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Autonomous Technology and Dynamic Obligations: Uncrewed Maritime Vehicles and the Regulation of Maritime Military Surveillance in the Exclusive Economic Zone

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 March 2021

Simon MCKENZIE Open the ORCID record for Simon MCKENZIE [Opens in a new window]
Simon MCKENZIE*
Affiliation:
University of Queensland School of Law, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australias.mckenzie@uq.edu.au
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Abstract

The development of uncrewed maritime vehicles [UMVs] has the potential to increase the scale of military maritime surveillance in the exclusive economic zones of foreign coastal states. This paper considers the legal implications of the expanded use of UMVs for this purpose. It shows how features of the legal regime—namely how its application depends on determining the intent of a vessel's operation (to distinguish marine scientific research from military surveillance), as well the obligation to have due regard—have a “dynamic” quality that will pose a challenge to UMVs operated by autonomous technology. The legal obligations will require equipping UMVs with the capacity to communicate something about their identity, the purpose of their mission, and to be able to have some capacity to be responsive to the economic and environmental interests of the coastal state.

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Articles
Information
Asian Journal of International Law , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , January 2021 , pp. 146 - 175
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

*

Research Fellow, Law and the Future of War research group, University of Queensland School of Law. The author would like to thank Eve Massingham and Rain Liivoja for their helpful feedback on a draft of this paper and their useful suggestions, and Isabelle Peart for her research assistance. The research for this paper received funding from the Australian Government through the Defence Cooperative Research Centre for Trusted Autonomous Systems. The views and opinions expressed in the paper are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Australian Government or any other institution.

References

1. 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force 16 November 1994) [UNCLOS].

2. Robert FARLEY, “Navy of The Future: Submarines Could Soon Become Underwater Drone Motherships” The National Interest (30 October 2019), online: The National Interest <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/navy-future-submarines-could-soon-become-underwater-drone-motherships-92091>.

3. See MCKENZIE, Simon, “When Is a Ship a Ship? Use by State Armed Forces of Un-crewed Maritime Vehicles and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” (2020) 21 Melbourne Journal of International Law, forthcomingGoogle Scholar.

4. UNCLOS, supra note 1 at art. 3.

5. Ibid., at art. 57.

6. FIFE, Rolf Einar, “Obligations of ‘Due Regard’ in the Exclusive Economic Zone: Their Context, Purpose and State Practice” (2019) 34 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 43 at 53CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7. HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, Wolff, “Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone” (2014) 47 Belgian Review of International Law 45 at 46Google Scholar.

8. The obligation of due regard will apply to a wider range of devices than just those involved in military maritime surveillance. However, this paper focuses on UMVs used for this activity in order to consider their use for this specific purpose. There have been other papers that explore other aspects of the due regard obligation and its interpretation, including PREZAS, Ioannis, “Foreign Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: Remarks on the Applicability and Scope of the Reciprocal ‘Due Regard’ Duties of Coastal and Third States” (2019) 34 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 97CrossRefGoogle Scholar; HAMAMOTO, Shotaro, “The Genesis of the ‘Due Regard’ Obligations in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” (2019) 34 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 7CrossRefGoogle Scholar; FORTEAU, Mathias, “The Legal Nature and Content of ‘Due Regard’ Obligations in Recent International Case Law” (2019) 34 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 25CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fife, supra note 6.

9. See for example, McKenzie, supra note 3; VEAL, Robert and RINGBOM, Henrik M., “Unmanned Ships and the International Regulatory Framework” (2017) 23 Journal of International Maritime Law 100Google Scholar; VEAL, Robert, TSIMPLIS, Michael, and SERDY, Andrew, “The Legal Status and Operation of Unmanned Maritime Vehicles” (2019) 50 Ocean Development and International Law 23CrossRefGoogle Scholar; SCHMITT, Michael N. and GODDARD, David S., “International Law and the Military Use of Unmanned Maritime Systems” (2016) 98 International Review of the Red Cross 567Google Scholar; Andrew NORRIS, Legal Issues Relating to Unmanned Maritime Systems Monograph (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2013).

