Abstract
The Roman Republic was one of the earliest and long-lasting democracies (510-27 BCE). To prevent the creation of dictatorship, it had a system of separation of powers but it failed to protect the Roman Republic. The ultimate cause of the fall of the Roman Republic was due to the immense wealth that Rome accumulated from its empire and the impact this wealth had on Rome’s institutions, especially its generals. Cicero proposed constitutional reforms to prevent its demise. His reforms were unnecessary because the Roman Senate already had the constitutional authority to prevent its demise. The problem was that Senators lacked an incentive to use their constitutional authority to save Rome’s democracy.
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Notes
There is a debate as to the degree that the Roman Republic was a democracy. Syme (1939) argues that the democracy was a total facade for aristocratic rule. By contrast, Cicero, an elected official and keen observer of Roman life, clearly viewed the Roman Republic as a vibrant, but under attack, democracy.
Before the Marius reforms, the armies were composed of farmers, who had to provide their own horse or armor. Hence, wealthy individuals were given higher rank.
We do not know the average attendance at the Forum. Cicero indicates that it took about 5 hours to count the votes on legislation.
Another unique Republic institution was that of Dictators. Dictators were elected and would serve for six months, or to the end of a military emergency. Their primary responsibility was to defend the Republic when it faced an external threat. They were absolute rulers with the authority to execute individuals, without trials, and to abrogate laws. This institution atrophied in use after the Punic Wars, because Rome no longer had a credible external threat. However, Sulla and Julius Caesar resuscitated the office and demanded that they be elected dictators for life, because of the extensive powers of dictators.
This system gradually evolved over the nearly five hundred years of the Roman Republic. Hence, there is no single Roman Constitution, but a series of Roman Constitutions (Flower 2010). I focus on the Constitution as operative in the time of Cicero, and discuss historical changes only to the extent they impact my analysis.
Cicero’s interpretation is common among Roman historians. Parenti (2003) goes so far as to argue that Caesar was a supporter of the plebians, and this is the reason he was assassinated by members of the Senate. However, Caesar cut the bread dole of the plebes in half, and forced many to relocate in Spain. Hence, most modern historians argue that the political competition was between elites over power and money (Dunstan 2010; Mouritsen 2001, 2017).
Brunt (1988) and Mackay (2009) expand on Cicero’s list of opponents of the Senate to include the Italian allies. They fought in the Roman army, but did not get equal compensation with that of the Roman legions. But again, Cicero’s reforms of the Republic’s constitution would not have affected this problem, because the Senate already had the authority over military expenditures.
I cannot in this paper resolve this dispute among Roman historians.
The assassins of Caesar did not confiscate Caesar’s wealth, and hence, Octavian inherited it, and used Caesar’s wealth to defeat the assassins.
Augustus understood the problem of controlling the military and government administration. He instituted a number of reforms to maintain power. He paid legionnaires out of government revenues and expanded the military to 26 legions, with no general commanding more than two legions. He also instituted the Praetorian guard for his personal protection (Wasson 2018). Furthermore, he created a permanent civil service and increased taxes to pay for these reforms (Eck, 2003; Salmon, 1962.)
The relation of the Roman government with fellow Latin tribes varied over time. A crucial strategy employed by Rome was to conquer fellow Latin tribes and rule them at a distance. The conquered tribes were required to provide soldiers for the Roman armies. But they did not share in the booty from conquests and did not receive the rights of Roman citizenship. This relationship led to a series of rebellions by the Latin tribes (Samnites, Marsi and other Latin tribes and cities) referred to as the Social Wars (91-87 BCE). Rome defeated the rebelling tribes but conferred full Roman citizenship, including voting rights in the assemblies, to avoid future rebellions
Buchanan and Tullock (1999) argue that the advantage of a bicameral legislature is that it approximates a supermajority vote.
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Jankowski, R. The demise of the Roman Republic: a faulty constitution?. Const Polit Econ 32, 218–232 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-021-09330-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-021-09330-0