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Individual Stability of Coalition Structures in Three-Person Games

  • MATHEMATICAL GAME THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
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Abstract

Cooperative games with coalition structures are considered, and a principle of coalition structure individual stability with respect to some cooperative solution concepts is defined. In comparison with the paper [15], we consider the opportunity for the players to block the deviation of a player in case their payoffs decrease with the deviation. We prove the existence of an individually stable coalition structure with respect to the Shapley and equal surplus division values for the case of three-person games according to the new definition of the stable coalition structure.

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Funding

The work was funded by Shandong Province “Double-Hundred Talent Plan” (No. WST2017009).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Mathematics and Statistics, Qingdao University, Qingdao, 266071, China

    Fengyan Sun, E. M. Parilina &  Hongwei Gao

  2. Institute of Applied Mathematics of Shandong, Qingdao, 266071, China

    E. M. Parilina

  3. St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, 199034, Russia

    Fengyan Sun & E. M. Parilina

Authors
  1. Fengyan Sun
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  2. E. M. Parilina
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  3. Hongwei Gao
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Corresponding authors

Correspondence to Fengyan Sun, E. M. Parilina or Hongwei Gao.

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Translated by V. Potapchouck

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Fengyan Sun, Parilina, E.M. & Hongwei Gao Individual Stability of Coalition Structures in Three-Person Games. Autom Remote Control 82, 1083–1094 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117921060084

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117921060084

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