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Standards of Review for the Non-Precluded Measures Clause in Investment Treaties: Different Wording, Different Levels of Scrutiny

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Abstract

The non-precluded measures (‘NPM’) clause allows a state to restrict the exercise of the investor’s rights and protections provided for in international investment agreements (‘IIAs’) during emergencies. In light of the increase in investor-state disputes brought by foreign investors under investment treaties, treaty negotiators have included such a clause in recent IIAs to support the state’s position and mitigate the impact of these treaties on their regulatory powers. The nexus requirement is a key element to successfully invoke this clause in investment arbitrations and requests tribunals to adopt a standard of review. States determine the level of scrutiny and deference of the tribunal by employing different wording for this requirement, and consequently the tribunal must adopt an appropriate standard of review in each case. This article will discuss these different layers of the nexus requirement and their relevant standards of review. First, the authors describe the structure of the clause and aspects to be considered in the process of adopting an appropriate standard of review in investment arbitrations. They then analyze the standard of review for each category of the nexus requirement. The authors consider good faith, reasonableness and an abbreviated form of the proportionality test developed within WTO law as possible models for investment arbitration tribunals.

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Notes

  1. Burke-White and von Staden (2007), p. 389.

  2. The self-judging clause denotes that the evaluation of what measure is necessary is not carried out completely objectively from an external point of view, but primarily from the point of view of the state concerned. Such clauses are closely tied with the state’s security interests, and it is because of the importance of security issues that states tend to leave the determination of certain requirements to their discretion.

  3. Von Staden (2012).

  4. CC/Devas v. India, PCA Case No. 2013–09, Award on Jurisdiction and Merits of 25 July 2016.

  5. Deutsche Telekom AG v. India, PCA Case No. 2014–10, Interim Award of 13 December 2017.

  6. Burke-White and von Staden (2007), pp. 368–376; Mitchell and Henckels (2013), p. 93; Bücheler (2015), p. 243; Alvarez and Khamsi (2009), pp. 427–449.

  7. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights between the United States and Austria 1931, Art. VII.

  8. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, US-Iran 1955, Art. XX; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States), Judgment of 6 November 2003, ICJ Reports 2003, p. 161, para. 43; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 282.

  9. Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 1959 (Germany-Pakistan BIT) Protocol.

  10. The BITs and investment chapters of the treaties of the EU, Japan, the Model BITs of Canada, India, the Netherlands, the Economic Union of Belgium and Luxembourg (BLEU) and Brazil have followed this practice.

  11. Canadian Model BIT 2004, Art. 10.

  12. German Model BIT 2008, Art. 3; Draft Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 2008 (UK Model BIT 2008), Art. 7.

  13. Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (Germany-Lebanon BIT) 1997, Ad Art. 3 of the Protocol.

  14. Burke-White and von Staden (2007), p. 329.

  15. Russian Model BIT 2016, Art. 6; Indian Model BIT 2016, Art. 32; EU-Viet Nam Investment Protection Agreement 2019, Art. 4.6; EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement 2018, Art. 8.3; Brazilian Model BIT 2015, Art. 13; German Model BIT 2008, Art. 3; UK Model BIT 2008, Art. 7; Canadian Model BIT, Art. 10.

  16. BLEU Model BIT (Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union) 2019, preamble and Art. 3; the Dutch Model Investment Agreement 2019, preamble and Art. 2.

  17. Enron v. Argentine, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award of 22 May 2007, para. 332; Sempra v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award of 28 September 2007, para. 374; CMS v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award of 12 May 2005, para. 359. For example, the Enron tribunal held that ‘there is nothing that would prevent an interpretation allowing for the inclusion of economic emergency in the context of Article XI’. Enron v. Argentine, para. 332. In the Indian cases, the tribunals went a step further and considered a margin of appreciation to be accorded to the state in defining what constitutes its essential interests. CC/Devas v. India, paras. 244–245; Deutsche Telekom AG v. India, paras. 235–236.

  18. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments (US-Argentina BIT) 1991, Art. 11.

  19. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union-China BIT) 1984, Art. 4.

  20. Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (South Korea-China BIT) 1992 Protocol, para. 2.

  21. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union-Kazakhstan BIT) 1998, Art. 3.

  22. US-Argentina BIT, Art. 11.

  23. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (India-Mauritius BIT) 1998, Art. 11; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Hungary-India BIT) 2003, Art. 12.

