Abstract
The current interest in the notions of ontological dependence and metaphysical grounding is usually associated with a renewal of interest in Aristotelian metaphysics. Curiously, some authors have recently argued that the Aristotelian view of universals, according to which universals depend for their existence on their exemplifiers, is incoherent from a grounding perspective. In this paper I argue that such criticism is misleading. I shall examine their arguments and clarify the supposed incoherence.
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Notes
To avoid misunderstandings, let me stress one point: A creation relation is not a superinternal relation. When R in aRb is superinternal, b and R are both grounded in a. When R in aRb is a creation relation, b is grounded in ‘its being in the R relation to a’. Neither the Tractatus nor the writing relation are grounded in Wittgenstein. Rather, the (existence of the) Tractatus is grounded in the fact that Wittgenstein wrote it. Similarly, as regards Aristotelianism, it is not the case that both the facts of exemplification and the universals included in such facts are grounded in objects. Universals alone are grounded in facts of exemplification. If a is contingently F, then neither does a ground F, nor does a ground the exemplification fact (that a is F). Instead, the fact that a is (contingently) F grounds the fact that F exists. Thanks to an anonymous referee for comments on this point.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for making this point.
For a detailed discussion of the differences, see Bernstein (2017).
I do not consider the origin essentialism of books plausible, i.e. I believe that in any possible world in which someone writes this book (i.e. the same sequence of sentences), the Tractatus does exist. Anyway, my example does not depend on this controversial point.
For this default view, according to which grounding is a kind of necessary relation see Audi (2012b), Dasgupta (2014), deRosset (2010), Rosen (2010) and Trogdon (2013). For an exception to this view, see Skiles (2014). It may be noticed that neither Costa nor Alvarado reject the view that grounding is a form of necessitation.
Although some metaphysicians (Schaffer 2009; Jago 2016) claim that grounding is a relation which holds between any kinds of entities, including facts, objects, properties, etc., most of them—Rosen (2010), Fine (2012), Audi (2012a, b), Raven (2012), Cameron (2016) among others—take facts (propositions or similar) as the only adequate relata of grounding links. For a recent discussion about the relation between grounding and dependence, see among others Schnieder (2017) and Rydéhn (2018).
For more reasons to reject the constitutive essential account of dependence (see Koslicki 2013: pp. 55–7).
Alvarado (2019: p. 13) writes: ‘Aristotelianism requires that thin particulars instantiate at least one universal. This requirement can be understood as a ‘generic’ dependence of thin particulars on instantiations, but it is also a case in which instantiations are ‘constitutively sufficient’ for the thin particular –or particulars– involved in the fact.’.
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Imaguire, G. On the Coherence of Aristotelian Universals. Synthese 199, 7255–7263 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03112-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03112-9