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Justice in an uncertain world: Evidence on donations to cancer research

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Abstract

The paper uses information on actual and hypothetical charitable contributions to cancer research in the United Kingdom to elicit information on justice principles endorsed by donors. They face a choice between fund-raising contributions for several hereditary and lifestyle-related cancers. Donors’ choices of how much to donate to different cancers reveal how they view luck vis-a-vis risky individual choices. The estimation results reveal that donations are smaller for cancers with higher prevention rates, which is the probability that the potential cancer victim can avoid the cancer in question by some choice. We also find that provision of information on lifestyle-related causes of cancer adversely affects contributions. In contrast, information on hereditary causes has a positive effect on donations. Furthermore, a large share of donors indicated in their feedback that they chose donations to a hereditary over a lifestyle-related cancer to “punish” poor individual choices. These findings suggest that many donors lean toward choice egalitarianism, which conditions donations on the potential beneficiaries’ choices.

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Notes

  1. See, e.g., Rawls 1971; Dworkin 1981a, 1981b; Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989; Sen 1993; Roemer 1998; Fleurbaey 2008.

  2. The comparative statics results in this section hold in a wide range of environments where, in addition to the level of donations, donors choose the cancer type toward which to direct their contributions. Such extension would yield a finding that a choice-egalitarian donor is more likely to donate to cancers with relatively low prevention rates than a non-choice-egalitarian donor. For space considerations, we do not model this choice.

  3. Utilitarianism corresponds to the case of linear W.

  4. This assumption accords well with the literature on the value of statistical life (Viscusi & Aldy, 2003).

  5. Note that although libertarians are opposed to compulsory donations, they are not advocating against voluntary ones.

  6. Andreoni et al. (2016) provide evidence for the effect of timing on subjects’ fairness preferences under risk. Also, see Exley (2016) for evidence on how risk is used as an excuse for selfish behavior.

  7. One could also consider a game-theoretic model where the patient first makes an ‘investment’ choice whether to adopt a healthy lifestyle and avoid the cancer, and then the donor makes her decision. In such a setup, a reciprocity model in the spirit of Charness and Rabin (2002) seems a good starting point. However, game-theoretic models seem less appropriate in our framework, as communication channels between donors and patients do not exist.

  8. After usage for some time, the format of raising donations changed from ”My Project” to CRUK (2019). However, the functionality and information content have changed minimally. The main changes pertain to how information can be accessed.

  9. These four are “basic cancer biology research”, “cancer nurses”, “clinical trials” and “general research”.

  10. Charities may have different interpretations for what a “very large” donation is. Irrespective of the interpretation, “directed service” is in general not available to everyone. We are grateful to David Milton, the head of the fundraising team from Worldwide Cancer Research, for clarifying these and many other specifics of charitable giving to cancer.

  11. We used the donors’ comments to identify whether donations are from groups of non-family members.

  12. The coding of the comments was independently performed by two researchers. The results were then compared to each other.

  13. An example of a donation in this category is a Christmas gift from person A to person B that specifies that a specific contribution to the charity will be made in the name of person B.

  14. The procedure of coding the names was also independently performed by two researchers. Similarly to the outcome for coding of the comments, the comparison revealed almost identical results.

  15. The ratio of the numbers of male to female donors in our sample is 0.66. This number is considerably smaller than the ratio of the two genders (0.98) in the UK population.

  16. A logarithmic transformation of the donation amount reduces the skewness of the distribution from 2.09 to − 0.07 and the kurtosis from 7.60 to 3.26.

  17. Each donation is recorded with a unique system reference number in the data set we obtained from the CRUK. The data contained only the first names of donors and several first names appeared repeatedly. Unfortunately, there is no identifying information to unambiguously determine whether donations came from the same individual or different individuals sharing the same first name. On the one hand, the functionality of the donation platform allows for any individual to come back and make another donation. On the other hand, given the extent of the population that the CRUK website could reach, the chances that any two observations with a common first name correspond to different donors are very high. We have performed the estimations under the assumption that whenever two observations are characterized by the same first name they represent two individuals and the assumption that whenever two observations are characterized by the same first name they represent the same individual. The estimation results are similar. We only report the results under the first assumption.

