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Relating Neuroscience to Responsibility: Comments on Hirstein, Sifferd, and Fagan’s Responsible Brains

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Abstract

The article explores the agreements and disagreements between the author and the authors of Responsible Brains on how neuroscience relates to moral responsibility. The agreements are fundamental: neuroscience is not the harbinger of revolutionary revision of our views of when persons are morally responsible for the harms that they cause. The disagreements are in the details of what is needed for neuroscience to be the helper (rather than the challeger) of the moral sciences.

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Notes

  1. William Hirstein, Katrina L. Sifferd, and Tyler K. Fagan, Responsible Brains: Neuroscience, Law, and Human Culpability (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2018). Parenthetical page references in the text are to this book.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Charles Walgreen University Chair, Center for Advanced Study Professor of Law and Philosophy, Co-Director of the Program in Law and Philosophy, University of Illinois, Champaign, USA

    Michael S. Moore

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  1. Michael S. Moore
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Correspondence to Michael S. Moore.

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Moore, M.S. Relating Neuroscience to Responsibility: Comments on Hirstein, Sifferd, and Fagan’s Responsible Brains. Criminal Law, Philosophy 16, 283–298 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-021-09573-w

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-021-09573-w

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