Abstract
Recent attempts to extend internalization theory into new fields of enquiry illustrate the crucial role of control in the theory. In this paper, we focus on two examples: one applying internalization theory to external business relationships of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and one applying new internalization theory to MNEs’ governance. We argue that, in both cases, the ability of the extended theory to explain MNE behavior can be questioned, either because of the governance of the external relationships is shared between the MNE and its counterparts (as in the first case), or because of the substantial increase in the level of complexity of the MNE’s decision-making system (as in the second case). We conclude that scholars applying internalization theory to MNEs’ external business relationships, and to their decision-making processes, should address what shared governance in external business relationships, and the issue of bounded rationality/bounded reliability, actually mean for the possibility to apply the usual economic logic behind internalization theory. It is essential that future research focuses on what impact the circumscribed control in the two cases has on the ability of MNEs to assess, both ex ante and ex post, the level of transaction costs and managerial costs as bases for its decisions to invest abroad and run foreign operations.
Résumé
Les efforts récents d’étendre la théorie de l’internalisation à de nouveaux champs d’enquête démontrent le rôle crucial du contrôle dans la théorie. Dans cet article, nous nous focalisons sur deux exemples: l’un appliquant la théorie de l’internalisation aux relations commerciales externes des entreprises multinationales (MNEs - Multinational Enterprises) et l’autre appliquant la nouvelle théorie de l’internalisation (NIT - New Internalization Theory) à la gouvernance des MNEs. Nous argumentons que dans les deux cas, la capacité de la théorie étendue à expliquer le comportement des MNEs puisse être remise en question, soit parce que la gouvernance des relations externes se partage entre la MNE et ses homologues (comme dans le premier cas), soit en raison de l’augmentation substantielle du niveau de la complexité du système décisionnel de la MNE (comme dans le second cas). Nous concluons que les chercheurs qui appliquent la théorie de l’internalisation aux relations commerciales externes des MNEs et à leur processus de prise de décision devraient aborder ce que la gouvernance partagée dans les relations commerciales externes et le problème de la rationalité limitée/fiabilité limitée signifient réellement pour la possibilité d’appliquer la logique économique habituelle derrière la théorie de l’internalisation. Il est essentiel que de futures recherches se focalisent sur l’impact que le contrôle circonscrit dans les deux cas puisse avoir sur la capacité de la MNE à évaluer, à la fois ex ante et ex post, le niveau des coûts de transaction et managériaux comme bases de ses décisions d’investir et de mener des opérations à l’étranger.
Resumen
Los intentos recientes para extender la teoría de internalización a nuevos campos de investigación ilustran el papel crucial del control en la teoría. En este artículo, nos enfocamos en dos ejemplos: uno aplicando la teoría de internalización a las relaciones externas de las empresas multinacionales (EMN), y otro aplicando la Nueva Teoría de Internalización (NIT por sus iniciales en inglés) al gobierno de las empresas multinacionales. Sostenemos que en ambos casos se puede cuestionar la habilidad de la teoría extendida para explicar el comportamiento de la empresa multinacional, ya sea porque el gobierno de las relaciones externas es compartido entre la empresa multinacional y sus contrapartes (como en el primer caso) o por el aumento sustancial en el nivel de complejidad del sistema de toma de decisiones de la empresa multinacional (como en el segundo caso). Concluimos que los académicos aplicando la teoría de internalización en las relaciones de negocio externas y el asunto de la racionalidad limitada/fiabilidad limitada realmente significan para la posibilidad de aplicar la lógica económica acostumbrada tras la teoría de internalización. Es esencial que la investigación en el futuro se enfoque en impacto que el control restringido en los dos casos tiene en la habilidad de las empresas multinacionales de evaluar, tanto ex ante como ex post, el nivel de los costos de transacción y los costos gerenciales como las bases para sus decisiones para invertir en el extranjero y realizar operaciones en el exterior.
Resumo
Tentativas recentes de ampliar a teoria da internalização para novos campos de pesquisa ilustram o papel crucial do controle na teoria. Neste artigo, nos concentramos em dois exemplos: um aplicando a teoria de internalização às relações de negócios externos de Empresas Multinacionais (MNEs) e um aplicando a Nova Teoria de Internalização (NIT) à governança de MNEs. Argumentamos que em ambos os casos a capacidade da teoria ampliada para explicar o comportamento da MNE pode ser questionada, seja porque a governança das relações externas é compartilhada entre a MNE e suas contrapartes (como no primeiro caso) ou devido ao aumento substancial no nível de complexidade do sistema de tomada de decisão da MNE (como no segundo caso). Concluímos que acadêmicos que aplicam a teoria da internalização nas relações de negócios externas das MNEs e no seu processo de tomada de decisão devem abordar o que a governança compartilhada nas relações de negócios externas e a questão da racionalidade limitada/confiabilidade limitada realmente significam para a possibilidade de aplicar a lógica econômica usual por trás da teoria da internalização. É essencial que pesquisas futuras se concentrem em qual impacto o controle circunscrito nos dois casos tem sobre a capacidade da MNE de avaliar, tanto ex ante quanto ex post, o nível de custos de transação e custos de gestão como bases para suas decisões de investimento no exterior e executar operações no exterior.
摘要
最近将内化理论扩展到新的研究领域的尝试说明了控制在理论中的关键作用。在本文中, 我们重点关注了两个例子: 一个是将内化理论用于跨国公司(MNE)的外部业务关系, 另一个是将新内化理论(NIT)用于MNE的治理。我们认为, 在这两个例子里, 扩展的理论解释MNE行为的能力都可能被质疑, 这是因为MNE与其对局者之间的外部关系治理的共享(如第一种情况), 或是因为MNE决策系统复杂程度的大幅增加(如第二种情况)。我们得出的结论是, 对MNE外部业务关系以及对其决策过程应用内化理论的学者应解决外部业务关系中的共享治理和有限理性/有限可靠性问题对内化理论背后应用通常的经济逻辑的可能性实际意味着什么。至关重要的是, 未来研究的重点应放在这两个例子里的外接控制对MNE在事前和事后评估作为其决定进行海外投资并开展国外业务的基础的交易成本和管理成本水平的能力产生何种影响。
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This research has been supported by Handelsbanken’s research foundations.
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Accepted by Rajneesh Narula, Area Editor, 12 February 2021. This article has been with the authors for two revisions.
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Forsgren, M., Holm, U. Controlling without owning – owning without controlling: A critical note on two extensions of internalization theory. J Int Bus Stud 53, 1734–1746 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-021-00416-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-021-00416-3