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Collective Opinion as Tendency Towards Consensus

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Abstract

Group beliefs in social networks are often construed as arising from individual beliefs through processes of update and aggregation. In this paper, we explore an alternative ‘arational’ perspective. More specifically, we focus on group attitudes as neutral tendencies toward alignment of opinions driven by influence patterns among agents modeled in a Markov dynamics. In addition, we investigate logical patterns in the resulting potential group beliefs or, in more neutral arational terminology: collective opinion structures.

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Notes

  1. In such a graph representation, there is an edge from i to j iff \(\mathfrak {I}_{ij} > 0\).

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Acknowledgements

This research is supported by the Major Program of the National Social Science Foundation of China (NO. 17ZDA026). The author is supported by the “Shuimu Scholars” programme of Tsinghua University. The author would like to thank Fenrong Liu, Sonja Smets and Alexandru Baltag for bringing to his attention the fascinating topic on social network and information flow and keeping giving him advice during the writing of this paper. Especially, he would like to thank Johan van Benthem for his substantial feedback and help, which put the results presented here into perspective. Furthermore, the author would like to thank the two referees for their invaluable comments and suggestions. At last, the author would like to thank the Tsinghua - Amsterdam Joint Research Centre for Logic for making the exchange visits possible to conduct the research in this paper.

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Appendix

Appendix

1.1 A1 Proof of Theorems 2 and 3

Theorem 2

When an influence matrix is strongly connected, 0 and 1 are the only absorbing states in the generated transition matrix (Theorem 2). This is implied by the following: (a) A group state b is absorbing in \(\mathbb {T}\) generated by \(\mathfrak {I}\) if and only if Ib = b, (b) For a strongly connected influence matrix \(\mathfrak {I}\), every column vector x with \(\mathfrak {I}\mathbf {x} = \mathbf {x}\) is a constant vector (Theorem 11.10 in [13]).

Theorem 3

Next we prove, using also the regularity, that all states except 1 and 0 can reach both absorbing states.

Lemma

Given a group with a strongly connected and aperiodic influence matrix \(\mathfrak {I}\), for any vector \(\mathbf {b}\in \mathfrak {b}\) with some iG such that bi = 1, there exists a walk from b to 1. I.e., there is a sequence p0,p1,…,pn of vectors in \(\mathfrak {b}\) such that p0 = b, pn = 1 and for all natural numbers k ∈ [0,n − 1], \(\mathbb {T}_{p^{k}, p^{k+1}} >0\). Similarly, there is a walk from b1 to 0.

Proof

First, it is well-known, [24], that when a stochastic matrix \(\mathfrak {I}\) is strongly connected and aperiodic, there is a natural number N such that for all nN, \(\mathfrak {I}^{n}_{ij} > 0\) for all i and j in the group (see also [30, Appendix D.3, Theorem D.3.1] for a concrete proof).

Now take any binary vector \(\mathbf {b}\in \mathfrak {b}\) such that bi = 1 for some iG. We fix such an agent, ι, satisfying bι = 1. We try to find a natural number n and n + 1 binary vectors p0,…,pn such that \(\mathbb {T}_{p^{k}, p^{k+1}} >0\) for all natural numbers k ∈ [0,n − 1] and p0 = b and pn = 1.

We first show how to find the sequence of binary vectors. Let p0 = b. Suppose that pk has been defined, then we set \(p^{k+1}_{i} := 1\), if there is yG such that \(\mathfrak {I}_{iy}>0\) and \({p^{k}_{y}} = 1\), and := 0, otherwise. □

Claim

This definition implies that for all positive integers k, \(\mathbb {T}_{p^{k}, p^{k+1}} >0\).