    Ideally, one would have identifying information and deal with the data as an unbalanced panel. A fixed effects model would be appropriate in this case. This would allow to uncover a number of additional behavioral aspects of justice under uncertainty and channels affecting charitable contributions. Since the present data set does not contain such information, we leave this interesting research avenue to the future. We are indebted to the editor for this point.

  18. For surveys of gender differences in behavior and preferences, see, e.g. Croson and Gneezy (2009) and Wiepking and Bekkers (2012).

  19. However, there are exceptions, albeit very few. For a survey that used a variation of the dictator game, Bekkers (2008) finds that men are more likely to give to health charities than women.

  20. Social distance refers to “feelings of connection (or lack thereof) between two individuals” (Loewenstein 2007).

  21. However, some studies find no evidence that experience of illness matters for decisions whether or not and how much to give (e.g., Smith et al., 1995).

  22. In contrast to the present survey, in Safra et al. (2019) the respondents were presented only with information about causes of a generic cancer and faced a different choice problem.

  23. We have removed 47 incomplete questionnaires, 9 questionnaires that were completeed in less than 1 minute, and 1 questionnaire for which the respondent refused to continue after reading the consent form.

  24. Due to lack of statistical evidence, we did not use these variables in the empirical analysis.

  25. Since donations were chosen contemporaneously, the disturbances in the estimated equations are likely to be correlated.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1

(i) We start with the analysis of the choice egalitarian ex ante donor’s choice problem. Using the assumptions about the values of \( U^{P}\left (H\right ) \) and \(U^{P}\left (M\right ) ,\) the choice egalitarian ex ante donor’s utility function in Eq. 1 can be written as

$$ V^{xa}\left( d\right) =W\left( y-d,p_{s}\left( d\right) +\left( 1-p_{s}\left( d\right) \right) p_{r}\right) . $$

The first-order condition for the maximization of this objective function is given by

$$ \begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} \frac{\partial V^{xa}\left( d\right) }{\partial d} &=&-W_{1}\left( y-d,p_{s}\left( d\right) +\left( 1-p_{s}\left( d\right) \right) p_{r}\right) \\ &&+p_{s}^{\prime }\left( d\right) \left( 1-p_{r}\right) W_{2}\left( y-d,p_{s}\left( d\right) +\left( 1-p_{s}\left( d\right) \right) p_{r}\right) \\ &=&0. \end{array} $$
(4)

Note that concavity of W and strict concavity of e imply that the second-order condition for the donor’s optimization problem is always satisfied. Denote the optimal level of d by d. By the implicit function theorem, the effect of pr on the optimal d is given by

$$ \begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} \frac{\partial d^{\ast }}{\partial p_{r}} &=&-\frac{\frac{\partial^{2}V^{xa}\left( d\right) }{\partial d\partial p_{r}}}{\frac{\partial^{2}V^{xa}\left( d\right) }{\partial d^{2}}} \\ &=&-\frac{-W_{12}\left( \cdot \right) \left( 1-p_{s}\left( d\right) \right) -p_{s}^{\prime }\left( d\right) W_{2}\left( \cdot \right) +p_{s}^{\prime }\left( d\right) \left( 1-p_{r}\right) \left( 1-p_{s}\left( d\right) \right) W_{22}\left( \cdot \right) }{\frac{\partial^{2}V^{xa}\left( d\right) }{ \partial d^{2}}} \\ &<&0, \end{array} $$

where the last inequality follows from the sign assumptions on the second-order derivatives of W. Hence, the optimal donation is negatively affected by the prevention rate.

