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AI ethics and the banality of evil

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Abstract

In this paper, I draw on Hannah Arendt’s notion of ‘banality of evil’ to argue that as long as AI systems are designed to follow codes of ethics or particular normative ethical theories chosen by us and programmed in them, they are Eichmanns destined to commit evil. Since intelligence alone is not sufficient for ethical decision making, rather than strive to program AI to determine the right ethical decision based on some ethical theory or criteria, AI should be concerned with avoiding making the wrong decisions, and this requires hardwiring the thinking activity as a prerequisite for decision making.

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Notes

  1. Professor Stuart Russell of University of California Berkley believes that it is imperative that human values be translated and programmed into AI systems. (Goldhill, 2015)

  2. In contrast, “implicit ethical agents” behave according to some designed functionality.

  3. Asimov’s laws of robotics:

    1. A robot may not injure a human being, or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.

    2. A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the first law.

    3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the first or second law. (Asimov, 1984)

  4. This is the title of a book by Hannah Arendt.

  5. Martin Heidegger would disagree with this, pointing out that “thinking only begins at the point where we have come to know that Reason, glorified for centuries, is the most obstinate adversary of thinking.” (cited in Mini, 1994)

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  1. Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia

    Payman Tajalli

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Tajalli, P. AI ethics and the banality of evil. Ethics Inf Technol 23, 447–454 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-021-09587-x

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