Abstract
I study a college-admissions model with two need-blind colleges and heterogeneous students. In a game in which colleges can choose a financial aid policy and either binding, nonbinding, or no early admissions, a unique equilibrium outcome exists. In equilibrium, the more prestigious and wealthier college is more selective, has a more generous financial aid policy, and offers nonbinding early admissions, whereas the other college offers a binding program. Compared to the counterfactual in which only regular admissions are offered, early admissions make the more prestigious college worse off, the other college better off, and students, in the aggregate, better off.
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Murra-Anton, Z. Financial aid and early admissions at selective need-blind colleges. Econ Theory 74, 833–870 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01379-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01379-0