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Intuitions in the Ontology of Musical Works

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Abstract

An impressive variety of theories of ontology of musical works has been offered in the last fifty years. Recently, the ontologists have been paying more attention to methodological issues, in particular, the problem of determining criteria of a good theory. Although different methodological approaches involve different views on the importance and exact role of intuitiveness of a theory, most philosophers writing on the ontology of music agree that intuitiveness and compliance with musical practice play an important part when judging theories. A multitude of diverse claims exist regarding folk intuitions and matters of musical practice in the literature on the ontology of musical works. In this review paper, a systematized collection of about one hundred empirical claims extracted from the theoretical literature is presented. All of the empirical claims are categorized thematically. The paper also includes a short discussion on the role of appeals to common intuitions in methodological literature, as well as some suggestions for future research.

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Notes

  1. According to Uidhir, revisionism is especially difficult to avoid for the ontologists who seek to integrate ontology of art into general metaphysics – in this case reconsideration and revision of our current beliefs about art has to follow (Uidhir 2013, p. 23).

  2. In case empirical research on this subject will be conducted in the future, there are seven possible answers described by Levinson (2011, p. 262) that could be adapted for questionnaires. However, Levinson’s position is not included in this review because he does not raise a hypothesis on what common intuitions tell us on this question – only “a guess” that it might be somewhere around (3): “(1) Nothing can destroy it, once created; the most that can occur is its becoming permanently “lost” – i. e., never again entering anyone’s consciousness. (2) Little short of the destruction of the human species, leaving no successors, would suffice to destroy it. (3) The permanent elimination of all records and memories of it […]. (4) Disintegration of the musical practice in which recognizable performance of the work is possible – including instruments, techniques, capacities, stylistic knowledge – would suffice to destroy it […]. (5) Loss of the musical tradition and background knowledge necessary for the work to be adequately understood […]. (6) Absence of all material embodiments of the work – scores, original manuscripts, recordings, live performances – though not of conceptions and memories and reproductive capacities in individual minds […]. (7) Irreversible large-scale neglect of, or disrespect for, the work […].”

  3. Matheson and Caplan propose not to give too much of importance to the conformity between theory and our modal intuitions because modal intuitions have little to do with our critical practice (Matheson and Caplan 2008, p. 495).

  4. See Kelemen (1999), Rose (2015).

  5. See Strohminger and Nichols (2014), De Freitas et al. (2016).

  6. For arguments why experimental philosophy might be useful for ontology of art, see Thomasson (2012). Rose (2019) offers arguments why revisionary metaphysicians should also be interested in experimental philosophy.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Jonas Dagys, Roberto Casati, Vilius Dranseika, Florian Cova, and Shen-yi Liao for their advice. I also thank Rima Puniska for language editing.

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    Elzė Sigutė Mikalonytė

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Mikalonytė, E.S. Intuitions in the Ontology of Musical Works. Rev.Phil.Psych. 13, 455–474 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00535-8

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