Abstract
Modal collapse arguments are all the rage in certain philosophical circles as of late. The arguments purport to show that classical theism entails the absurdly fatalistic conclusion that everything exists necessarily. My first aim in this paper is bold: to put an end to action-based modal collapse arguments against classical theism. To accomplish this, I first articulate the ‘Simple Modal Collapse Argument’ and then characterize and defend Tomaszewski’s criticism thereof. Second, I critically examine Mullins’ new modal collapse argument formulated in response to the aforementioned criticism. I argue that Mullins’ new argument does not succeed. Third, I critically examine a powers-based modal collapse argument against classical theism that has received much less attention in the literature. Fourth, I show why God’s being purely actual, as well God’s being identical to each of God’s acts, simply cannot entail modal collapse given indeterministic causation. This, I take it, signals the death of modal collapse arguments. But not all hope is lost for proponents of modal collapse arguments—for the death is a fruitful one insofar as it paves the way for new inquiry into at least two new potential problems for classical theism. Showing this is my paper’s second aim.
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Notes
Two notes. First, a positive ontological item is anything that exists (has being or reality). Second, what intrinsicality consists in is a matter of debate. We can make do with an intuitive understanding thereof, since nothing in my paper hangs on a precise and formalized account. I follow David Lewis’s classic articulation: “We distinguish intrinsic properties, which things have in virtue of the way they themselves are, from extrinsic properties, which they have in virtue of their relations or lack of relations to other things” (Lewis, 1986, p. 61). Intrinsic properties (else: predicates), then, characterize something as it is in itself, without reference to things wholly apart from or outside of or disjoint from the thing in question. By contrast, extrinsic properties (else: predicates) characterize something as it is in relation or connection with something wholly apart from or outside it (or as it fails to be so related). For an overview of debates concerning intrinsicality and extrinsicality, see Marshall and Weatherson (2018).
First, a note. I follow the standard usages of possibility, contingency, and necessity in modal collapse debates. I shall also use possible worlds as a semantic device without ontological import. As I use it, a possible world is just a complete, maximal, or total way reality could be. Second, some definitions. Something exists (obtains, is true) contingently if and only if it exists (obtains, is true) in some possible worlds but not others. In other words, it is possibly within reality, but it is also possibly absent from reality. It can fail to exist (obtain, be true). By contrast, something exists (obtains, is true) necessarily if and only if it exists (obtains, is true) in all possible worlds. It must be in reality; it cannot fail to exist.
Assuming, of course, that reasons are or would be mental items of some kind and, hence, positive ontological items intrinsic to but distinct from God.
Modal collapse arguments have been developed that also focus on God’s knowledge. For treatments, see Schmid and Mullins (2021), Grant (2012), Grant and Spencer (2015), and Moreland and Craig (2003, p. 525). I will only be focusing on modal collapse arguments based either on God’s pure actuality or else God’s identity with God’s acts. Thus, when I say ‘the modal collapse argument’, I only mean this latter type of modal collapse argument.
I am thankful to an anonymous referee for bringing this line of response to my attention. See Waldrop (Forthcoming) for a further discussion of ways to rigidify ‘God’s act of creation’, including various additions of actuality operators and an essentiality thesis.
Definite descriptions and singular terms, when indexed to a designated world by an actuality operator, become rigid. Cf. Waldrop (Forthcoming) and Kaplan (1979).
Here, ‘the actual creation’ rigidly designates this particular creation we actually inhabit.
Deterministic causation occurs just in case it is impossible that the cause C occurs without its effect E. In other words, < ~possibly, C and ~E >. This is equivalent to: < necessarily, ~(C and ~E) >, which in turn is equivalent to < necessarily, if C, then E >. Given that God’s actual act of creation is the cause of the actual creation, it follows that (5) accurately represents the relevant deterministic causal link.
This is my own parody argument, but the idea of a parody along similar lines is found in Tomaszewski (2019).
As I use it, traditional theism is different from classical theism. Traditional theism (again, as I use it) is simply the core theistic claims common to most (if not all) models of the theistic God—God is (i) infallibly omnipotent, (ii) omniscient, (iii) perfectly good, (iv) necessarily existent, and (v) the creator of the concrete world.
Alternatively, one could say that it is only those other things that are connected or related to the act (not vice versa), where the relation they bear to the act is one of causal dependence.
Why? Because (i) otherwise, C is just an inexplicable, brute happening; (ii) God contingently acts as he does at least in part because of who he is (e.g., because he is loving, merciful, just, etc.), and this means that C is explained at least in part by N; and (iii) God’s contingent acts are not arbitrary but instead are reason-based, and this means that his acts are partially explained in terms of the reasons which God essentially has (e.g. in every possible world, God has (non-necessitating) reason to actualize moral agents with whom he can share his love).
Since non-classical theism requires that N is wholly necessary—in which case, it is devoid of contingency. And in that case, it is also devoid of potency. (I am assuming that the non-classical theist agrees with the classical theist that God is not a contingent being).
All that’s needed is that the relevant predication is true not in virtue of how God is in himself but instead in virtue of creation’s dependence (or lack thereof) on God. In other words, all we need is that the relevant predication is extrinsic.
It should be clear, from context, that in each of the previous two sentences, (iii) is intended to be read de dicto rather than de re. That is, the first instance of (iii) means: the necessary truth of the proposition < there is a C1-generating thing >, while the second instance of (iii) means: the necessary truth of the proposition < there is a divine creative act >.
Could the classical theist deny that God intentionally acts? It’s hard to see how. First, this runs contrary to the explicit affirmations of at least many classical theist scholars. As Thomas Ward points out, at least for Christian classical theistic reflection on the doctrine of creation, God’s intentional action must serve as a guidepost and foundation (Ward, 2020, p. 5). And as the classical theist Ron Highfield explains, “God’s act of creating is not irrational or arbitrary but is accompanied by God’s intentions and is directed toward an end” (Highfield, 2015, p. 77). Second, part of what demarcates theism from views like deism and various non-theisms is that ultimate reality is personal (in some sense—perhaps only analogously). And surely acts intentionally is partly constitutive of being personal. Third, some of the most powerful arguments for theism not only become unavailable to classical theists if they deny that God intentionally acts, but they also become arguments against classical theism. For instance, the fine-tuning argument, all sorts of teleological arguments, and many more arguments besides—if successful—show that whatever is ultimately responsible for the universe is an intentional agent.
Recall that I am not mounting these problems as positive arguments against classical theism; I am simply sketching such problems in the hopes of advancing modal collapse debates to issues about divine action raised by the death of modal collapse arguments.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for helpful comments.
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Schmid, J.C. The fruitful death of modal collapse arguments. Int J Philos Relig 91, 3–22 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-021-09804-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-021-09804-z