Abstract
In this paper, I try to facilitate the understanding of the concept of ‘omniscience’ by taking into account the terminology developed in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Thus, I start by explaining why omniscience can be regarded neither as grounded knowledge nor as ungrounded or objective certainty. Instead, omniscience might be considered as subjective certainty, which has the advantage of leaving scope for a doubt that enables and strengthens religious faith. Lastly, I clarify how God’s omniscience would be enriched if He were informed of—without needing to share—our objective certainties, in addition to which I highlight two paradoxes that would arise if we disagreed with God regarding some of our objective certainties. These paradoxes reveal that even though the believer could not understand literally God’s statement, it might strengthen her faith if she realized and accepted that a true and consistent commitment to such statement entails the suspension of her own capacity for judgment.
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Notes
This standpoint is characteristic of perfect being theology, which takes as a reference St. Anselm’s (1998) conception of God as that than which nothing greater can be thought.
Scripture quotations are from The Holy Bible, English Standard Version (Crossway).
From this point forward, I shall abbreviate On Certainty with ‘OC.’
By the way, Wittgenstein (2001: § 7) defined ‘language-game’ as ‘the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven’.
I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this remark.
The fact that I have described this language-game as if it were played by two ordinary persons—one of which requires a sacrifice without providing any justification, whereas the other simply must decide whether she carries it out—leads me to conclude that, at least in this sense, religious doubt leaves no room for fideism. For this basic language-game can be easily understood even without being a believer.
Henceforth, when I use the term ‘certainty,’ I will be referring to objective certainty, whereas I will only make reference to subjective certainty when I explicitly indicate so.
See footnote 10.
For instance, people do not usually say ‘I have a body’ or ‘Physical objects exist’—save in exceptional cases or with heuristic purposes—but show those certainties in whatever they say and do.
Ariso (2016: 573) provided four arguments as to why certainties cannot be acquired at will. Specifically, he explained why, ‘in order to assimilate a certainty, it is irrelevant whether the individual concerned (1) has found a ground that seemingly justifies that certainty; (2) has a given mental state; (3) is willing to accept the certainty on the proposal of a persuader; or (4) tries to act according to the certainty involved’.
It should be noted that the fact that God is informed of our certainties does not involve at all that He shares them. Thus, if God notes that I am certain of being in pain at a given moment, that does not mean God is in pain.
I want to emphasize that this is a thought experiment, so that I place the emphasis not on explaining why God seems to speak falsely, but on thinking through the consequences of this thought experiment.
It is obvious that our previous certainties could be considered later as mistakes, but that conclusion could be reached only within a new world-picture and not within the very world-picture in which the mentioned certainties are regarded as such. For world-pictures are neither true nor false, but the necessary background for discerning between true and false.
When one’s certainty is called into question, the concerned individual may try to orient herself in order to consider that situation as if it no longer puts her certainty into question, e.g., she may—want to—think that she has misunderstood the relevant statement or even remain indifferent to it (see Wittgenstein 1988: § 393; Ariso 2012, 2017). In this thought experiment, however, I am taking for granted that the individual is willing to believe and follow God at any cost. In fact, this is just the attitude that God aims to foster in the believer. That is why He says: ‘You will seek me and find me, when you seek me with all your heart’ (Jeremiah 29:13). Therefore, this search also entails pushing intellectualist queries into the background: ‘Trust in the Lord with all your heart, and do not lean on your own understanding’ (Proverbs 3:5).
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Ariso, J.M. Advantages and Paradoxes of Regarding Omniscience as Subjective Certainty in Wittgenstein’s Sense. SOPHIA 60, 431–440 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-020-00795-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-020-00795-4