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On the indignity of killer robots

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Abstract

Recent discussion on the ethics of killer robots has focused on the supposed lack of respect their deployment would show to combatants targeted, thereby causing their undignified deaths. I present two rebuttals of this argument. The weak rebuttal maintains that while deploying killer robots is an affront to the dignity of combatants, their use should nevertheless be thought of as a pro tanto wrong, making deployment permissible if the affront is outweighed by some right-making feature. This rebuttal is, however, vulnerable (but not insurmountably so) to the charge that killer robots would cause unnecessary suffering. The strong rebuttal, in contrast, argues that the use of killer robots would not disrespect the dignity of combatants, for reasons discussed. I also argue that, irrespective of whether killer robots disrespect the dignity of combatants, they would not necessarily bring about their undignified deaths: for one can maintain dignity in the face of indignity.

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Notes

  1. The responsibility gap concerns who is ultimately responsible for the actions of killer robots given that, by design, they are able to make autonomous decisions about who lives and who dies.

  2. The essence of the argument is this: If one has a choice between using a killer robot (incapable of acting for the right reason) and a human combatant (capable of acting for the right reason), even where the outcome is the same (e.g., justifiably killing an enemy combatant), deploying the human combatant is the morally superior choice.

  3. I thank the anonymous reviewer for pushing me to clarify this point.

  4. Singer (1986) and Gluchman (2017, cf p. 141) offer objections to this view.

  5. The concept of an inherent, inalienable dignity, synonymous with or constitutive of humanity’s innate capacity for autonomy, is metaphysically problematic. As Coghlan (2018) asks: How can dignity, so constituted, be inalienable given that autonomy, and rationality are not inalienable? After all, autonomy and rationality may be absent in certain members of humanity (those with severe learning difficulties or in a permanent vegetative state, for example). This issue need not concern us, however, given that our interest is in the dignity of combatants who, by their very nature, possess the aforementioned capacity for autonomous rational thought and action, and are therefore held to be moral agents. Even if we side-step this issue, Macklin (2003) and Pinker (2008) complain that dignity is a subjective and imprecise term used to describe what we already think of as respect for a person’s autonomy (see also Alpinar-Şencan et al., 2017). For the purpose of this paper, I am happy to continue using the term ‘dignity’ for convenience, even though I take respecting one’s dignity to be synonymous with respecting one’s rational autonomy.

  6. Webster (2016) likewise distinguishes between dignity that is intrinsic and dignity that is variable.

  7. Purves et al. (2015) briefly suggest something similar.

  8. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996.

  9. IHL Volume II, Chapter 20, Section A, Rule 70.

  10. The Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effect (CCW), 2003.

  11. Of course, there is a risk that in order to retaliate effectively against killer robots the combatants would need to construct more powerful weapons which, in turn, would lead to more advanced killer robots to counter the retaliatory prowess of the combatants’ arsenal, possibly leading to a killer-robot induced arms race. This could then defeat any humanitarian advantage (in terms of saving lives) first envisaged by those seeking to deploy killer robots. Leveringhaus (2016) makes a similar point. I thank the anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this.

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  1. School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, 3010, Australia

    Garry Young

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Young, G. On the indignity of killer robots. Ethics Inf Technol 23, 473–482 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-021-09590-2

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