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YES Bank fiasco: a corporate governance failure

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Abstract

Financial market has been jolted on 5 March 2020 when the central government has put YES Bank Ltd., India’s fourth largest private bank, under moratorium, and the RBI has come out with a bailout package. The former CEO had extended loans in quid pro quo non-arrangement to the companies confronting financial turmoil. Theoretically, independent directors supposed to bring independent judgement about strategy and risk management which, for the bank, has been miserably failed and has extended loans without considering the borrowers’ ability of repayment. The audit committee has too failed to show its acumen and approved the management’s proposals.

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Deb, R. YES Bank fiasco: a corporate governance failure. Decision 48, 181–190 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40622-021-00277-7

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