10. Norris, supra note 9 at 23; MCLAUGHLIN, Robert, “Unmanned Naval Vehicles and the Law of Naval Warfare” in NASU, Hitoshi and MCLAUGHLIN, Robert, eds., New Technologies and the Law of Armed Conflict (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2014), 229 at 238CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11. See NASU, Hitoshi and LETTS, David, “The Legal Characterization of Lethal Autonomous Maritime Systems: Warship, Torpedo, or Naval Mine?” (2020) 96 International Law Studies 79 at 93Google Scholar.

12. MUGG, James, HAWKINS, Zoe, and COYNE, John, Australian Border Security and Unmanned Maritime Vehicles (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2016) at 12–16Google Scholar.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., at 6–8.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., at 19.

17. James MUGG and Zoe HAWKINS, “Securing Australia's Oceans: The Case for Unmanned Maritime Vehicles” The Strategist (13 July 2016), online: The Strategist <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/securing-australias-oceans-case-unmanned-maritime-vehicles/>.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Peter DUTTON, “Securing Australia's Borders for the Future” Minister for Home Affairs (29 October 2018), online: MHA <https://minister.homeaffairs.gov.au/peterdutton/Pages/Securing-Australia's-borders-for-the-future.aspx>. There are doubts, however, about the government's commitment to this proposal: Andrew TILLETT, “Clouds Gather over Dutton's Plan for Eyes in the Sky” Australian Financial Review (28 February 2020), online: Australian Financial Review <https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/clouds-gather-over-dutton-s-plan-for-eyes-in-the-sky-20200227-p544th>.

21. The US is the most prominent example of this: David B. LARTER, “The US Navy Is Spending Millions Plotting the Drone-Enabled Fleet of 2045” Defense News (13 February 2020), online: Defense News <https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/02/13/the-us-navy-is-spending-millions-plotting-the-drone-enabled-fleet-of-2045/>.

22. It should be noted that, given the potential for an espionage mission in foreign territory to face unforeseen situations, a UMV carrying out this kind of a mission would require a level of cognition, learning, and capacity to react to unexpected circumstances that is, at the very least, many years away: Bradley MARTIN, Danielle C. TARRAF, Thomas C. WHITMORE, Jacob DEWEESE, Cedric KENNEY, Jon SCHMID, and Paul DELUCA, “Advancing Autonomous Systems: An Analysis of Current and Future Technology for Unmanned Maritime Vehicles” RAND Corporation (2019), online: RAND Corporation <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2751.html> at 35.

23. Scott SAVITZ, “Small States Can Use Naval Mines and Unmanned Vehicles to Deter Maritime Aggression” Real Clear Defense (16 July 2018), online: Real Clear Defense <https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/07/16/naval_mines_and_unmanned_vehicles_for_maritime_deterrence_113609.html>.

24. Martin et al., supra note 22 at 17.

25. Along with the US, the UK has also sought to invest in large UMVs for naval combat: H.I. SUTTON, “Royal Navy to Get First Large Autonomous Submarine” Forbes (5 March 2020), online: Forbes <https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/03/05/royal-navy-to-get-first-large-autonomous-submarine/#75bfa4521f0b>.

26. Malcolm DAVIS, “Autonomous Military and Naval Logic Gains Life of Its Own” The Australian (8 October 2019), online: The Australian <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/defence/autonomous-military-and-naval-logic-gains-life-of-its-own/news-story/3fe066cfcabbfbaf3dbc904be7ab37a5>.

27. Ibid.

28. “The Wave Glider: How It Works”, Liquid Robotics (2020), online: Liquid Robotics <https://www.liquid-robotics.com/wave-glider/how-it-works/>.

