Abstract
Orthodoxy holds that there is a determinate fact of the matter about every arithmetical claim. Little argument has been supplied in favour of orthodoxy, and work of Field, Warren and Waxman, and others suggests that the presumption in its favour is unjustified. This paper supports orthodoxy by establishing the determinacy of arithmetic in a well-motivated modal plural logic (Theorem 1). Recasting this result in higher-order logic (Theorem 13) reveals that even the nominalist who thinks that there are only finitely many things should think that there is some sense in which arithmetic is true and determinate.
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Goodsell, Z. Arithmetic is Determinate. J Philos Logic 51, 127–150 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-021-09613-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-021-09613-9