Abstract
The concept of a face of population states arises naturally in evolutionary games. This paper studies faces of profiles in asymmetric evolutionary games with infinite strategy space. The concepts of strong immovable and immutable faces of profiles are introduced and stability results for these faces are discussed.
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Acknowledgements
The authors sincerely thank two anonymous referees for valuable suggestions to improve the manuscript. In particular, they are grateful for pointing out interesting related research problems mentioned at the end of Sect. 4.
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The second named author would like to acknowledge financial support from SERB, Department of Science and Technology, Govt. of India, through the Project MTR/2017/000674 titled “Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games with Continuous Strategy Space”.
Appendix
Appendix
This section begins with the proof of Lemma 3 which is stated in Sect. 3.1. The remainder of the Appendix is devoted to the proofs of various results employed in part (b) of Theorem 1. In particular, the uniform continuity of the map \(t \mapsto \sigma _i(a_i|\mu (t))\) is established in Lemma 4. This is followed by Lemma 5 where we prove that \(J_i(\eta _i(\cdot |{\bar{B}}), \eta _{-i}) - J_i(\eta _i,\eta _{-i}) = 0\) for any weak cluster point \(\eta \) of replicator trajectories originating nearby the face \(\bigtriangleup _{{\bar{B}}}\). The weak lower semicontinuity of \(\Vert \cdot \Vert _{\infty }\) is verified in Lemma 6 which in turn is used to show the weak closedness of the \(\varepsilon \)-ball around the face \(\bigtriangleup _{{\bar{B}}}\) in Lemma 7.
Proof of Lemma 3
By the definition of strong norm [(see e.g., (1) in Mendoza-Palacios and Hernández-Lerma (2015) or p. 360 of Shiryaev (1995)],
For a Borel set \(B_i\), we consider two cases, namely \(B_i \cap {\bar{B}}_i = \emptyset \) and \(B_i \cap {\bar{B}}_i \ne \emptyset \).
Case 1: \(B_i \cap {\bar{B}}_i = \emptyset \).
In this case,
Note that the maximum value \((1- \mu _i({\bar{B}}_i))\) in this case is achieved when \(B_i = {\bar{B}}_i^c\).
Case 2: \(B_i \cap {\bar{B}}_i \ne \emptyset \). If \( B_i^1 = B_i \cap {\bar{B}}_i\) and \(B_i^2 = B_i \cap {\bar{B}}_i^c\), then
Combining Case 1 and Case 2, we obtain
\(\square \)
Lemma 4
Under the conditions and notations of part (b) in Theorem 1, the map \( t \mapsto \sigma _i(a_i|\mu (t))\) is uniformly continuous.
Proof
Since \(U_i(\cdot )\) is bounded, by Proposition 4.4 of Mendoza-Palacios and Hernández-Lerma (2015), \(\sigma _i(\cdot |\mu )\) satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 4.3 of Mendoza-Palacios and Hernández-Lerma (2015).
As we are dealing with probability measures, by condition (ii) of Theorem 4.3 of Mendoza-Palacios and Hernández-Lerma (2015), there exists a constant \(D >0\) such that
Using the replicator dynamics equation (2) and the boundedness of \(\sigma _i\) (by condition (i) of Theorem 4.3 of Mendoza-Palacios and Hernández-Lerma (2015)) on \(\bigtriangleup \), we get for \(B_i \in {\mathcal {B}}(A_i)\),
By (24), we have
Substituting (25) in (23) gives
This shows that the map \( t \mapsto \sigma _i(a_i|\mu (t))\) is Lipschitz and hence uniformly continuous. \(\square \)
Lemma 5
Under the conditions and notations of part (b) in Theorem 1, we have
for any weak cluster point \(\eta \) of a replicator trajectory \((\mu (t))_{ t \ge 0}\).
Proof
Let \(\eta \) be a weak cluster point of a trajectory \((\mu (t))_{t \ge 0}\). Recall that for \(i \in I\), \(\sigma _i(a_i|\eta ) = J_i(a_i, \eta _{-i}) - J_i(\eta _i, \eta _{-i})\). The set \(G_i = \{a_i \in A_i \; | \; \sigma _i(a_i|\eta ) \ne 0 \}\) is open as the payoff functions \(U_i\) are continuous.
From (20), it now follows that
for \(\mu _i(0)\)-almost every \(a_i \in {\bar{B}}_i\), from which we obtain \( \mu _i(0)(G_i) = 0\).
This immediately shows that
because, by Lemma 2 of Bomze (1991) or Theorem 4.6 of Mendoza-Palacios and Hernández-Lerma (2015), the supports of \(\mu _i(0)\) and \(\mu _i(t)\) are same.