Next consider a choice egalitarian ex post donor. From Eq. 2, her objective function can be written as

$$ V^{xp}\left( d\right) =p_{s}\left( d\right) W\left( y-d,1\right) +\left( 1-p_{s}\left( d\right) \right) W\left( y-d,p_{r}\right) . $$

Differentiating it with respect to d yields the first-order condition for her optimization problem

$$ \begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} \frac{\partial V^{xp}\left( d\right) }{\partial d} &=&p_{s}^{\prime }\left( d\right) \left[ W\left( y-d,1\right) -W\left( y-d,p_{r}\right) \right] \\ &&-p_{s}\left( d\right) \left[ W_{1}\left( y-d,1\right) -W_{1}\left( y-d,p_{r}\right) \right] -W_{1}\left( y-d,p_{r}\right) \\ &=&0. \end{array} $$
(5)

By the implicit function theorem and the properties of W, we have

$$ \begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} \frac{\partial d^{\ast }}{\partial p_{r}} &=&-\frac{\frac{\partial^{2}V^{xp}\left( d\right) }{\partial d\partial p_{r}}}{\frac{\partial^{2}V^{xp}\left( d\right) }{\partial d^{2}}} \\ &=&-\frac{-p_{s}^{\prime }\left( d\right) W_{2}\left( \cdot \right) -\left( 1-p_{s}\left( d\right) \right) W_{12}\left( \cdot \right) }{\frac{\partial^{2}V^{xp}\left( d\right) }{\partial d^{2}}} \\ &<&0, \end{array} $$

which implies that the optimal donation of the choice egalitarian ex post donor is also negatively affected by the prevention rate.

(ii) By setting pr equal to 0 in Eq. 1, a non-choice egalitarian ex ante donor’s objective can be written as

$$ V^{xa}\left( d\right) =W\left( y-d,p_{s}\left( d\right) \right) . $$

Similarly, setting pr equal to 0 in Eq. 2, a non choice egalitarian ex post donor’s objective can be written as

$$ V^{xp}\left( d\right) =p_{s}\left( d\right) W\left( y-d,1\right) +\left( 1-p_{s}\left( d\right) \right) W\left( y-d,0\right) . $$

Since the prevention rate does not appear in both functions, the optimal donation of either donor is independent of pr.

Appendix B: Choice Questions

Question 1

Suppose you have been asked to donate to research on cancer treatment of two cancers: non-Hodgkin lymphoma and melanoma.

Non-Hodgkin lymphoma is a type of cancer that develops in the lymphatic system, which is a network of vessels and glands spread throughout one’s body. The percentage of preventable cases of Non-Hodgkin lymphoma in the United Kingdom is around 3%, which means that about 3% of the cases could have been prevented by adopting alternative lifestyles (the remaining 97% are associated with hereditary genetic defects or other causes).

Melanoma is a type of skin cancer that develops from the pigment-containing cells known as melanocytes and that can spread to other organs in the body. The percentage of preventable cases of Melanoma in the United Kingdom is around 86%, which means that about 86% of the cases could have been prevented by adopting an alternative lifestyle (avoiding UV radiation associated with excessive exposure to sunlight).

Now you can decide whether to donate to one, both, or none of them.

Question 1.1

For donating only to non-Hodgkin lymphoma.

You have indicated that you would donate only to non-Hodgkin lymphoma.

Please indicate the amount that you would have donated. You can enter any positive number between 0.01 and 200. If you enter 34.75, that will mean that you would have donated 34 pounds and 75 pence. Please do not enter any currency signs.

Question 1.2

For donating only to melanoma.

You have indicated that you would donate only to melanoma.

Please indicate the amount that you would have donated. You can enter any positive number between 0.01 and 200. If you enter 34.75, that will mean that you would have donated 34 pounds and 75 pence. Please do not enter any currency signs.

Question 1.3

For donating to both cancers.

You have indicated that you would donate to both cancers.

Please indicate the amount that you would have donated to non-Hodgkin lymphoma. You can enter any positive number between 0.01 and 200. If you enter 34.75, that will mean that you would have donated 34 pounds and 75 pence. Please do not enter any currency signs.

Please indicate the amount that you would have donated to melanoma. You can enter any number positive between 0.01 and 200. If you enter 34.75, that will mean that you would have donated 34 pounds and 75 pence. Please do not enter any currency signs.

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Melkonyan, T., Safra, Z. & Ma, S. Justice in an uncertain world: Evidence on donations to cancer research. J Risk Uncertain 62, 281–311 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-021-09348-7

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