29. Ronald KESSEL, Craig HAMM, and Martin TAILLEFER, “Persistent Maritime Surveillance Against Underwater Contacts Using a Wave Gliders: Fleet Composition and Effectiveness”, Maritime Situational Awareness Workshop, NATO Center for Maritime Research and Experimentation, Conference Paper, 8–10 October 2019, at 6.

30. The maritime aerial surveillance of Australia's EEZ is carried out by a private company: “Airborne Surveillance: What We Do” Cobham Aviation Services (2020), online: Cobham <https://www.cobham.com.au/what-we-do/surveillance>. See also “SRT ‘Ensuring Bahrain Is Protected by a Ring of Steel’” SRT Marine Systems (1 November 2019), online: SRT <https://srt-marine.com/srt-takes-part-in-bidec-2019-2/>; “Coastal Surveillance” Kongsberg (2020), online: Kongsberg <https://www.kongsberg.com/kda/about-us/knc-systems/knc-coastal-surveillance/>; “Elbit Systems Commenced the Operation of the Maritime UAS Patrol Service to European Union Countries” Elbit Systems (18 June 2019), online: Elbit Systems <https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-commenced-the-operation-of-the-maritime-uas-patrol-service-to-european-union-countries/>.

31. For example, see FILIPIAK, Dominik, STRÓŻYNA, Milena, WE˛CEL, Krzysztof, and ABRAMOWICZ, Witold, “Big Data for Anomaly Detection in Maritime Surveillance: Spatial AIS Data Analysis for Tankers” (2018) 215 Scientific Journal of Polish Naval Academy 5Google Scholar; PALLOTTA, Giuliana, VESPE, Michele, and BRYAN, Karna, “Vessel Pattern Knowledge Discovery from AIS Data: A Framework for Anomaly Detection and Route Prediction” (2013) 15 Entropy 2218CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32. KRASKA, James, “Putting Your Head in the Tiger's Mouth: Submarine Espionage in Territorial Waters” (2015) 54 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 164 at 192Google Scholar.

33. Martin et al., supra note 22 at 34–6.

34. H.I. SUTTON, “China Deployed 12 Underwater Drones in Indian Ocean” Forbes (22 March 2020), online: Forbes <https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/03/22/china-deployed-underwater-drones-in-indian-ocean/>.

35. UNCLOS, supra note 1 at art. 55.

36. See Alonso GURMENDI, “Customary International Law Symposium: ‘Making Sense of Customary International Law’ and Power Dynamics” Opinio Juris (7 July 2020) online: Opinio Juris <http://opiniojuris.org/2020/07/09/customary-international-law-symposium-making-sense-of-customary-international-law-and-power-dynamics/>.

37. NANDAN, Satya N. and ROSENNE, Shabtai, eds., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: A Commentary, Vol. 2 (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985) at 493–4Google Scholar.

38. Ibid., at 494.

39. Ibid., at 493–505.

40. Prezas, supra note 8.

41. See Ronald O'ROURKE, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress (Washington: Library of Congress—Congressional Research Service, 2014) at 20; Asaf LUBIN, “The Dragon-Kings’ Restraint: Proposing a Compromise for the EEZ Surveillance Conundrum” (2018) 57 Washburn Law Journal 17 at 28–38; Brian WILSON, “An Avoidable Maritime Conflict: Disputes Regarding Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone” (2010) 41 Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce 421 at 425–8.

42. Kraska, supra note 32 at 182; Moritaka HAYASHI, “Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Foreign Coastal States” (2012) 27 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 795 at 795–6; Lubin, supra note 41 at 38–46; Wilson supra note 41 at 428–30.

