Innovations in urban integration policies: Immigrant councils as democratic institutions

Abstract

Cities differ widely in how they integrate migrants, even within the same nation state, and this local dimension in integration policies is understudied. One model that a growing number of cities in both Western Europe and North America have been trying out is setting up immigrant councils and other institutional structures to integrate immigrants. Such representation of immigrant interests in local bodies –has accordingly gained more importance. In this paper, we consider two such local consultative bodies focused on immigrant issues in Norway. Drawing on Smith's concept of ‘democratic innovations’ this paper explores the innovative potential in increasing immigrant's political opportunity structure through such institutions and discusses the democratic potential of such boards. The value of consultative bodies like these as a part of cities integration policy is disputed. Much of this contention has to do with their institutional design, as some may end up being ‘institutional ghettos’, while others become catalysts for enhanced participation. We therefore explore how the local context influences the design and performance of such bodies.

Introduction

There has been a local turn in immigrant incorporation policies in European cities (Alexander, 2003; Borkert & Caponio, 2010; Flamant, 2020; Penninx & Martinello, 2004). City governments have become major players in immigrant integration. National models of integration have been challenged by a growing interest in the local dimension of migrant integration policies (Dekker et al., 2015). Cities in the same country, confronted with ethnic diversity, have adopted different rhetoric and tools (Flamant, 2020). This is partly because integration essentially is a local process, as is the recognition and management of cultural diversity (Niessen & Engeberink, 2006). It is primarily at the level of local policies that the social inclusion of immigrants and the governance of ethno-cultural diversity are negotiated (Ambrosini & Boccagni, 2015). It is also at the local level that immigrants have greater opportunities to become involved in the political life of their new country of residence (Morales & Giugni, 2011). The local context is also key in determining the opportunities available to migrants for forming civil society organisations. Local solutions and management strategies are crucial for identifying, developing and diffusing new integration models (Borkert & Caponio, 2010: 11). Within the framework of immigration policies, new concepts and practices of citizenship are being developed. Such institutional configurations have been a source not only of contradiction, conflict and diverging results, but also of remarkable innovations as well (Ambrosini & Boccagni, 2015: 38). A faceted field of political mobilisation is also emerging at the local level, in which civil society and migrant initiatives have gained public salience and the ability to influence policy choices.

A city's response to immigration and the resulting ethnic diversity could therefore be an opportunity to improve the local democratic system. Managing diversity could mean expanding the spaces for democracy by increasing the democratic participation of minority groups at city level. Political participation can take many forms, including voting, engagement in NGO's, consultative bodies, involvement in neighbourhood planning or protests, among others. In this article we focus on instruments such as committees and consultative bodies – that is, deliberative forums created by governments to involve immigrants and their organisations in decision-making (Schiller et al., 2020; Takle, 2015a). They represent a political opportunity structure for the mobilisation of immigrants to participate in democratic institutions. The representation of immigrant interests in local bodies, consultations or other arenas where urban governments treat issues related to the settlements of ethnic minorities is one form of political integration in which new models are currently being developed. The establishment of advisory councils can be understood as adopting a pluralist policy characterised by the institutionalisation of ethnic-based representation (Alexander, 2003). In the Norwegian context, the board of Immigrant Organisations has existed in Oslo since the 1980s. Oslo has also achieved a dramatic rise in immigrant's direct political participation, with many ethnic minority members elected to its city council. In Norway and Denmark there is a practice of strategic use of the party-list system, especially the ability to write-in and move candidates up the list with personal votes. This is one explanation for the high level of minority representation in the City Council in Oslo. The design of advisory councils and the micropolitics at play define their success in enhancing participation. Basic weaknesses seem to be a lack of decision-making powers, impact and recognition. A crucial challenge is the relationship between the consultative body and mainstream political institutions and parties (Guentner & Stanton, 2013: 45). It is therefore important to see such boards in context and consider how they are linked to other parts of the local political structure.

In this article, we explore the experimentation with similar models in two other Norwegian cities, Tromsø and Bodø. Should these councils be understood as ‘multicultural flagships’ in the municipalities' branding as open and tolerant cities – but with no real power – or do they contribute to a strengthened local democracy? In this paper we look more closely at the design of these two boards, how they perform and to what degree they make a difference in the local political system in which they are incorporated. Institutional opportunities are also studied through the support services for migrants provided by the cities, their overall policies towards migration (including funding of ethnic associations) and the profile of the political institutions with regard to immigrants.

This article is structured as follows: We begin with our theoretical points of departure, inspired by the growing literature on multicultural democracy and the concept of political opportunity structure. We then present the case studies in the two cities with an overview of similarities and differences in the local contexts of the two councils. The two councils' local history, composition and performance are then analysed, and the article ends with a discussion of the innovative potential in these forms of institutions based on the findings of this study.

