Abstract
I argue that there is an interesting and underexplored sense in which some negative reactive attitudes such as anger are often absurd. I explore implications of this absurdity, especially for our understanding of forgiveness.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Change history
12 November 2021
A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10225-0
Notes
Coren (2020) discusses Nagel’s absurdity-argument in an account of a less prominent reactive attitude, namely, awe. Contra Nagel, Coren argues that the benefits of awe as a reply to our cosmic insignificance shows one way in which human life is not absurd.
Nagel’s later view is that an absurd situation includes “a conspicuous discrepancy between pretension and aspiration and reality” such as “…you declare your love over the telephone to a recorded announcement; as you are being knighted your pants fall down” (1979: 13). For discussions of Nagel’s views on the absurd, see Westphal and Cherry (1990: 199–203); see also the provocative account in Gordon (1984).
Following Shoemaker (2015), I restrict my focus to agential anger. All references to anger should be read this way. There are many cases of anger that do not instantiate a reactive attitude; or, if they do, they do not seem like the sorts of reactive attitudes in which I’m interested here. For example, I might become angry after a gust of wind blows an important paper from my grasp. In the cases of interest here, there must be some possibility of communicating our anger with the agent with whom we are angry, and it must be possible for that agent to answer us. Interestingly, Shoemaker (2015: 105, 162, and 202) argues that there is no communicative point in blaming or becoming angry with psychopaths. I’ll not explore that implication of the communicative account of agential anger.
Of course, the literature on Strawson’s piece focuses mostly on the more controversial step of his argument, which runs something like the following: those reactive attitudes and emotions form our responsibility practices (praise and blame), and moral responsibility is misunderstood by incompatibilists (and by consequentialist incompatibilists) because they assume that the facts of moral responsibility can be, or ought to be, explained by something other than those ordinary attitudes. I don’t need to address those controversies, for my purposes here. But for further reading on those controversies, see, for instance, Todd (2016), Beglin (2018), Coren (forthcoming), and the collection of essays in Russell (2016).
Derk Pereboom (2005) argues that we can and should suppress and ultimately get rid of some of the negative reactive attitudes.
This is importantly compatible with anger often being an appropriate response, such as in response to morally heinous actions.
Christopher Franklin (2013) asks why blame is preferable to sadness or disappointment as responses to horrendous evils and atrocities. Franklin persuasively motivates a plausible answer (and one that’s consistent with everything I support in this paper): our blaming practices are parts of how we express our standards of value, such that to give up on blame entirely (and adopt sadness instead as replies to evil) would be to “fail to value what we ought to value” (209). Myisha Cherry (2018) observes that moral anger may be proportionate or disproportionate; Cherry connects this proportionate anger to Aristotle’s claim that we ought to be angry to the right degree (and in the right way, at the right time, toward the appropriate people, and generally aiming at the mean – relative to us, not the objects alone – between excess and deficiency) (51).
References
Beglin D (2018) Responsibility, libertarians, and the ‘facts as we know them’: a concern-based construal of Strawson’s Reversal. Ethics 128:612–625
Cherry M (2018) The errors and limitations of our ‘anger-evaluating’ ways. In Myisha C, Flanagan O (eds.) The Moral Psychology of Anger, Rowman and Littlefield
Cogley Z (2013) Basic desert of reactive emotions. Philos Explor 16:165–177
Coren D (2020) Non-symmetric awe: why it matters even if we don’t. Philosophia 49:217–233
Coren D (Forthcoming) Resentment, parenting, and Strawson’s compatibilism. Erkenntnis.:1–23
D’Arms J, Jacobson D (2000) The moralistic fallacy: on the ‘appropriateness’ of emotions. Philos Phenomenol Res 61:65–90
Festinger L (1957) A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford University Press
Festinger L (1964) Conflict, decision, and dissonance (vol 3). Stanford University Press
Franklin CE (2013) Valuing blame. In: Justin Coates D, Tognazzini NA (eds) Blame: Its Nature And Norms. Oxford University Press
Govier T (2002) Forgiveness and revenge. Routledge, London
Griswold CL (2007) Forgiveness: a philosophical exploration. Cambridge University Press, New York
Hallich O (2013) Can the paradox of forgiveness be dissolved? Ethical Theory Moral Pract 16:999–1017
Holmgren MR (1993) Forgiveness and the intrinsic value of persons. Am Philos Q 30:341–352
Hughes PM (2016) Two cheers for forgiveness (and even fewer for revenge). Philosophia 44:361–380
Jones K (1996) Trust as an affective attitude. Ethics 107:4–25
McGeer V (2018) Scaffolding agency: a proleptic account of the reactive attitudes. Eur J Philos:1–23
Murphy JG (2001) Forgiveness. In: Becker LC, Becker CB (eds) Encyclopedia of ethics. Routledge, New York, pp 561–562
Murphy JG, Hampton J (1988) Forgiveness and mercy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Nagel T (1971) The Absurd. J Philos 68:716–727
Nussbaum M (2015) Transitional anger. J Am Philos Assoc:41–56
Nussbaum M (2016) Anger and forgiveness: resentment, generosity, justice. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Pereboom D (2005) Living without free will. Cambridge University Press
Pettigrove G (2012) Meekness and ‘moral’ anger. Ethics 122:341–370
Russell P (ed) (2016) Free will and reactive attitudes: perspectives on P.F. Strawson’s ‘freedom and resentment’. Routledge, New York
Shoemaker D (2015) Responsibility from the margins. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Shoemaker D (2018) Responses to Watson, Talbert, and McKenna. Philos Stud 175:999–1010
Srinivasan A (2018) The aptness of anger. J Polit Philos 26:123–144
Strawson P (1962) Freedom and resentment. Proc Br Acad 48:1–25
Tanaka K (2014) Anger and moral judgment. Australas J Philos 92:269–286
Todd P (2016) Strawson, moral responsibility, and the ‘order of explanation’: an intervention. Ethics 127:208–240
Ware O (2014) Forgiveness and respect for persons. Am Philos Q 51:247–260
Watson G (1987) Responsibility and the limits of evil: variations on a Strawsonian theme. In: Schoeman F (ed) Responsibility, character, and the emotions: new essays in moral psychology. Cambridge University Press
Watson G (2014) Peter Strawson on responsibility and sociality. In: Shoemaker D, Tognazzini N (eds) Oxford studies in agency and responsibility (volume 2). Oxford University Press, Oxford
Westphal J, Cherry C (1990) Is life absurd? Philosophy 65:199–203
Wolf S (1981) The importance of free will. Mind 90:366–378
Wolf S (2008) Confronting physician assisted suicide and euthanasia: my father’s death. Hastings Cent Rep 38:23–26
Zaibert L (2009) The paradox of forgiveness. J Moral Philos 6:365–393
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Coren, D. Anger and Absurdity. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 24, 717–732 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10217-0
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10217-0