Abstract
The transition from “natural” sensation to “phenomenological” perception is revealed since the dynamic temporality within perception is elaborated by Merleau-Ponty. Inheriting Husserl’s phenomenology of time-consciousness and clarifying temporal elements within body schema, Merleau-Ponty assimilates phenomenological temporality into phenomenal body. With the analyses of spatial synthesis in terms of “depth,” the original unity between temporality of perception and spatiality of body is illuminated. It makes the transition from “temporality of (perceptual) consciousness,” to “temporality of body (perceiving)” possible. Further, by introducing the corporeal temporality and its dynamic model into the phenomenology of Nature that is considered as the foundation of phenomenology of body, Merleau-Ponty put forward a new concept of time. Time as Schema in this sense is integrated into symbiotic structure with Nature and flesh in the name of chiasme.
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Notes
The “Central I” in Merleau-Ponty’s main texts, for example Phénoménologie de la perception (1945/2004: 478), mainly refers to the “consciousness-subject” with certain constructive effects in the intellectualism with the method of “reflective analysis” in Descartes-Kant tradition. Merleau-Ponty believes that Husserl has surpassed traditional intellectualism and philosophy of consciousness in a sense. Husserl’s analyses of perception and his theory of time-consciousness points out the direction of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of body, but Merleau-Ponty implies that Husserl’s phenomenology still has some kinship with traditional idealism, and does not fully emphasize the unique statue of “body” in direct comparison with “consciousness”. Therefore, coupled with the influence from existential philosophy, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, the “consciousness-subject” referred by the “Central I” exists not only in Descartes-Kant, but also in Husserl’s philosophy. He thinks that Husserl’s philosophy is still a kind of phenomenology of consciousness, which is incompatible with Merleau-Ponty’s own “body-subject” concept in a certain sense.
Merleau-Ponty put this sentence as an inscription at the beginning of the chapter “temporality” in Phenomenology of Perception, which shows that Merleau-Ponty basically accepts Heidegger’s interpretation of the relationship between “Dasein” and “temporality” to a certain extent. See Merleau-Ponty (1945/2004: 471), Heidegger (2010: 316).
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the National Office for Philosophy and Social Sciences [The National Social Science Fund of China: 20CZX042]. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers at Human Studies for their helpful comments.
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Shen, Y. The Trio of Time: On Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Time. Hum Stud 44, 511–528 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-021-09589-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-021-09589-0