Abstract
Consider three widely shared claims that have not been discussed vis-à-vis one another. (i) In his Proslogion, Saint Anselm argued that the claim “God exists” is true. (ii) If an intuition that a claim c is a useful a-priori justificatory resource, this can only be because such an intuition is a justification that c is true. And (iii) if an intuition that c is a justification that c is true, c can stand, not only for mathematical or logical claims, but also for controversial philosophical ones, e.g., “God exists”. This essay addresses (i) to (iii) while dialoguing with the literature on Anselm and intuition and articulating an alternative reading of the Proslogion. The alternative reading is that regardless of whether the Proslogion backs up or aims to back up the claim that “God exists” is true, it implicitly articulates the Meaning Argument whose conclusion is that all persons of faith are able to understand that the claim “God exists” is meaningful. This argument, it is argued, is evidence that an intuition that c may be a useful a-priori justificatory resource even if such intuition does not track truth, but merely meaning in being a justification for taking c to be meaningful. It is also supported that an intuition that “God exists” is not a justification that this claim is true. This is an indication that there may be reasons for thinking that the same applies to other controversial philosophical claims.
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Notes
For truth-driven readings, consider: Norman Malcolm (1960); Charles Hartshorne (1965); David Lewis (1970); Alvin Plantinga (1974); Peter Millican (2004); Brian Davies (2004); Ian Logan (2009), etc. For formulations distinct from Anselm’s of ontological arguments, see the essays in Graham Oppy (2018).
See Millican (2004) for an attempt to articulate an ontological argument in a way that avoids these objections.
“M” is short for Anselm’s Monologion whose translation by Jasper Hopkins and Hebert Richardson was adopted. The Arabic number stands for this work’s chapters. See Anselm (2000a).
This expression was borrowed from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1994, p.2), even though it is not this essay’s aim to use it how these authors did or to engage oneself in the task of spelling out what exactly they meant by it.
“Ver” is short for Anselm’s De Veritate whose translation by Jasper Hopkins and Hebert Richardson was adopted. The Arabic number stands for this work’s chapters. See Anselm (2000c).
Anselm’s view on truth is quite complex and cannot be further addressed here. For such an inquiry, consider Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams (2004).
“Gra” is short for Anselm’s De Grammatico whose translation by Jasper Hopkins and Hebert Richardson was adopted. The Arabic number stands for this work’s chapters. See Anselm (2000b).
“R” is short for Responsio. The translation is also Ian Logan’s whose numbering of this work was adopted. See Anselm (2009).
Examples of these properties are: PG4: to exist “through Himself” (P 5.1); PG5: to have made “all other things from nothing” (P 5.1); PG6: to be “sensible” (P 6.1); PG7: to “not [be] a body” (P 6.1); PG8: to be “omnipotent” (P 7.1); PG9: to be unable to do that which is better not to do (P 7.2); PG10: to be “merciful in relation to us” (P 8.3); PG11: to be “impassible” (P 8.1) in not being “affected by any compassion for misery” (P 8.4); PG12: to be “totally just and supremely just” (P 9.1); PG13: to “justly show […] mercy to the wicked” (P 9.2); PG14: to “justly punish […] the wicked” (P 10.1); PG15: to “justly […] spare […] the wicked” (P 10.1); PG16: to be “just in all His ways” (P 11.1); PG17: to only have ways that are those of “mercy and truth” (P 11.3); PG18: to be “the very life by which He lives” (P 12.1); PG19: to be “unlimited and eternal” (P 13.2); PG20: to be “seen and not seen by those seeking Him” (P 14.1); PG21: to be “greater than can be thought” (15.1); PG22: to “dwell” in a “inaccessible light” (P 16.1); PG23: to have “harmony, fragrance, flavour, gentleness and beauty […] in His own ineffable way” (P 17.1); PG24: to have “no parts” (P 18.1); PG25: to have “all things [existing] in Him” (P 19.1); PG26: to not be “subject[ed] to change” (P 22.2); PG27: to be a “good” that “is equally the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit” (23.1); etc.
For a more detailed take on such violence, see my own, Moreira (2019).
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank John A. Demetracopoulos, Amanda Moreira, Irene Olivero and the anonymous referee of Philosophia for valuable comments on previous versions of this essay. I also would like to thank for valuable discussions on Anselm all the participants of a conference in which I presented a previous draft of the present essay: The Seventh Saint Anselm Conference organized by Saint Anselm College and held online in April of 2021.
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Moreira, F.G.A. Anselm, Intuition and God’s Existence. Philosophia 50, 619–637 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00403-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00403-w