Abstract
In this paper, I claim that even though the conventional account of illocution (Sbisà, in Lodz Pap Pragmat 5(1):33–52, 2009a; In: B Fraser, K Turner (eds) Language in life, and a life in language. Emerald, pp 351–357, 2009b) makes an attempt to theorize social relations in illocutions, the attempt is unsuccessful. Sbisà's conventional account fails to describe the ways in which a fair social agreement can be established. A fair social agreement is a key element for the idea of social relations in the conventional account of illocution. However, considering the role of gender and power relations embedded in social construction, it is difficult to accept the possibility of such an agreement. Since Sbisà fails to provide a probe into power relations, her attempt to establish the point of social relationships remains insufficient. The main argument here is that in the unjust social milieu, the kind of social agreement essential to illocution is difficult. Moreover, what may look like a social agreement might be a result of the systemic oppression done to one particular group. In what follows, I claim that the problem of theorizing the social relation in illocutions remains unresolved.
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Notes
In the later debates and interpretations of speech act theory, the idea of uptake becomes central to the debate. Philosophers such as Strawson (1964), Searle (1969, 1971) and Bach and Harnish (1979) designate uptake as the core illocutionary effect. In her interpretation of Austin, Hornsby (2000) also takes uptake as the central effect.
The conventional procedures might be understood as ceremonial or institutional procedures (Sbisà 2013, 32).
Searle (1969) interprets uptake as the hearer's recognition of the speaker's illocutionary intention.
Grice (1957) discusses the idea of meaning in terms of triadic hearer directed intention on the part of the speaker. He claims that for the speaker to constitute the meaning, they must say something with a primary intention to produce a belief in the hearer about a particular state of affair, namely the content of the sentence. A second intention is that the hearer must recognize the speaker's first intention. The third intention is that the recognition of the first intention should be the hearer's reason to recognize the speaker's first intention. Here, the idea of meaning is discussed merely in terms of the speaker's intention where the relation between the speaker and the hearer is cut off. Sbisà claims that Strawson (1964) reduces Austin's theory in terms of speaker's meaning, which gives rise to the split between conventional and communicative illocutionary acts. Hornsby (2000) defines Grice's account as inadequate. The argument is that in everyday lives, it is impossible to have such complex intentions as put forward by Grice. She claims that the popularity of the Gricean idea of speaker's meaning implies the masculinity of traditional methods and theories.
Sbisà (2009a, b, chapter) claims that Jennifer Hornsby (1995, 2000) supports the intentional idea of illocution rather than conventional account of illocutionary actions. Hornsby discusses the theory of communication in terms of uptake, which is closer to Strawson's interpretation of illocutions. I believe that using Sbisa's understanding of illocution, we might be able to resolve the problem of individualism. Sbisà does not provide a direct response to the allegations of self-sufficiency and individualism raised by Hornsby (2000). Nevertheless, her paper questions the foundations of speech in terms of intentions. Hornsby draws on the intentional account of speech and questions the validity of speech act in the social context; it is to this advantage that I treat Sbisà's idea of conventional illocutionary act as a response to the intention-based understanding of illocutions, and hence indirectly, as a response to the allegation of individualism. However, to be able to do so, we need to engage with their individual arguments on a deeper level.
Such a claim is discussed by Rae Langton (Langton 1993), in her account of illocutionary silencing. In her view, silencing occurs when people’s social backgrounds (social status and group locations) interferes with their ability to perform an illocutionary act (Langton 1993, 299). When there is silencing, a person’s ability to perform an illocutionary act is disabled (315).
The fundamental assumption here is that women might not have sexual rights. It should not be difficult to imagine such a patriarchal society where women lack rights on their own bodies. One such example can be found if one looks into the case of marital rape in India. Here, non-consensual sexual intercourse in marriage is still not considered as a criminal offence if the woman’s age is more than 15 years. Given that non-consensual sexual intercourse after marriage is excluded from the offence of rape, the husband might take it within his right to have sex with his wife whenever he intends to. To know more, see Geetanjali Gangoli (2011) and K.I. Vibhute (2001). To know about the Indian Penal Code, one can refer to IPC-375, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/623254/.
Remember that the performance of an illocutionary act brings changes of a deontic or normative nature. In this particular case, if the act of commanding is to be performed, the husband cannot be taken responsible for forcing sex on his wife.
It might not be specified in legal terms that the husband holds the right to sexual intercourse but since non-consensual intercourse after marriage is not an offence, it is easy for the husband to believe that it is within his right to extract sex from his wife. Given that the case is established in a heavily patriarchal society, it is a lot easier for the husband to assume his sexual rights.
Note that the hearer’s agreement about the illocutionary effect is essential for an illocutionary act. It is on the basis of this argument that the allegations of the speaker’s centrality and the speaker’s self-sufficiency in Austin’s speech act theory are challenged.
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Sharma, R. Illocution and Social Relations: A Critical Analysis. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 38, 453–467 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-021-00247-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-021-00247-5