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Socializing willpower: Resolve from the outside in

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 April 2021

Stephen Setman
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN47906-2098. ssetman@purdue.edu; drkelly@purdue.eduhttps://setman.carrd.co/, http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~drkelly/
Daniel Kelly
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN47906-2098. ssetman@purdue.edu; drkelly@purdue.eduhttps://setman.carrd.co/, http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~drkelly/

Abstract

Ainslie's account of willpower is conspicuously individualistic. Because other people, social influence, and culture appear only peripherally, it risks overlooking what may be resolve's deeply social roots. We identify a general “outside-in” explanatory strategy suggested by a range of recent research into human cognitive evolution, and suggest how it might illuminate the origins and more social aspects of resolve.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Creative Commons
The target article and response article are works of the U.S. Government and are not subject to copyright protection in the United States.
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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