theory (Brock, 1968; Brock & Brannon, 1992), informational value is often linked to the scarcity of that information in the same way as a scarce product is often perceived as higher in monetary value. Thus, when information is first revealed by the transgressor, it is no longer seen as privileged or restricted information and thus might be viewed as less important or valuable than if the transgressor were to attempt to block access to this information. This idea is consistent with prior research indicating that people desire prohibited information more than information that is readily available (Knishinsky, 1982; Worchel, 1992; Worchel & Arnold, 1973). Presuming that information is seen as less scarce and thus less valuable following stealing thunder, this could result in people less extensively processing that information and/or weighting that information less strongly in judgments of the transgressor, thereby decreasing its evaluative impact.

Second, research on attributions regarding message sources has shown that individuals are perceived as more trustworthy, and thus are more persuasive, when they disclose information or present arguments that go against their self-interest (e.g., Eagly, Wood, & Chaiken, 1978; Walster, Aronson, & Abrahams, 1966; Wood & Eagly, 1981). Thus, stealing thunder might yield evaluative benefits by altering the impression one forms of the transgressor. Specifically, should the transgressor provide the damaging information proactively (an action which appears to go against the transgressor's self-interest), this might lead the recipient to perceive the transgressor as more sincere in any attempts to make amends for the error or in any expressions of regret. Additionally, at a more general level, this action might also result in favorable inferences regarding the honesty of the transgressor. These favorable incident-specific or general inferences could offset the negative evaluative damage produced by the information itself.

Empirical evidence has generally supported the notion that stealing thunder mitigates the evaluative damage of past transgressions. Its efficacy was first demonstrated in a legal setting in which participants were asked to review details about one of three versions of a criminal trial (Williams et al., 1993). Across two studies, defendants who had voluntarily revealed damaging information were perceived as less guilty and more credible than defendants about whom the damaging information was first revealed by the prosecutor (see also Dolnik, Case, & Williams, 2003).

Subsequent studies have demonstrated the efficacy of stealing thunder in political contexts (e.g., Ondrus, 1998; Ondrus & Williams, 1996), interpersonal contexts (Zablocki, 1996), business and workplace settings (Arpan & Pompper, 2003; Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005; Claeys & Cauberghe, 2012), and a variety of other domains (e.g., Fennis & Stroebe, 2014; Reimsbach & Hahn, 2015). Likewise, research has identified diverse evaluative benefits to those who employ this tactic, such as increased willingness to vote for the transgressing politician (Ondrus & Williams, 1996), fewer negative terms when describing the transgressor (Ondrus, 1998), and greater willingness to order products from the transgressing company (Fennis & Stroebe, 2014). Other work has investigated boundary conditions of stealing thunder, including message framing to downplay the severity of the transgression (Dolnik et al., 2003), the severity of the transgression (Baldwin & Williams, 1993), the extent to which people carefully think about the transgression (Howard, Brewer, & Williams, 2006), characteristics of the message source (White & Williams, 1998), and characteristics of the recipient (Howard et al., 2006; Ondrus & Williams, 1995; White & Williams, 1998).

Importantly, stealing thunder is not a tactic whose effectiveness is confined to the laboratory. Indeed, this tactic has been advocated and commonly used by attorneys for decades (see Ohler v. USA,2000; for an example heard by the U.S. Supreme Court). In fact, texts on trial techniques strongly direct readers to employ stealing thunder under virtually all circumstances, claiming that “If you don't divulge the information, your opponent will, with twice the impact” (Mauet & McCrimmon, 1992, pp. 47–48; see also Bergman, 2016; Keeton, 1973; McElhaney, 2005; Stuesser, 1990). Within the entertainment world, stealing thunder has often been used by celebrities faced with potential scandals. For example, tennis star Maria Sharapova used this tactic by publicly revealing that she tested positive for a banned substance at the Australian Open prior to the release of this information by tennis authorities (Clarey & Tierney, 2016). Presumably, these examples show a belief that stealing thunder provides reputational benefits.

Of the various factors that may influence the efficacy of stealing thunder, one feature that has yet to be examined is the specificity of the confession. To date, the classic stealing thunder paradigm has used specific confessions, often revealing substantial detail regarding the nature and magnitude of the transgression. Indeed, the aforementioned real-world examples provided numerous details regarding the transgression, consistent with the focus of contemporary literature.

However, one could imagine confessions of a far more vague and general nature. Consider the attempt of former U.S. President George W. Bush to steal thunder by admitting to past issues with drinking, presumably in an effort to minimize the damage of future revelations regarding a prior DUI conviction (e.g., CNN, 2000). Likewise, former U.S. President Bill Clinton admitted publicly to causing pain in his marriage, presumably attempting to decrease the impact of future reports of specific incidents of marital infidelity (e.g., Balz, 1992). These examples illustrate confessions linked to a broad category of transgressions versus a specific transgression.

The presumed underlying assumption by those using vague/general confessions is that they provide the benefits of stealing thunder without the perceived costs of divulging details regarding the transgression. Indeed, one can imagine the practical benefits of not disclosing more information than necessary, such as increased privacy while also reducing the risk of providing information that may lead to the exposure of additional transgressions. On the other hand, a general confession might be less effective than a specific confession because the transgressor is perceived as evasive and/or because the confession provides little in the way of actual information.

Determining the role of specificity in stealing thunder holds conceptual importance as it would help clarify the features critical to the success of stealing thunder, thereby contributing insight into why the tactic works. For instance, commodity theory suggests that restricted information is perceived as valuable and thus it should be more actively scrutinized and impactful than less-restricted information. Given that general confessions provide little actual information regarding a transgression, this implies that their effectiveness may be reduced compared to specific confessions because of the added informational value inherent in the details, which remain restricted. Similarly, if specific confessions are required in order for stealing thunder to be effective, it might also imply that positive attributions regarding the transgressor's character resulting from a confession only emerge if the confession contains specific details. It could indicate that transgressors are not seen as acting against their self-interest unless they support their confession with specific details. In contrast, the finding that general confessions provided protection would indicate that other factors, such as mere admission of error, may play a central role in the effectiveness of the stealing thunder tactic and that the actual information contained in the confession is relatively inconsequential. That is, it may be the case that perceivers place substantial weight on the confession of wrongdoing, thus the mere act of admitting that you're wrong may be enough to mitigate some of the evaluative damage from a transgression.

To date, no study has examined whether the specificity of a confession influences the success of this tactic. Thus, across four studies, the present research tested the role of specificity in stealing thunder effects. Study 1 examined to what extent the specificity of the confession (general vs. specific) influenced the effectiveness of the stealing thunder tactic. Study 2 sought to replicate and extend the effects observed in Study 1 by also exploring the influence of moderately-specific confessions. Study 3 extended this research by crossing all three levels of confession specificity with the severity of the transgression (relatively mild vs. relatively severe). Finally, Study 4 explored potential mechanisms that might explain the efficacy of stealing thunder in general, as well as the role played by specificity in its efficacy.

All measures, manipulations, and exclusions are reported for each study. Sample sizes for each study were determined before data analysis using a combination of a minimum acceptable level of power and a time-based stopping rule (i.e., once the minimum sample size necessary for power was achieved, data collection continued until the conclusion of the academic term).