Journal of Southern History

Early in this study of the jurisprudence of Justice Robert (Bob) Gammage, John C. Domino states his hope that his book "will fill a major gap that exists in [End Page 368] the literature documenting the history of judicial politics in Texas" (p. 10). The author succeeds by keeping his focus squarely on that main topic: judicial politics. This book is not a biography; within a dozen pages in the first chapter, Domino has already placed his subject on the bench, having skipped lightly over Gammage's military service, his occasional college teaching, and even his climb up the rungs of Texas Democratic Party politics. Gammage served in the Texas House, the Texas Senate, and the United States House of Representatives, and he was briefly assistant attorney general of Texas. Domino lingers on Gammage's legislative career just long enough to describe his affiliation with the "Dirty Thirty" (a reform-minded group in the state capitol) and to summarize his role in the quixotic attempts to amend the Texas constitution in the 1970s (p. 2). These political tales are key to understanding Gammage's liberal views after his election to the judiciary.

The second chapter is dedicated to Gammage's decade on the Third Court of Appeals in Austin (1982–1991), where he became a robust defender of individual rights and civil liberties. Gammage found support for his opinions as often in the state constitution as in federal judicial precedent. One notable example came in Kirby v. Edgewood Independent School District (1989), in which Mexican Americans argued that Texas's funding of public schools though local taxes violated the principle of equal protection by discriminating against students living in low-income school districts. A trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but the Third Court of Appeals reversed the ruling 2–1, arguing in part that access to education was not a fundamental right. In his long dissent, Gammage argued that, although the U.S. Constitution (and the federal judiciary) had not recognized such a right, the Texas constitution explicitly charged the state with providing public education. His views were vindicated the next year by the Texas Supreme Court, which reversed the Third Court and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.

The next chapter similarly covers Gammage's ascension to the Texas Supreme Court (1991–1995). Altogether, Gammage wrote more than 250 opinions, making an exhaustive analysis impractical. Instead, Domino offers summaries of milestone opinions that he believes best represent Gammage's "jurisprudence of rights and liberties" (p. 11). Justice Gammage continued to expound progressive views, but soon found himself again in the dissenting minority as the conservative majority on the court increased year by year, election by election. Faced with the prospect of losing his own seat unless he chased after the millions of donor dollars as was becoming the norm in state judicial campaigns, Gammage shocked the state (and gained national attention) by abruptly resigning in 1995. Domino tells us where the rising tide of dollars was coming from and why it flooded court races: conservative Democrats had given way to Gammage's generation of liberal Democrats, whose support for plaintiffs and progressive causes led to a backlash. Texas courts turned from blue to Republican red as lobbyists for business interests (including the medical community) joined with conservatives to spend whatever was necessary to elect judges who shared their views.

The next chapter, "Court Wars: Judicial Politics and Reform," covers Gammage's subsequent leading role in the decade-long effort to reduce the role [End Page 369] of money in judicial campaigns. He and other reformers variously proposed limiting contributions, capping spending, and, more radically, eliminating the popular election of judges. In a concluding chapter, Domino gives a balanced summary of the goals and mixed achievements of these efforts.