Abstract
It is often assumed that the first stage of many classical arguments for theism depends upon some version of the Principal of Sufficient Reason (PSR) being true. Unfortunately for classical theists, PSR is a controversial thesis that has come under rather severe criticism in the contemporary literature. In this article, I grant for the sake of argument that every version of PSR is false. Thus, I concede with the critics of PSR, that it is possible that there is, at least, one fact that is ontologically brute. I then proffer an epistemological challenge to ontological bruteness. Specifically, I argue that whenever a knowledge seeker, S, perceives some unexplained fact, F, it is never reasonable for S to believe F is ontologically brute. I conclude that, even if PSR is false, it is more reasonable to believe that the key premise in the first stage of classical arguments for theism is true.
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Notes
The classical arguments for theism I have in mind are plentiful in the ancient literature. For some examples see the works of Philo of Alexandria (1993 originally, 20-50BC p. 537), Maximos the Confessor (2014, originally, 628–630 pp. 3–5), and John of Damascus (1958, originally, 743 pp. 168–170). Additionally, Lloyd Gerson (1993) and (1994), has done an unparalleled job reconstructing Neoplatonic arguments for theism, such as one finds in the likes of Plotinus. The Jewish and Christian thinkers I just cited were heavily influenced by Middle Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophy.
The arguments develop in this article do not depend on one being committed to a facts ontology. If one wanted to, she could reformulate CAT-1 so as to avoid talk about facts. For example, one could restate 1.2. as follows: < If there is an x such that x instantiates y, there is a z such that z fully or partially explains why x instantiates y > where ‘x’ is ‘the universe’ and ‘y’ is some relation or property like ‘being ordered’, ‘being composite’, or ‘being beautiful’. I, however, find it more convenient to talk about facts.
Bertrand Russell famously proposed always, “to begin any argument that I have to make by appealing to data which will be quite ludicrously obvious” (Russell, 1940 p. 6). In a similar manner, classical theists traditionally begin arguments for theism by appealing to data that might be considered “ludicrously obvious” or incorrigible and, thus, not in need of any additional justification.
Perhaps the most devastating contemporary criticism of PSR has been proffered by Peter van Inwagen (1983, 2009). There are, however, other objections to PSR. For a detailed survey of these objections, as well as responses to them, see Pruss (2006). Recently, to circumvent the formidable challenge of van Inwagen’s objection to PSR, its defenders have reformulated the principle in terms of metaphysical grounding; e.g., see Dasgupta (2016) and Amijee (2020). In response to this trend, McDaniel (2020) has pushed back and argued that, even if one formulates PSR in terms of grounding, the principle is subject to a relevantly similar version of van Iwagen’s powerful objection.
Here I am following Bas van Fraassen’s (1980) contention that explanations are answers to why questions. It is important to note, however, that Jaworski (2009) has argued, quite persuasively, that explanations also encompass answers to how questions. While this is an important point, the distinction between why and how questions is not directly relevant to the topic at hand. Thus, for the sake of concision and clarity I have chosen to focus exclusively on why questions.
By way of example, among philosophers of science, there has recently been an explosion of interest in ‘non-causal’ scientific explanations; see Lange (2016) and Reutlinger and Saatsi (2018). Even just a brief perusal through this material reveals that there are many different ways of interpreting Q1 that I have not covered here.
I realize physicists are exploring various theories that supposedly explain why F3 obtains and that, perhaps, one of these theories provides the best explanation. My point was not to argue that F3 is actually an unexplained fact. Rather, I’m simply using this as a hypothetical example to explain what I mean when I say that some fact is unexplained.
The distinction between epistemological and ontological brute facts was first introduced by Eric Barnes (1994) and was more recently reiterated by Fahrbach (2005) and Vintiadis and Mekios (2018). My explication of the distinction closely resembles theirs. It is important to note, however, that Elanor Taylor (2018) has challenged this distinction. Taylor claims facts that have an objective explanation that we will never know are not epistemically brute; but, rather, somewhere in between an epistemically and ontologically brute fact. It is not clear to me, however, what she means by this.
I want to emphasize that I am not claiming we actually need to build such a device to discover why F3 obtains. This is just a hypothetical scenario.
I have opted to use the term ‘partial belief’ roughly to suggest that there can be more fine-grained attitudes towards propositions aside from all-out belief. Specifically, I take it that one can hold that a given proposition is true with varying degrees of confidence. Presumably, one who partial believes that some proposition, P, is true is more confident in the proposition being true than someone who completely lacks a belief that P. I should add that if one preferred to use the term ‘credence’ she could. I suspect that someone far more clever than I could develop a Bayesian style argument that assigned a numerical value to the subjective probability that I is true given our overall success at discovering the explanations for unexplained facts. I would also like to note that in using the term ‘partial belief’ I not making any commitments regarding the ontological status of ‘partial beliefs’; for an excellent survey of the ontological discussion surrounding credence and belief see Jackson (2020).
Some philosophers may prefer to talk about S’s attitude towards I in terms of acceptance instead of in terms of degrees of belief. Such a philosopher could simply restate premise 2.2. as follows: < If S perceives an unexplained fact, it is more reasonable for S to accept that I is true, unless she encounters a defeater for a belief that I is true > . I do not think this makes a significant difference to what I am arguing in this article. For some foundational discussions about the distinction between ‘acceptance’ versus ‘belief’ see Fraassen (1980) and Harmon (1986).
As I suggested in the footnote above, should one feel inclined, she could assign a numerical value to the subjective probability that I is true given the overwhelming success that human beings have had at discovering explanations for unexplained facts; in which case, she could argue that, initially, S has a high level of credence that I is true.
I’d like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me.
In the second stage to classical arguments for God’s existence classical theists develop various arguments which proport to show that the fact in question could not existentially depend on itself for its own existence. For example, a classical theist might argue that the fact that the universe is ordered could not existentially depend on itself for its own existence (I am setting aside the details of such an argument for the sake of brevity). Note, however, that even if one is not persuaded by the arguments proffered by classical theists in stage two this does not entail that the fact that the universe is ordered is an ontologically brute fact. It simply entails that nothing grounds the fact that the universe is ordered.
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Brown, J.M. An epistemological challenge to ontological bruteness. Int J Philos Relig 91, 23–41 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-021-09805-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-021-09805-y