43. Kraska, supra note 32 at 183.

44. See for example, Prezas, supra note 8; Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 7; Hayashi, supra note 42; Kaiyan H. KAIKOBAD, “Non Consensual Aerial Surveillance in the Airspace over the Exclusive Economic Zone for Military and Defence Purposes” in Kaiyan H. KAIKOBAD and Michael BOHLANDER, eds., International Law and Power: Perspectives on Legal Order and Justice—Essays in Honour of Colin Warbrick (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 513; Ivan SHEARER, “Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: The Case of Aerial Surveillance” (2003) 17 Ocean Yearbook Online 548; Boleslaw A. BOCZEK, “Peacetime Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Third Countries” (1988) 19 Ocean Development & International Law 445.

45. Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 7 at 56–7.

46. Hayashi, supra note 42 at 796. For a comprehensive overview of the restrictive claims of coastal states, see Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 7 at 49–53.

47. For example, upon Brazil's ratification of UNCLOS on 22 December 1998, Brazil made a declaration that “the provisions of the Convention do not authorize other States to carry out military exercises or manoeuvres, in particular those involving the use of weapons or explosives, in the Exclusive Economic Zone without the consent of the coastal State”. See “Status of Treaties—United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” United Nations Treaty Collection (n.d.), online: UNTC <https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en>.

48. Kraska, supra note 32, at 183; Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 7 at 45.

49. UNCLOS, supra note 1 at art. 56(1)(a).

50. Ibid., at art. 56(1)(b).

51. Ibid., at art. 56(1)(c).

52. Ibid., at art. 56(2).

53. Ibid., at art. 58(1).

54. Ibid., at art. 58(2).

55. Instead, there is explicit reference to the freedom of navigation; of overflight; to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to part VI; to construct artificial islands and other installation permitted under international law, subject to part VI; of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in art. 87(2); and of scientific research, subject to parts VI and XIII. See ibid., at art. 87(1)(a)–(f).

56. Satya N. NANDAN and Shabtai ROSENNE, eds., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: A Commentary, Vol. 3 (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985) at 91; Prezas, supra note 8 at 113; Hayashi, supra note 42 at 799; Andrew S. WILLIAMS, “Aerial Reconnaissance by Military Aircraft in the Exclusive Economic Zone” in Peter A. DUTTON, ed., Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010), 49 at 58–9; Wilson, supra note 41 at 435–6.

57. See e.g. UNCLOS, supra note 1 at art. 19(2)(f).

58. Ibid., at art. 20.

59. Ibid., at art. 29.

60. Hayashi, supra note 42 at 799; Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 7 at 60–3.

61. UNCLOS, supra note 1 at art. 58(3).

62. See for example, Sienho YEE, “Sketching the Debate on Military Activities in the EEZ: An Editorial Comment” (2010) 9 Chinese Journal of International Law 1 at 3–4.

63. UNCLOS, supra note 1 at art. 59.

64. Prezas, supra note 8 at 98.

65. Kaikobad, supra note 44 at 523.

66. Ibid., at 530.

67. Ibid., at 528.

68. Ibid., at 530–1.

69. Ibid., at 540.

70. UNCLOS, supra note 1 at part XIII.

71. This is apparently because it was thought that what was included in the part “adequately gave meaning to the concept”. See Tim STEPHENS and Donald ROTHWELL, “Marine Scientific Research” in Donald ROTHWELL, Alex OUDE ELFERINK, Karen SCOTT, and Tim STEPHENS, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 559 at 562.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Haiwen ZHANG, “Is It Safeguarding the Freedom of Navigation or Maritime Hegemony of the United States?—Comments on Raul (Pete) Pedrozo's Article on Military Activities in the EEZ” (2010) 9 Chinese Journal of International Law 31; see Prezas, supra note 8 at 101 for a more comprehensive overview of this argument. For a different approach to justifying coastal state jurisdiction over military surveying in the EEZ, see WU Jilu, “The Concept of Marine Scientific Research” in Peter A. DUTTON, ed., Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010), 65.