A city's response to immigration and the resulting ethnic diversity could become a decisive moment in the evolution of its democratic system (Martinello, 1999: 50). It is first of all at the local level that migrants have greater opportunities to become involved in political life. These avenues can be described as opportunity structures – that is, a set of formal and informal signals that encourage or discourage political activity (Morales & Giugni, 2011). Looking at participation in elections, the political opportunity structure in Norway is more inclusive at the local than at the national level. Here immigrants with a residence of 3 years or more have the right to vote in local elections, compared to the requirement of full citizenship status for participation in national elections, which occurs after 5 years of residence.¹ This means that the principle of territory trumps national citizenship, which is necessary to vote in the national elections. The local context is always what determines the opportunities that migrants have to form civil society organisations.

The question of whether an inclusive opportunity structure actually leads to societal integration or inclusion is not straightforward. It depends on a number of factors, such as how democratic institutions are designed, the wider context and local and national discourses about immigration and integration (Guentner & Stanton, 2013: 43). Public discourses about migrants and migration have more importance in some situations than the institutional context of laws and various policy arrangements (Cinalli & Giugni, 2011: 58). A precondition would also be the existence of a civil society that could represent the interests of immigrants in policymaking. According to de Graauw and Vermulen (2016: 990), one of the factors important for the enactment and implementation of a city's integration policy is that the cities have an infrastructure of community-based organisations that actively represent immigrants' collective interests in local politics and policymaking. It is a prerequisite for the collaboration between different immigrant groups and with the city administration as well. This means that the different immigrant groups need to have organised themselves in associations and organisations in the cities where they settle.

Cultural recognition is seen as a prerequisite for integration and political empowerment. Migrants' political participation correlates positively with the density of networks of ethnic associations. An infrastructure of ethnic associations is thus a prerequisite for such mobilisation. However, not all immigrant groups are the same (Tillie, 1998). The civic community of some ethnic groups is more developed than others (van Heelsum, 2005). Groups that arrived many years ago are of course much more organised than groups that arrived more recently. Participation in elections is more popular among some groups than others. Where immigrant groups are well organised and regularly collaborate with each other to realise shared goals, there is a stronger commitment to immigrant integration. Where organisations are weaker as a result of internal fragmentation and polarisation, there will not be the same bottom-up pressure for policies to respond to immigrants' group interests (de Graauw & Vermulen, 2016: 1008). The associations' capacity to influence local policymaking varies from city to city, and within the same city, some ethnic groups are stronger than others, not only as a consequence of their numbers – a number of other factors play a role as well. Certain groups are more successfully incorporated into the political process than others (Fennema & Tillie, 1999), and in-group isolation in some ethnic groups may lead to withdrawal from the surrounding society, including other ethnic groups. Ethnic associations could therefore also mean segregation. Strong engagement in ethnic association thus may mean less interest in participating in the political life of the host society (Strömblad & Adman, 2010: 722).

Well-intended instruments such as consultative bodies have the potential to strengthen local democracy, but bad design and lack of commitment could also lead to ‘institutional ghettoization’ and reinforce social divisions (Guentner & Stanton, 2013: 39). Consultative bodies are often launched with the best of intentions to open dialogue between municipal institutions and new residents. They might promote active citizenship and open new routes to political participation. However, consultation exercises may just be another tactic of elitist governance if not grounded in a regime of rights (Guentner & Stanton, 2013: 50). They may open new routes to political participation, but often their impact is unclear. Early experiences with such bodies is that they rarely enable migrants to get involved in important decisions or lead to their further integration into mainstream political processes, as found by (Guentner & Stanton, 2013: 45). In some cities they are mere talking shops or tools for clientelism (Martinello, 1999). Others point at the ambiguous character of these institutions. One example is the board in Oslo that has been described as an ambiguous design with a double mandate: one from the City of Oslo and one from the immigrant organisations (Takle, 2015b). This ambiguity is common among other immigrant councils across Europe. Regardless of good intentions, one effect could be reproducing exclusion and political powerlessness. Martinello lists four risks that might cause this:

• institutional design, such as target groups (what about those who are not consulted?);

• style: formal settings may attract some groups while informal settings appeal more to others;

• selection of issues on which migrants are consulted; and

• time and frequency of meetings – spontaneous meetings might be less demanding, while regular meetings may be more effective (Martinello, 1999).

The consultative body needs a representative structure and a clear agenda, with a strong link to the municipal authority. A critical challenge arises from a weak relationship between the bodies and mainstream political institutions and parties. Some of the consequences of a weak relationship may include a lack of decision-making powers, impact and recognition. Their design and the micropolitics at play therefore define how successful they are in binding decisions and feeding into the formal decision-making process (Guentner & Stanton, 2013: 44). Such bodies need political commitment and to be framed within a broader integration strategy to avoid isolation.

Institutional design matters (Smith, 2009). Any institutional design will involve compromises between different goals. Institutions are not simply structures through which democratic goods are realised, but are also the medium through which democratic agency is expressed. Institutional design is integral to the form that democratic agency can take. The specificities of the local urban context are important, as local factors shape integration dynamics in crucial ways.

In the present case studies, we will be look more closely at the design of two consultative bodies in Norway. How were the members appointed? To what degree do they set the agenda themselves? Are they incorporated into a policy stream defined by the City Council? This has bearing on power and delegated autonomy. Another issue is regularity: Do they meet regularly or only spontaneously? These are some of the questions that will guide the analyses of the two councils.