Proof

Take any iG. (a) If there is a yG such that \(\mathfrak {I}_{iy}>0\) and \({p^{k}_{y}} = 1\), according to the definition of \(P(Bv_{i}^{\prime }=1|Bv=p^{k})\) given by (2), \(\mathfrak {I}_{iy}>0\) and \({p^{k}_{y}} = 1\) imply that \(P(Bv_{i}^{\prime }=1|Bv=p^{k}) > 0\). Since in this case \(p^{k+1}_{i} = 1\), it clearly follows that \(P(Bv_{i}^{\prime }=p^{k+1}_{i}|Bv=p^{k}) > 0\). (b) If there is no yG such that \(\mathfrak {I}_{iy}>0\) and \({p^{k}_{y}} = 1\), then \(P(Bv_{i}^{\prime }=1|Bv=p^{k}) = 0\), which implies that \(P(Bv_{i}^{\prime }=0|Bv=p^{k}) =1 > 0\). In this case \(p^{k+1}_{i} = 0\). Therefore, we have \(P(Bv_{i}^{\prime }=p^{k+1}_{i}|Bv=p^{k}) > 0\).

It follows that, for all iG, \(P(Bv_{i}^{\prime }=p^{k+1}_{i}|Bv=p^{k}) > 0\), which implies that \(\mathbb {T}_{p^{k}, p^{k+1}} = {\prod }_{i\in G}P(Bv_{i}^{\prime }=p^{k+1}_{i}|Bv=p^{k}) > 0\).

Next, we show that by taking any number n satisfying \(\mathfrak {I}_{ij}^{n} > 0\) for all i,jG (the existence of such numbers n is ensured by the property of the influence matrix \(\mathfrak {I}\) observed at the beginning of this proof), pn = 1.

Assume that n is the number satisfying \(\mathfrak {I}_{ij}^{n} > 0\) for all i,jG. Then for all xG, there must be a walk from x to ι in the graph representation of the matrix \(\mathfrak {I}\)Footnote 1 whose length is n. For each xG, fix such a walk wx from x to ι. Let Sn = {wxxG}. Keep in mind that for all walks in the associated graph, their length is n and they start from x and end at ι. □

Claim

pn = 1.

Proof

For all xG, let \({w_{x}^{m}}\) be the agent m steps away from ι along the opposite direction of the path wxSn. For example, \({w_{x}^{0}} = \iota \). (a) We first show that for all xG and all m > 0, \(p^{m}_{{w^{m}_{x}}} = 1\) by induction. Obviously, \(p^{1}_{{w^{1}_{x}}} = 1\), because there is yG, which is \({w^{0}_{x}}\) (i.e., ι), satisfying \(\mathfrak {I}_{{w^{1}_{x}}y} > 0\) and \({p^{0}_{y}} = 1\). (b) Now suppose that \(p^{m}_{{w^{m}_{x}}} = 1\). By noticing that \({w^{m}_{x}}\) satisfies \(\mathfrak {I}_{w^{m+1}_{x}{w^{m}_{x}}} > 0\), we get \(p^{m+1}_{w^{m+1}_{x}} = 1\). (c) Next, we show that for the number n, \(G = \{{w^{n}_{x}}\mid x\in G\}\). Recall the definition of wx. For all xG, it follows by the definition of wx that \({w^{n}_{x}} = x\).

Therefore, for all xG, \({p^{n}_{x}} = p^{n}_{{w^{n}_{x}}}= 1\). That is pn = 1.

By a similar argument there is a walk from any state b1 to 0. □

1.2 A2 Proof of Theorem 5

The proof is by induction. We first prove the base case for all states of a group \(\mathbf {b}\in \mathfrak {b}\) and all group members iG, \(\mathfrak {I}_{i\ast }\cdot \mathbf {b} = {\sum }_{\mathbf {s}_{i} = 1}\mathbb {T}_{\mathbf {bs}}\).