76. YU Zhirong, “Jurisprudential Analysis of the U.S. Navy's Military Surveys in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Coastal Countries” in Peter A. DUTTON, ed., Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010), 37 at 43; XUE Guifang (Julia), “Surveys and Research Activities in the EEZ: Issues and Prospects” in Peter A. DUTTON, ed., Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010), 89 at 100.

77. Raul (Pete) PEDROZO, “Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: East Asia Focus” (2014) 90 International Law Studies 514.

78. Ibid., at 525–6; Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 7 at 58.

79. Hayashi, supra note 42 at 797. See also Pedrozo, supra note 77 at 524–7.

80. Pedrozo, supra note 77 at 526.

81. Raul (Pete) PEDROZO, “Coastal State Jurisdiction over Marine Data Collection in the Exclusive Economic Zone: U.S. Views” in Peter A. DUTTON, ed., Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010), 23 at 28–9; J. Ashley ROACH, “Marine Scientific Research and the New Law of the Sea” (1996) 27 Ocean Development & International Law 59 at 60–1; Emmanuella DOUSSIS, “Marine Scientific Research: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead” in Gemma ANDREONE, ed., The Future of the Law of the Sea: Bridging Gaps Between National, Individual and Common Interests (Cham: SpringerOpen, 2017), 87 at 99; Sam BATEMAN, “The Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone: Military Activities and the Need for Compromise?” in Tafsir M. NDIAYE and Rüdiger WOLFRUM, eds., Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes: Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas A. Mensah (Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), 569 at 576–7.

82. Efthymios PAPASTAVRIDIS, “Intelligence Gathering in the Exclusive Economic Zone” (2017) 93 International Law Studies 446 at 452.

83. Stephens and Rothwell, supra note 71 at 571.

84. Ibid.

85. Hayashi, supra note 42 at 797.

86. Ibid., at 797–8.

87. Ibid., at 798; Zhang, supra note 75; Xue, supra note 76 at 100.

88. For example, Amazon Web Services provides a range of data storage and analytics services to the Australian Government. See Elouise FOWLER, “Government Signs on with Amazon in $39m Cloud Computing Deal” Australian Financial Review (27 June 2019), online: Australian Financial Review <https://www.afr.com/technology/government-signs-on-with-amazon-in-39m-cloud-computing-deal-20190627-p521on>.

89. Papastavridis, supra note 82 at 452.

90. Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 7 at 58–9; James KRASKA and Raul PEDROZO, International Maritime Security Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013) at 270.

91. Daniel P. O'CONNELL, The International Law of the Sea, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) at 577–8.

92. Ibid.

93. Tullio SCOVAZZI, “‘Due Regard’ Obligations, with Particular Emphasis on Fisheries in the Exclusive Economic Zone” (2019) 34 International Journal of Marine & Coastal Law 56 at 60.

94. Prezas, supra note 8 at 101–2; Papastavridis, supra note 82 at 471–2.

95. See for example, Papastavridis, supra note 82 at 453–4; Kraska, supra note 32 at 182; Shearer, supra note 44 at 561. See Kaikobad, supra note 44 at 517–18 for a compelling description of the different scholarly positions.

96. Prezas, supra note 8 at 102–3. See also Bernard H. OXMAN, “The Regime of Warships Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” (1984) 24 Virginia Journal of International Law 809 at 838.

97. Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 7 at 54.

98. Ibid., at 55.

99. Ibid.

100. Prezas, supra note 8 at 101.

101. Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 7 at 55–6.

102. Prezas, supra note 8 at 102–3.

103. For example, upon Brazil's signature of UNCLOS on 10 December 1982, Brazil made a declaration that “[t]he Brazilian Government understands that the provisions of the Convention do not authorize other States to carry out in the exclusive economic zone military exercises or manoeuvres, in particular those that imply the use of weapons or explosives, without the consent of the coastal State”, confirmed upon ratification of UNCLOS (22 August 1988): see “Status of Treaties—United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” United Nations Treaty Collection (n.d.), online: UNTC <https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en>.