  24. German Model BIT 2008; Finland-Mexico BIT 1999.

  25. Brazilian Model BIT 2015, Art. 13.

  26. BLEU Model BIT (Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union) 2019, Art. 1.

  27. India-Mauritius BIT, Art. 11(3).

  28. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (1986), para. 282.

  29. Schill and Briese (2009), p. 68.

  30. Continental Casualty v. Argentine, ICSID ARB/03/9, Award of 5 September 2008.

  31. GATT, US—Sect. 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Report of the Panel, BISD 36S/345, adopted 7 November 1989, para. 5.26; WTO, Thailand—Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS371/44, adopted 15 July 2011, paras. 76–81; WTO, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS161 and 169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, paras. 164, 166.

  32. CC/Devas v. India (2016), paras. 211–290; Deutsche Telekom AG v. India (2017), paras. 183–291.

  33. Deutsche Telekom AG v. India (2017), paras. 238–291.

  34. CC/Devas v. India (2016), paras. 240–245.

  35. Davis (1988), pp. 469–470.

  36. Bethlehem et al. (2009), p. 379.

  37. Henckels (2015), pp. 29–30.

  38. Vadi and Gruszczynski (2013), p. 632.

  39. Chen (2012), p. 28.

  40. Schill (2012), p. 583.

  41. Ibid., p. 580.

  42. Vadi (2018), p. 201.

  43. Chen (2012), pp. 27–28.

  44. Vadi (2018), p. 201.

  45. Party equality would thus translate into a ‘no deference’ paradigm. Schill (2012), p. 587.

  46. Van Harten and Loughlin (2006), p. 143; Burke-White and von Staden (2009), p. 289; Schill (2012), p. 587.

  47. Van Harten and Loughlin (2006), p. 143.

  48. Ibid.

  49. Ibid., pp. 148–149; Schill (2012), pp. 587–588.

  50. Burke-White and von Staden (2009), p. 291; Schill (2102), pp. 587–588.

  51. Ortino (2013), p. 443.

  52. Schill (2012), p. 589.

  53. Burke-White and von Staden (2009), p. 296.

  54. Arato (2013), pp. 570.

  55. Van Harten (2007), pp. 379–380.

  56. Burke-White and von Staden (2009), p. 337.

  57. Glamis Gold v. the United States of America [2009] NAFTA-UNCITRAL Award of 8 June 2009, para. 617.

  58. Von Staden (2012).

  59. Chen argued that this indicates the strong will of states at the time to enhance the functions of BITs and the protection of investors. Chen (2012), p. 31.

  60. Theoretically, the method of review differs from the standard of review. Commentators and arbitrators may frequently conflate them, but the method of review is a technique (like proportionality or reasonableness) used by arbitrators to determine the validity of state interference with investors’ rights or interests. As Henckels points out, ‘the standard of review refers to the intensity with which the method of review is applied. Both concepts are closely interlaced, because when tribunals employ a method of review in analyzing the validity of a state measure, they must also determine the appropriate standard of review’. In other words, when a tribunal applies a certain method of review, it concretizes and calibrates the standard of review accorded to the state. Accordingly, we will employ both terms interchangeably. Henckels (2015), p. 31.

  61. Alvarez and Khamsi (2009), p. 379; Alvarez and Brink (2010), pp. 315–358; Bjorklund (2008), p. 479.

  62. Burke-White and von Staden (2009), pp. 330–331; Paine (2018), pp. 4–5.

  63. Burke-White and von Staden (2009), pp. 330–331.

  64. Schill (2012), p. 591; Kaufmann-Kohler (2007) pp. 358, 378. As Professor Kaufmann-Kohler argued, despite the fact that arbitral decisions could not be considered as binding precedent, they have a persuasive character for future tribunals. ‘A persuasive precedent is a decision that is not binding but is entitled to respect and careful consideration.’ The persuasive precedent in investment law context is based on ‘the need for certainty and predictability, as well as the need for consistency or equal treatment’.

  65. Akande and Williams (2002), pp. 372–373.

  66. Crawford (2011), p. 22.

  67. Vadi and Gruszczynski (2013), p. 617.

  68. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (1986), para. 282.

  69. Ibid.

  70. Ibid.

  71. Oil Platforms (2003), para. 43.

  72. Burke-White and von Staden (2007), p. 345.

  73. Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 October 2018, ICJ Reports 2018, p. 628, para. 45; Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 13 February 2019, ICJ Reports 2019, p. 7, para. 31.