Claim

\({\sum }_{\{\mathbf {s}\in \mathfrak {b}\mid \mathbf {s}_{i} =1\}}{\prod }_{\{x\in G\mid x\neq i\}} P(Bv_{x}^{\prime } = \mathbf {s}_{x}|Bv = \mathbf {b}) = 1\)

Proof

Recall that \(P(Bv^{\prime } = \mathbf {s}| Bv = \mathbf {b}) = \mathbb {T}_{\mathbf {bs}}\). Since \(\mathbb {T}_{\mathbf {bs}} = {\prod }_{x\in G} P(Bv_{x}^{\prime } = \mathbf {s}_{x}|Bv = \mathbf {b})\), for all \(\mathbf {s}\in \mathfrak {b}\) such that si = 1: \( P(Bv^{\prime } = \mathbf {s}| Bv = \mathbf {b}, Bv_{i}^{\prime } = 1) = \frac {P(Bv ' = \mathbf {s}| Bv = \mathbf {b})}{P(Bv_{i}^{\prime } = 1|Bv =\mathbf {b})} = {\prod }_{\{x\in G\mid x\neq i\}} P(Bv_{x}^{\prime } = \mathbf {s}_{x}|Bv = \mathbf {b}) \). Obviously, \({\sum }_{\{\mathbf {s}\in \mathfrak {b}\mid \mathbf {s}_{i} =1\}}P(Bv^{\prime } = \mathbf {s}\mid Bv = \mathbf {b}, Bv_{i}^{\prime } = 1) = 1\).

Making use of the claim, we prove the base case:

$$ \begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} \mathfrak{I}_{i\ast}\mathbf{b} & =& P(Bv_{i}^{\prime} = 1|Bv = \mathbf{b})\\ & =& P(Bv_{i}^{\prime} = 1 | Bv = \mathbf{b}) \cdot (\underset{\{\mathbf{s}\in \mathfrak{b}\mid \mathbf{s}_{i} =1\}}{\sum}\underset{\{x\in G\mid x\neq i\}}{\prod} P(Bv_{x}^{\prime} = \mathbf{s}_{x} | Bv = \mathbf{b}))\\ & =& \underset{\{\mathbf{s}\in \mathfrak{b}\mid \mathbf{s}_{i} =1\}}{\sum}\underset{x\in G}{\prod} P(Bv_{x}^{\prime} = \mathbf{s}_{x} | Bv = \mathbf{b}) = \underset{\{\mathbf{s}\in \mathfrak{b}\mid \mathbf{s}_{i} =1\}}{\sum}\mathbb{T}_{\mathbf{bs}} \end{array} $$

Next we prove \(\mathfrak {I}^{n+1}_{i\ast }\cdot \mathbf {b} = {\sum }_{\mathbf {s}_{i} = 1}\mathbb {T}^{n+1}_{\mathbf {bs}}\) assuming that \(\mathfrak {I}^{n}_{i\ast }\cdot \mathbf {b} = {\sum }_{\mathbf {s}_{i} = 1}\mathbb {T}^{n}_{\mathbf {bs}} \enspace \).

$$ \begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} \underset{\mathbf{s}_{i} = 1}{\sum}\mathbb{T}^{n+1}_{\mathbf{bs}} &=& \underset{\mathbf{s}_{i} = 1}{\sum}\mathbb{T}^{n}_{\mathbf{b}\ast}\mathbb{T}_{\ast\mathbf{s}}= \mathbb{T}^{n}_{\mathbf{b}\ast}\cdot \underset{\mathbf{s}_{i} = 1}{\sum}\mathbb{T}_{\ast\mathbf{s}} = \mathbb{T}^{n}_{\mathbf{b}\ast}\cdot \begin{bmatrix} {\sum}_{\mathbf{s}_{i} = 1}\mathbb{T}_{\mathbf{1}\mathbf{s}}\\ \vdots\\ {\sum}_{\mathbf{s}_{i} = 1}\mathbb{T}_{\mathbf{0}\mathbf{s}}\\ \end{bmatrix} = \mathbb{T}^{n}_{\mathbf{b}\ast}\cdot \begin{bmatrix} \mathfrak{I}_{i\ast}\mathbf{1}\\ \vdots\\ \mathfrak{I}_{i\ast}\mathbf{0}\\ \end{bmatrix} \\ &=& \underset{\mathbf{k}\in \mathfrak{b}}{\sum}(\mathbb{T}^{n}_{\mathbf{bk}}\cdot\mathfrak{I}_{i\ast}\cdot \mathbf{k})= \mathfrak{I}_{i\ast}\cdot \underset{\mathbf{k}\in \mathfrak{b}}{\sum}(\mathbb{T}^{n}_{\mathbf{bk}}\cdot \mathbf{k})= \mathfrak{I}_{i\ast}\cdot \begin{bmatrix} {\sum}_{\mathbf{k}_{1} = 1}\mathbb{T}^{n}_{\mathbf{bk}}\\ \vdots\\ {\sum}_{\mathbf{k}_{|G|} = 1}\mathbb{T}^{n}_{\mathbf{bk}}\\ \end{bmatrix} \\ &=& \mathfrak{I}_{i\ast}\cdot \begin{bmatrix} \mathfrak{I}^{n}_{1\ast}\mathbf{b}\\ \vdots\\ \mathfrak{I}^{n}_{|G|\ast}\mathbf{b}\\ \end{bmatrix} = \mathfrak{I}_{i\ast}\cdot (\mathfrak{I}^{n}\mathbf{b}) = (\mathfrak{I}_{i\ast}\mathfrak{I}^{n})\cdot \mathbf{b}= \mathfrak{I}^{n+1}_{i\ast}\mathbf{b} \end{array} $$

