Abstract
The private sector in North Korea is virtually non-existent, and typical forms of grass-root Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) required for forestry carbon trading are not recognized. The state regulates the local forest communities and labor market through central planning and control. Previous researches tend to target grass-root NGOs that were established voluntarily after democratization, while implicitly excluding a state-supervised organization in which residents are members. This paper demonstrates that the carbon benefits secured by forestry projects could be negotiated by a non-voluntary state-supervised organization initially established as a resident watch-dog. Since state-supervised organizations in recipient countries can play a key role in educating grassroots citizens on the true role of NGOs, originated from democratized western countries, this paper will be a valuable reference for accommodating beneficiary obligations specified in multilateral funding. Although North Korea has been selected as a case study for this paper, this kind of peaceful intervention is relevant to other countries that face similar state-supervised resident organizations in implementing multilateral funding projects.
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Notes
Paris Agreement Article 6.2 states that Parties shall, for internationally transferred mitigation outcomes toward nationally determined contributions promote sustainable development.
Foreign Investment Law Article 15 allows foreign investors to lease land necessary for their enterprises for a maximum period of 50 years, further the transfer and inheritance of the leased land.
Western Australia Carbon Rights Act 2003 (as revised in 2006) 6. (1) When a carbon right form is registered (a) the carbon right houses a separate interest in the land.
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Um, DB. Assigning a grass-root NGO role to legitimate organizations as resident watch-dogs in negotiating carbon benefits derived from multilateral funding. Int Environ Agreements 21, 631–646 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-021-09535-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-021-09535-6