Abstract
In (Re-)Defining Racism, I offer the first comprehensive examination of the philosophical literature on racism and argue for a new methodological approach that I call conventionalism. Framing my argument within this approach, I defend an oppression theory of racism. In this article, I will attempt to accomplish two goals: offer a reply to the thoughtful comments of my critics, and lay out the main argument and major themes of my book in an accessible manner. First, I will describe the philosophical problem of defining “racism” and explain why I think a new methodological approach is necessary to address this problem. Second, I will present the moralist presupposition of my project and extend my oppression theory of racism in response to the challenge of assigning responsibility for oppression. Finally, I will address several criticisms to my prescriptive approach, including: (1) my prescriptive approach unjustifiably privileges moralist explanation (explaining why racism is bad) over social explanation (explaining the causes of racism); (2) the tool of semantic clarification, which my conventionalist framework draws upon, is inadequate for resolving conceptual disagreement; (3) my call for scholars to negotiate the meaning of “racism” is unlikely to succeed and would be insufficient to inspire social change if it were to succeed; and, finally, (4) my conventionalist approach is wedded to a misguided intensionalist semantics, for an extensionalist semantics is more appropriate for the term “racist.”
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Page references are to (Re-)Defining Racism, unless otherwise indicated.
The term “reverse racism,” since its inception, has remained widely rejected by many people (especially nonwhites). To some degree, something similar can be said about the contentiousness of the term “institutional racism.” However, the latter appears to be more widely accepted. The more common controversy over the term “institutional racism” concerns its definition; that is, the term itself is widely accepted but its definition is widely contested. Another interesting phenomenon occurs when certain terms and their standard definitions are widely accepted but some of their uses are nevertheless subjected to fierce critique. Individualistic definitions of “racism” are often singled out in this way. Though most people would agree that race-based hatred is racist, for example, standard uses of this definition are frequently criticized as “ideological.” One argument holds that the nature of racism has significantly “changed” and that, consequently, centering a conception of racism around individualistic forms of racism functions to downplay or rationalize “newer” forms of racism, such as institutional racism. Worth noting is that the normal use of some of these terms may be parasitic upon others. I call this phenomenon “language game contestation” in the book. For example, a proposal to correct “institutional racism” is commonly met with charges of “reverse racism,” while proponents of the former charge proponents of the latter with racism for hiding behind the idea of reverse racism to justify institutional racism.
There is more to my argument. For example, the need to combat, change or resist the harms of individuals and social structures entails a need to understand the causes of racial oppression. This practical need generates a theoretical need for empirical explanation—an issue I return to below.
Zheng extends the SCM model in (2019).
In fairness to Zheng, she maintains that any burdens imposed upon oppressed individuals to attend to their implicit biases must be reasonable, given the unjust burdens they already carry. This qualification, in my view, does not go far enough. On the prima facie argument I provide in this section, it must be added that whites must carry heavier burdens, as is required for altering the racist structure of society which generates IRB in the first place. Further, the issue of attributive responsibility for IRB should also be addressed.
I am alluding here to Cabezas’ criticism of my claim that social explanation is a task best left to the social scientist. He calls this the “orthogonal” view of empirical and philosophical theories of racism. While this criticism is an interesting one—and one I admittedly did not adequately address—this is not the place to do so. My focus in this reply is on a different objection raised by Cabezas. Namely, Cabezas’ critique that the explanatory-descriptive project he advocates undermines the moralist presupposition I take to be essential to a proper philosophical analysis of racism.
Why use the term “moralism” to denote projects that have an antiracist goal? Why not reserve the term for projects that analyze racism’s “badness” in terms of personal wrongdoing? My answer is that describing all theories of racism as moralist implies that practical considerations are relevant to assessing them. This, in turn, undercuts the metaphysical argument that practical considerations are irrelevant or secondary to metaphysical considerations. I return to the significance of practical considerations in my reply to George Fourlas.
Garcia is here replying to my critique of his work; my critique originally appeared in (Urquidez 2017); an edited version appears in (Re-)Defining Racism.
For further discussion of the theoretical disregard of the practical, see (Urquidez 2018).
For further discussion of this type of philosophical argument, see (Urquidez 2020).
This arguably confirms a contention I make in the book; namely, that philosophers have a knack for framing philosophical problems in metaphysical terms. This is not an attack on philosophers; after all, it is likely that all philosophers have—at some point or other—been seduced by the charm of metaphysics. Rather, following Wittgenstein, I take this to be evidence that the seductive quality of metaphysics runs deep in language.