This completes the proof.

Next, we use Theorem 5 to prove the direction from 3 to 4 in Theorem 6.

First, using Theorem 5, we prove that as n tends to \(\infty \), if the powers of the transition matrix \(\mathbb {T}^{n}\) converge, so do \(\mathfrak {I}^{n}\), the powers of the influence matrix . □

Proof

Let the powers \(\mathbb {T}^{n}\) converge as n tends to \(\infty \). By Theorem 5, \(\mathfrak {I}_{ij}^{n} = \mathfrak {I}_{i\ast }^{n}\mathbf {e_{j}} = {\sum }_{\mathbf {s}_{i} = 1}\mathbb {T}^{n}_{\mathbf {e}_{j}\mathbf {s}}\) for all \(n\in \mathbb {N}\), where ej is the vector with i th entry 1 and all other entries 0. Because \(\mathbb {T}^{n}\) converges to \(\mathbb {T}^{\infty }\), \(\mathfrak {I}_{ij}^{n}\) converges to \({\sum }_{\mathbf {s}_{i} = 1}\mathbb {T}^{\infty }_{\mathbf {e}_{j}\mathbf {s}}\). Each entry of \(\mathfrak {I}\) thus converges to a number, and hence \(\mathfrak {I}\) converges. □

Second, we prove that if in the limiting matrix \(\mathbb {T}^{\infty }\), \(\mathbb {T}^{\infty }_{\mathbf {bd}} = 0\) for each state b and each state d1,0, no other entries are zero and \(\mathbb {T}^{\infty }_{\mathbf {11}} = \mathbb {T}^{\infty }_{\mathbf {00}} = 1\), then the rows of \(\mathfrak {I}^{\infty }\) are all the same strictly positive stochastic vector.

Proof

Given the assumption, for all iG, \(\mathfrak {I}_{ij}^{\infty } = \mathfrak {I}^{\infty }_{i\ast }\mathbf {e}_{j} = {\sum }_{\mathbf {s}_{i} = 1}\mathbb {T}^{\infty }_{\mathbf {e}_{j}\mathbf {s}} = \mathbb {T}^{\infty }_{\mathbf {e}_{j}\mathbf {1}}\). The second equality is what we have just proved. The third equality holds as the only non-zero entries in \(\mathbb {T}^{\infty }_{\mathbf {e}_{j}\ast }\) are \(\mathbb {T}^{\infty }_{\mathbf {e}_{j}\mathbf {1}}\), \(\mathbb {T}^{\infty }_{\mathbf {e}_{j}\mathbf {0}}\). □

Finally, the fact that the row vector in \(\mathfrak {I}^{\infty }\) sums to 1 follows from the fact that any powers of a probability matrix is a probability matrix (namely, each row vector sums to 1 and is non-negative).

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Shi, C. Collective Opinion as Tendency Towards Consensus. J Philos Logic 50, 593–613 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-020-09579-0

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