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Does Originalism Have a Natural Law Problem?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 June 2021
Abstract
Gienapp's critical move is to shift our attention from semantics to ontology. What is the Constitution? How was it conceived to exist in 1787, and how has that conception changed over time? These questions must be squarely addressed, he insists, before asking what the Constitution means. Does this whole text-focused enterprise rest on a mistake? Drawing on a wealth of primary sources and modern scholarship, Gienapp makes a strong and interesting case that it does. Boiled down, his main argument is that the founders were predominantly natural lawyers, and thus conceived of law quite differently than most originalists typically do.
- Type
- Forum: Originalism and Legal History: Rethinking the Special Relationship
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Society for Legal History
Footnotes
He wishes to thank Mary Sarah Bilder, Jonathan Gienapp, David Schwartz, and Lawrence Solum for their comments on a previous draft.
References
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