A more compelling case would take on Wittgenstein’s normativism (the view that linguistic meaning is irreducibly normative) and his arbitrariness of grammar thesis.
I would like to thank César Cabezas, Megan Mitchell, José Jorge Mendoza, Naomi Zack, George Fourlas, and Grant Silva for their comments at the 2021 Eastern and Central Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association. Their private conversations with me about these matters have also been helpful. I would like to thank Ezio Di Nucci for the invitation to host this symposium, and for his helpful comments on a previous draft. Finally, I am indebted to Marielynn Herrera and Justin Litaker for discussing my critics’ comments and my replies, and for commenting on some of my initial drafts. Of course, I alone am responsible for any remaining errors.
References
Bell D (1992) Faces at the bottom of the well: The permanence of racism. Basic Books.
Bonilla-Silva E (2018) Racism without racists: Color-blind racism and the persistence of racial inequality in America. 5th, ed. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham.
Cudd AE (2006) Analyzing oppression. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Curry TJ (2017) The man-not: Race, class, genre, and the dilemmas of black manhood. Temple University Press, Philadelphia.
Doane AW, Bonilla-Silva E (2003) White out: The continuing significance of racism. Routledge Press, New York.
Faucher L (2018) Racism. In: Taylor PC, Alcoff LM, Anderson L (eds) The routledge companion to philosophy of race. Taylor & Francis, New York and London.
Garcia JLA (1996) The heart of racism. J Soc Philos 27(1):5–46. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1996.tb00225.x
Garcia JLA (2018) A volitional account of racist beliefs, contamination, and objects. Proc Am Cathol Philos Assoc 92:59–85. https://doi.org/10.5840/acpaproc2020812103
Harris L (2002) Insurrectionist ethics: Advocacy, moral psychology, and pragmatism. In: Howie J (ed) Ethical issues for a new millennium. Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, pp 192–210.
Haslanger SA (2000) What are we talking about? The semantics and politics of social kinds. Hypatia 20(4):10–26. https://doi.org/10.1353/hyp.2005.0126
Haslanger S (2006) I—Sally Haslanger: What good are our intuitions: Philosophical analysis and social kinds. Aristotelian Soc Suppl Volume 80(1):89–118. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199892631.001.0001
Levine MP (2004) Philosophy and racism. In: Levine MP, Pataki T (eds) Racism in mind. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, pp 78–96.
Mills CW (2003) Heart' attack: A critique of Jorge Garcia's volitional conception of racism. J Ethics 7(1):29–62
Mitchell-Yellin B (2018) A view of racism: 2016 and America’s original sin. J Ethics Social Phil 13 (1). doi: https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v13i1.253
Shelby T (2002) Is racism in the “heart”? J Soc Philos 33(3):411–420. https://doi.org/10.1111/0047-2786.00150
Shelby T (2003) Ideology, racism, and critical social theory. Philosophical Forum 34(2):153–188. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9191.00132
Shelby T (2014) Racism, moralism, and social criticism. Du Bois Rev: Soc Sci Res Race 11(1):57–74. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1742058x14000010
Silva GJ (2019) Racism as self-love. Radic Philos Rev 22(1):85–112. https://doi.org/10.5840/radphilrev201913193
Urquidez AG (2017) Jorge Garcia and the ordinary use of "racist belief". Soc Theory Pract 43(2):223–248. https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract2017283
Urquidez AG (2018) What accounts of ‘racism’ do. J Value Inquiry 52(4):437–455. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-018-9626-0
Urquidez AG (2020) A revisionist theory of racism: Rejecting the presumption of conservatism. J Soc Philos 51(2):231–260. https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12338
Zack N (2003) Race and racial discrimination. In: The Oxford handbook of practical ethics, Hugh LaFollette (ed), 245–271.
Zheng R (2018) Bias, structure, and injustice: A reply to Haslanger. Feminist Philos Quart 4 (1), Article 4.
Zheng R (2019) What kind of responsibility do we have for fighting injustice? A moral-theoretic perspective on the social connections model. Critical Horizons 20(2):109–126.
Young IM (2010) A social connection model. In: Responsibility for justice. Oxford University Press, 95–122.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Urquidez, A.G. Reply to My Critics: (Re-)Defining Racism: A Philosophical Analysis. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 24, 679–698 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10207-2
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10207-2