104. Prezas, supra note 8 at 102.

105. Yee, supra note 62; Guangyi, LI, Binhua, WAN, and Hongjie, ZHU, “On the Rights and Obligations of Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone” (2011) 2011 China Oceans Law Review 148Google Scholar.

106. Zhiguo GAO, “China and the Law of the Sea” in Myron H. NORDQUIST, Tommy KOH, and John Norton MOORE, eds., Freedom of Seas, Passage Rights and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 265 at 293–4.

107. See for example, O'Connell, supra note 91 at 577–8.

108. Kaikobad, supra note 44 at 519.

109. Ibid., at 519–20.

110. Ibid., at 521.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid., at 553–4.

113. Scovazzi, supra note 93 at 61.

114. UNCLOS, supra note 1 at arts. 18(2), 19(1).

115. UNCLOS, supra note 1 at art. 53(1).

116. Kraska, supra note 32 at 184.

117. Euan GRAHAM, “China's Naval Surveillance off Australia: Good News and Bad” The Interpreter (24 July 2017), online: The Interpreter <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-s-naval-surveillance-australia-good-news-and-bad>. See also, Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2018” Department of Defense (16 May 2018), online: Department of Defense <https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF> at 67–9.

118. Andrew GREENE, “Chinese Surveillance Near PNG Expanding as Australia and US Begin Manus Island Naval Upgrades” ABC News (21 April 2019), online: ABC News <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-04-21/china-increases-surveillance-near-png/11028192>.

119. Ibid.

120. It should be noted that China has been carrying out military activities in foreign EEZs for quite a long time. See Pedrozo, supra note 81 at 31–2.

121. However, it should be noted that, while there is ongoing tension between the China and US over activities at sea, it has been about other issues. See Andrew GREENE, “China has ‘Won Control’ of the South China Sea. Now we Wait for Beijing's Next Move” ABC News (26 July 2020), online: ABC News <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-07-26/china-has-control-south-china-sea-australia-confrontation/12491366>.

122. UNCLOS, supra note 1 at art. 59.

123. Prezas, supra note 8 at 104.

124. Oxman, supra note 96 at 838.

125. Prezas, supra note 8 at 103.

126. Ibid.

127. Fife, supra note 6 at 47.

128. This obligation extends to apply to the conduct of naval exercises: KRASKA, James S., “Resources Rights and Environmental Protection in the Exclusive Economic Zone: The Functional Approach to Naval Operations” in DUTTON, Peter A., ed., Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010), 75 at 82Google Scholar.

129. Kaikobad, supra note 44 at 521.

130. Prezas, supra note 8 at 105; also see Scovazzi, supra note 93 at 58–9.

131. Bernard H. OXMAN, “The Principle of Due Regard” in The Contribution of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to the Rule of Law: 1996–2016 (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2018), 108 at 108. It also exists in other areas of international law.

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid. There are twelve provisions in UNCLOS that use a “due regard” obligation (UNCLOS, supra note 1 at arts. 27(4), 39(3)(a), 56(2), 58(3), 60(3), 66(3)(a), 79(5), 87(2), 142(1), 148, 234, 267), and a further two that use the synonymous phrase “reasonable regard” (UNCLOS, supra note 1 at arts. 147(1), 147(3)) The drafting history supports the conclusion that the terms basically mean the same thing. Oxman, supra note 96 at 827 explains that the change was due to a “retranslation of the Spanish term ‘debida consideración’ (which is the Spanish equivalent of ‘reasonable regard’ in the Convention on the High Seas) as ‘due regard’ or ‘due consideration’” in the proposed texts that were drafted by the Spanish-speaking delegates.

134. UNCLOS, supra note 1 at art. 56(2).

135. Ibid., at art. 58(3).

136. Prezas, supra note 8 at 110.

137. It has also been suggested that other states may be under an obligation of due regard with regard to other foreign states. See BURDEAU, Geneviève Bastid, “The Respect of Other States’ Rights (Freedom of Navigation and Other Rights and Freedoms Set Out in the LOSC) as a Limitation to the Military Uses of the EEZ by Third States” (2019) 34 International Journal of Marine & Coastal Law 117Google Scholar.