  74. CMS v. Argentina (2005), para. 374; Enron v. Argentine (2007), para. 339; Sempra v. Argentina (2007), para. 388; Mobil v. Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/04/16, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability of 10 April 2013, para. 1113; El Paso v. Argentine, ICSID ARB/03/15, Award of 31 October 2011, para. 656.

  75. Crawford (2002), p.184.

  76. Ibid., p. 178.

  77. Ibid., p. 184.

  78. CMS v. Argentina (2005), para. 374; Enron v. Argentine (2007), para. 339; Sempra v. Argentina (2007), para. 388.

  79. Sempra v. Argentina (2007), para. 376.

  80. Ibid., para. 378.

  81. Ibid., para. 350; Enron v. Argentine (2007), para. 308.

  82. CMS v. Argentina (2005), para. 323; Enron v. Argentine (2007), paras. 308–309; Sempra v. Argentina (2007) paras. 350–351.

  83. Mobil v. Argentina (2013), paras. 1024, 1025; El Paso v. Argentine (2011), para. 553.

  84. El Paso v. Argentine (2011), para. 552; Mobil v. Argentina (2013), para. 1015.

  85. Mobil v. Argentina (2013), paras. 1060–1071; El Paso v. Argentine (2011), paras. 614–626.

  86. Mobil v. Argentina (2013), paras. 1060–1071; El Paso v. Argentine (2011), paras. 614–626.

  87. Mobil v. Argentina (2013), para. 1113; El Paso v. Argentine (2011), para. 656.

  88. Manton (2016), pp. 126–127.

  89. LG&E v. Argentine, ICSID Case ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability of 3 October 2006, para. 239.

  90. Ibid., para. 257.

  91. Ibid., paras. 239–240.

  92. Henckels (2015), p. 24.

  93. GATT, US—Sect. 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (1989), para. 5.26.

  94. WTO, Thailand—Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines (2011), paras. 76–81.

  95. WTO, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (2001), paras. 164, 166.

  96. Continental Casualty v. Argentine (2008), para. 192.

  97. Ibid., para. 181.

  98. Ibid., para. 196.

  99. Ibid., para. 198.

  100. Ibid., para. 197.

  101. Ibid., paras. 200–222.

  102. Mitchell and Henckels (2013), p. 152.

  103. Ibid., p. 155.

  104. Deutsche Telekom AG v. India (2017), para. 239.

  105. Ibid., para. 286.

  106. Ibid.

  107. Ibid., para. 219.

  108. Ibid., para. 290.

  109. Alvarez and Khamsi (2009), p. 428.

  110. Alvarez and Khamsi (2009), p. 429.

  111. Ibid., p. 433.

  112. Ibid., pp. 433–434.

  113. Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 167.

  114. ‘The principle of effet utile has been accepted in numerous investor-state arbitration decisions. Under this principle, each and every clause of a treaty is to be interpreted as meaningful rather than meaningless [and] treaties, and hence their clauses, are to be interpreted so as to render them effective rather than ineffective’. Noble Ventures v. Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/01/11, Award of 12 October 2005, para. 52.

  115. Bjorklund (2008), pp. 496–497.

  116. Bücheler (2015), p. 231.

  117. Burke-White and von Staden noted that the necessity defence is not a standard of review, but rather a narrow carve-out of general customary law rules of state responsibility. It does not therefore lay the groundwork for a standard of review that could be generalized as public law disputes written large. Burke-White and von Staden (2009), pp. 282–283.

  118. Chen (2012), p. 35.

  119. Vandevelde (2013), p. 454.

  120. Bücheler (2015), p. 231.

  121. Burke-White and von Staden (2009), pp. 297–298.

  122. Burke-White and von Staden (2007), p. 323.

  123. Henckels (2020), p. 566.

  124. BLEU Model BIT (Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union) 2019, preamble.

  125. Black’s Law Dictionary (West Publishing, 1995), p. 1029. Cited in WTO, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (2001), para. 160.

  126. WTO, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (2001), para. 161.

  127. Ibid.

  128. Kurtz (2010), p. 366.

  129. Mitchell and Henckels (2013), pp. 93–94.

  130. Alvarez and Khamsi (2009), p. 440.

  131. Ibid., pp. 440–441.

  132. Mitchell and Henckels (2013), p. 158.

  133. Alvarez and Khamsi (2009), p. 440–441.

  134. Sacerdoti and Acconci (2014), p. 20.

  135. Mitchell and Henckels (2013), p. 159.

  136. Reinisch (2007), p. 201.

  137. Bücheler (2015), p. 281.

  138. Kingsbury and Schill (2010), p. 88.

  139. Sweet and Mathews (2008), p .88.

  140. Henckels (2015), p. 27.

  141. Ibid., p. 28.

  142. Ibid., pp. 28–29.

  143. Note UNCTAD (2009), pp. 94–95.

  144. Ibid., p. 94; Burke-White and von Staden (2009), p. 330.

  145. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (1986), para. 282.

