Determinants of corporate tone in an initial public offering: Powerful CEOs versus well-functioning boards

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Abstract

Recent literature on initial public offerings (IPOs) suggests a significant effect of tone in IPO underpricing but ignores its determinants. This study concentrates on the factors that shape the tone of the information disclosed in IPOs. Sampling 211 Latin American IPOs during the period 2000–2019, we find empirical evidence that a powerful CEO can influence tone, avoiding unfavorable tone and fostering the use of positive words in the information disclosed to the market. We also show that more independent boards tend to use more unfavorable tones. Additionally, we find a non-monotonic relationship between board size and the tone in the prospectus, which suggests that an optimal board size mitigates the excessive use of positive tone and leads to more unfavorable tones in the IPO prospectus. Overall, well-functioning boards counterbalance powerful CEOs and generate more realistic disclosure to the market. Finally, we find that market-dominant auditors, age of the issuing firm, proposed use of proceeds, and the number of risk factors significantly affect the tone in the information disclosed.

Introduction

Agency problems become greater once an entrepreneur decides to sell some part of their firm to outsiders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Specifically, when a firm decides to go public via a primary share offering, adverse selection and moral hazard problems may arise. An initial public offering (IPO) is a critical moment as it results in the separation of ownership and control of a firm. This separation can affect the way investors value the IPO (over or undervaluation) and the firm’s future performance. The problems are associated with information asymmetries between insiders and outside investors and the alignment of interest among managers and shareholders.

These problems are a major concern in Latin America when considering the role that capital markets play in economic growth (Levine, 2005). The region has lagged behind others regarding the regulatory environment and shows limited development of its capital markets compared to others. This fact might force firms to develop signaling mechanisms to attract capital from investors (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2007). Corporate governance, specifically information disclosure, can be used by firms to reduce information asymmetry and obtain better asset valuation, thus compensating for a weak institutional environment and poor investor protection (La Porta et al., 2006; González et al., 2020).

Additionally, recent research has shown that the level of information disclosure and the tone used in corporate communications matter for a firms’ valuation. For example, Loughran and McDonald (2013) and Brau et al. (2016), for the U.S., and González et al. (2019), for Latin America, found a direct relationship between tone in the IPO prospectus and underpricing. Specifically, González et al. (2019) showed that tone matters after including firms’ governance, financial, industry, and other control variables. In addition, González et al. (2021) found that tone in annual reports impacts a firms’ value. Nevertheless, despite the relevance of tone, little is known about its determinants.

Given the importance of tone (González et al., 2019, 2021), this paper goes further by considering its determinants in corporate communications, specifically through IPO prospectus in Latin America. We speculate that the tone used in the IPO prospectus, being the firm’s first contact with the stock market, is crucial for the issuance’s success. Sampling 211 Latin American IPOs during 2000–2019, we first followed an empirical approach to obtain a descriptive analysis of the language in the prospectus via the identification of patterns in texts. We are interested in the demonstration of language in its written form as a proxy for meaning. Furthermore, in a multivariate analysis setting, we studied the determinants of tone in IPO prospectuses.

Performing the descriptive analysis of the language in an IPO prospectus, we first choose the most relevant sections in terms of qualitative information; these are the summary and risk factors sections. Other elements of the IPO prospectus, such as the financial sector and other firms’ specific data, industry overview, ownership structure, and glossary, convey more factual and quantitative information and are less heterogeneous and informative for tone.

As expected, an unfavorable tone is more prevalent in the risk factor section than in the summary section; and the reverse is true for positiveness. Hence, our analysis shows that these two sections differ in terms of tone within the same prospectus. Additionally, an analysis of the risk factors section across different prospectuses did not reveal significant differences in tone, suggesting that firms convey this type of information in standard ways. Therefore, consistent with previous literature (González et al., 2019; Ferris et al., 2013; Hanley and Hoberg, 2010), we can conclude that the prospectus’s most informative part is the summary section.