138. Prezas, supra note 8 at 110.

139. Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), Award, 18 March 2015, [2015] P.C.A. Case No. 2011-03 [Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration].

140. Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, 14 March 2012, [2012] I.T.L.O.S. Case No. 16 [Bay of Bengal Case].

141. For a helpful overview of the case, see Michael WAIBEL, “Mauritius v. UK: Chagos Marine Protected Area Unlawful” EJIL:Talk! (17 April 2015), online: EJIL:Talk! <https://www.ejiltalk.org/mauritius-v-uk-chagos-marine-protected-area-unlawful/>.

142. Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration, supra note 139 at 202, paras. 519, 534–6.

143. Ibid., at 202, para. 519.

144. Ibid., at 210, paras. 534–5.

145. Ibid., at 212, para. 544.

146. Ibid., at 202, para. 519. See also Kraska, supra note 128 at 85–6.

147. Bay of Bengal Case, supra note 140 at 137, para. 476.

148. For example, Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), Advisory Opinion, 2 April 2015, [2015] I.T.L.O.S. Case No. 21 [SRFC Advisory Opinion].

149. Ibid., at 40, para. 216.

150. South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), Award, 12 July 2016, [2016] P.C.A. Case No. 2013-19 at 297, para. 756.

151. Papastavridis, supra note 82 at 458.

152. Prezas, supra note 8 at 109; Scovazzi, supra note 93 at 63.

153. Oxman, supra note 96 at 838; also see Fife, supra note 6 at 46–7.

154. Prezas, supra note 8 at 106.

155. Papastavridis, supra note 82 at 458.

156. Prezas, supra note 8 at 106.

157. Ibid., at 107.

158. Williams, supra note 56 at 51; Wilson, supra note 41 at 423.

159. Papastavridis, supra note 82 at 458.

160. Prezas, supra note 8 at 111.

161. Papastavridis, supra note 82 at 472.

162. Ibid., at 473.

163. Ibid.

164. Ibid., at 473–4.

165. Yu, supra note 76 at 42.

166. UNCLOS, supra note 1 at art. 236.

167. SRFC Advisory Opinion, supra note 148 at 61, para. 216.

168. Prezas, supra note 8 at 108.

169. Ibid., at 109.

170. Fife, supra note 6 at 52 provides some useful examples of how the due regard obligation might be operationalized.

171. Kraska, supra note 128 at 82; Bateman, supra note 81 at 573–4.

172. Prezas, supra note 8 at 112.

173. Ibid., at 111.

174. Ibid., at 109.

175. Ibid.

176. Ibid., at 107.

177. See CORNTHWAITE, Joshua L., “Can We Shoot Down That Drone? An Examination of International Law Issues Associated with the Use of Territorially Intrusive Aerial and Maritime Surveillance Drones in Peacetime” (2019) 52 Cornell International Law Journal 475Google Scholar.

178. Ibid., at 479.

179. Ibid., at 485–503.

180. Ibid., at 527–42. Also see Ashley DEEKS and Scott R. ANDERSON, “Iran Shoots Down a U.S. Drone: Domestic and International Legal Implications” Lawfare (20 June 2019), online: Lawfare <https://www.lawfareblog.com/iran-shoots-down-us-drone-domestic-and-international-legal-implications>; Mohamed HELAL, “The Global Hawk Incident: Self-Defense against Aerial Incursions—Reflections on the Applicable Law” Opinio Juris (4 July 2019), online: Opinio Juris <http://opiniojuris.org/2019/07/04/the-global-hawk-incident-self-defense-against-aerial-incursions-reflections-on-the-applicable-law/>.

181. Bateman, supra note 81 at 580.