  146. UNCTAD (2009), p. 95.

  147. Burke-White and von Staden (2007), p. 342.

  148. Ibid.

  149. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (1986), para. 222; Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (2018), para. 42; Certain Iranian Assets (2019), para. 42; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection, Judgment 12 December 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 803, para. 20.

  150. CMS v. Argentina (2005), para. 370.

  151. Deutsche Telekom AG v. India (2017), para. 231.

  152. Kabra (2019), p. 751.

  153. Ibid.

  154. Ibid.

  155. Ibid.

  156. Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan), Judgment of 31 March 2014, ICJ Reports 2014, p. 226, paras. 67, 212.

  157. Ibid., para. 88.

  158. WTO, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS431/AB/R, adopted 29 August 2014, para. 5.90.

  159. WTO, Argentina—Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, Report of the Panel, WT/DS453/R, adopted 9 May 2015, para. 7.911.

  160. CC/Devas v. India (2016), para. 243.

  161. Ibid., para. 238.

  162. Ibid., para. 371.

  163. Ibid., para. 373.

  164. In some treaties, particularly in the paragraph related to the non-disclosure of information, the phrase ‘it determines to’ has been used to express this self-judging character.

  165. Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment of 4 June 2008, ICJ Reports 2008, p. 177, para. 145.

  166. Enron v. Argentine (2007), para. 339; Sempra v. Argentina (2007), para. 388.

  167. WTO, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel, WT/DS512/R, adopted 26 April 2019, paras. 7.138–9; WTO, Saudi Arabia—Measures concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, Report of the Panel, WT/DS567/8, circulated 16 June 2020, para. 7.242.

  168. Akande and Williams (2002), p. 386.

  169. Ibid., pp. 389–390.

  170. Ibid., p. 389.

  171. Kolb (2000), paras. 69, 78.

  172. Schill and Briese (2009), pp. 125–138.

  173. Ibid., p. 125.

  174. Ibid., p. 126.

  175. Ibid., p. 127.

  176. Ibid., p. 137.

  177. Ibid.

  178. Ibid., pp. 128–131.

  179. Ibid., pp. 131–132.

  180. Kolb (2006), pp. 13–14; Burke-White and von Staden (2007), pp. 379–380. The latter scholars stated that good faith encompasses two basic elements: honest and fair dealing—reasonableness.

  181. Kolb (2006), p. 14.

  182. Ibid., p. 17.

  183. Ibid., pp. 17–19.

  184. Declaration (Separate Opinion) of Judge Keith in Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment of 8 June 2008, ICJ Reports 2008, p. 279.

  185. Kolb (2000), para. 115.

  186. Kolb (2006), p. 16; Kolb (2000), para. 127.

  187. Ismailov (2017), pp. 312–313.

  188. Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (2008), para. 145.

  189. Ibid., paras. 147–148, 202.

  190. Schill and Briese (2009), p. 116.

  191. Ibid., p. 118.

  192. WTO, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit (2019), para. 7.138.

  193. Ibid., para. 7.139.

  194. Ibid., para. 7.144.

  195. Ibid., paras. 7.142, 7.144.

  196. WTO, Saudi Arabia—Measures concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (2020), para. 7.292.

  197. Ibid., para. 7.286.

  198. Ibid., para. 7.293. BeoutQ is a broadcasting company and, in 2017, it began the unauthorized distribution and streaming of media content created by or licensed to beIN. The panel first held that the non-application of criminal procedures or penalties against beoutQ by Saudi Arabia violated Art. 61 of the TRIPS Agreement. Ibid., paras. 2.2.4, 7.224.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. PhD Candidate, International Trade and Investment Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

    Habib Sabzevari

  2. PhD Candidate, International and European Law, University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris, France

    Habib Sabzevari

  3. Member, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Mir-Hossein Abedian Kalkhoran

  4. Adjunct Professor, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

    Mir-Hossein Abedian Kalkhoran

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Abedian Kalkhoran, MH., Sabzevari, H. Standards of Review for the Non-Precluded Measures Clause in Investment Treaties: Different Wording, Different Levels of Scrutiny. Neth Int Law Rev 68, 281–314 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40802-021-00196-5

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