As \(G_i\) is open and \(\mu _i(t) \rightarrow \eta _i\) weakly, we get \(\eta _i(G_i) \le \liminf _{t \rightarrow \infty } \mu _i(t)(G_i)\) by Theorem 2.1 (iv) of Billingsley (1999). Combining this fact with (26) yield \(\eta _i(G_i) = 0\) which in turn gives
Finally observe that
\(\square \)
Lemma 6
Assume that the pure strategy sets \(A_1,\ldots ,A_n\) are compact. The norm \(\Vert \cdot \Vert _\infty \) is weakly lower semicontinuous on \(\bigtriangleup \). That is,
whenever \(\mu ^{(k)}\rightarrow \mu \) weakly.
Proof
Let \(\mu ^{(k)}\rightarrow \mu \) weakly. For every \(i\in I\) and continuous function \(f_i:A_i \rightarrow {\mathbb {R}}\) whose absolute value is bounded above by unity, we have
Taking limit infimum as \(k\rightarrow \infty \) and using weak convergence of \(\mu ^{(k)}\), we get
Now take supremum over all continuous \(f_i\) (whose absolute value is bounded above by 1) and then maximum over \(i\in I\), we get the desired inequality (28). \(\square \)
Lemma 7
Let \(A_i\) be compact and \({{\bar{B}}}_i\) a closed subset of \(A_i\), \(i\in I\). Then the following hold true:
-
(1)
The face \(\bigtriangleup _{{{\bar{B}}}}\) is weakly closed.
-
(2)
For every \(\varepsilon >0\), the set \(K^\varepsilon := \{ \mu \in \bigtriangleup ~:~ d_\infty (\mu ,\bigtriangleup _{{{\bar{B}}}}) \le \varepsilon \} \) is weakly closed.
Proof
-
(1)
Let \(\{ \nu ^{(k)} \}\) be a sequence in \(\bigtriangleup _{{{\bar{B}}}}\), and let \(\nu ^{(k)} \rightarrow \nu \) weakly. To verify that \(\nu \in \bigtriangleup _{{{\bar{B}}}}\), it is enough to show that \(\nu _i \in (\bigtriangleup _i)_{{{\bar{B}}}_i}\), \(i\in I\). Since \({{\bar{B}}}_i\) is closed and \(\nu ^{({k})}_i \rightarrow \nu _i\) weakly, it follows that
$$\begin{aligned} 1= \limsup _{k\rightarrow \infty } \nu ^{(k)}_i({{\bar{B}}}_i) \le \nu _i(\bar{B}_i) \end{aligned}$$from which we get \(\nu _i({{\bar{B}}}_i)=1\). This implies that \(\nu _i \in (\bigtriangleup _i)_{{{\bar{B}}}_i}\).
-
(2)
Let \(\{ \mu ^{(k)} \}\) be a sequence in \(K^\varepsilon \) and \(\mu ^{(k)}\rightarrow \mu \) weakly. Since \(\mu ^{(k)} \in K^\varepsilon \), we have
$$\begin{aligned} \Vert \mu ^{(k)}-\nu ^{(k)} \Vert _{\infty } \le \varepsilon + \frac{1}{k} \end{aligned}$$(29)for some \(\nu ^{(k)}\in \bigtriangleup _{{{\bar{B}}} }\), \(k=1,2, \ldots \).
As \(A_i\) is compact, so is \(\bigtriangleup _i\) with weak topology. This together with part (1) yields a subsequence \(\{ \nu ^{k_\ell } \}_{\ell =1}^\infty \) which converges weakly to a probability measure (say \(\nu \)) in \(\bigtriangleup _{{{\bar{B}}}}\). Taking limit infimum in (29) along this subsequence, we obtain
$$\begin{aligned} \liminf _{\ell \rightarrow \infty } \Vert \mu ^{(k_\ell )}- \nu ^{(k_\ell )}\Vert _\infty \le \varepsilon . \end{aligned}$$Now we use Lemma 6 to conclude that \(\Vert \mu -\nu \Vert _\infty \le \varepsilon \) and so \(d_\infty (\mu ,\bigtriangleup _{{{\bar{B}}}})\le \varepsilon \). This shows that \(\mu \in K^\varepsilon \) and hence the weak closedness of \(K^\varepsilon \). \(\square \)
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Narang, A., Shaiju, A.J. Stability of faces in asymmetric evolutionary games. Ann Oper Res 304, 343–359 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-021-04157-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-021-04157-2
Keywords
- Asymmetric evolutionary games
- Replicator dynamics
- Games with infinite strategy space
- Strong immovable and immutable faces
- Lyapunov stability
- Weak attracting