Regarding the determinants of tone and using its measures in the summary section, we found that powerful CEOs (those who are also chairman of the board) avoid unfavorable tone and use positive language. Although it could be argued that any CEO will use positive words to promote their firms, from the agency perspective, CEO duality is a proxy of CEO entrenchment. Entrenched, powerful CEOs have more private benefits to lose if investors significantly underprice the IPO, leading to a potential CEO turnover. Hence, powerful CEOs are understandably more prone to use a positive tone with less uncertainty in the IPO prospectus.

Concerning corporate governance structure, we show that more independent boards lead to the use of a more unfavorable tone in the information released to investors but have no effect on the positivism of this information. Moreover, we found a non-monotonic relationship between board size and the prospectus tone, which suggests an optimal board size that allows the firm to avoid an excessively positive tone in the IPO prospectus and to use a more unfavorable (realistic) tone in the process of disclosing information. Overall, well-functioning boards counterbalance powerful CEOs in the preparation of IPO prospectuses more accurately and conservatively. We also report that market-dominant auditors, age of the issuing firm, proposed use of proceeds, and the number of risk factors significantly affect tone.

This paper contributes to the growing literature regarding tone in corporate communications in the field of financial economics (Loughran and McDonald, 2013; Ferris et al., 2013; Brau et al., 2016; de Souza et al., 2019d; González et al., 2019, 2021; Wang et al., 2021; Reid et al., 2021; Duan et al., 2021). As far as we know, this paper is the first to analyze the determinants of tone in corporate communications by specifically using the IPO prospectuses. Our results show the relevance of corporate governance mechanisms in shaping the way firms communicate with their stakeholders.

Additionally, we show the tension between the boards and powerful entrenched CEOs through the information disclosed in the IPO prospectus. On the one hand, entrenched CEOs foster the market attention to the IPO and, therefore, their reputation. It is also true that an unsuccessful IPO will increase the probability of their dismissal and loss of control. On the other hand, we show that independent directors influence misleading information by CEOs and offer a more realistic IPO assessment to the market. Overall, we highlight the relevance of a proper balance of power in corporate governance at the firm level to guarantee more accurate information for outside investors, especially in terms of board size and independence.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first review the literature and develop our main hypotheses. Next, we describe the data used and perform a linguistic analysis. We then analyze the determinants of tone in Latin American IPO prospectuses. Finally, we conclude.

Section snippets

Corporate governance at firm level and tone in IPOs prospectuses

Transparency practices and, hence, corporate communications are a key component of corporate governance (Morey et al., 2009; OECD, 2015; Patel et al., 2002). Therefore, the quantity and quality of information that firms reveal to the market and the tone used could be affected by corporate governance arrangements at the firm level. Further, there is a natural tension between the board of directors and CEO, attributable to the board’s supervising role (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988).

Analysis of tone in Latin American IPOs

Our data is described in Table 1. The full sample is based on information collected across 1990–2019 and is composed of 521 prospectuses. Analyzing preliminary data, we observed a huge concentration of IPOs during 2000–2019, with 459 prospectuses compared with 62 during 1990–1999. We decided to work with IPOs across 2000–2019 because (a) these are representative of the full sample, (b) the more homogeneous structure of the prospectuses facilitates further analysis, and (c) access to the

Determinants of tone

This section considers the determinants of tone in the Latin American IPO prospectuses. We ran an Ordinary Least Square regression model with the following structure:Yi=α+βk'GVi+δk'CVi+φk'CCi+εiwhere Yi is the tone measure in the summary section (positive or unfavorable); GVi is the vector of governance-related variables: CEO duality (CEO Director), the number of directors (Board Size), and Board Independence .CVi is the vector of control variables, including the financial and the firm’s

Conclusion

This paper studied the prospectus issued during an IPO and its role in reducing information asymmetry between buyers and sellers of new assets. We focused on the qualitative information disclosed by the prospectus, specifically in the sections labeled “risk factors” and “summary.” Using a statistical approach to natural language processing, we found empirical evidence of dissimilarity between the two sections. This dissimilarity can be found in the tone used to describe the nature of the

Author statement

All authors contributed equally to this work.

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