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The Trinity is still unconstitutional

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 June 2020

BRIAN LEFTOW
BRIAN LEFTOW*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, 106 Somerset St., New Brunswick, NJ, 08901, USA
*
e-mail: Brian.leftow@rutgers.edu
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Abstract

I argue that we should not model the Trinity using the concept of constitution, and reply to William Hasker's recent defence of the constitutionalist position, also developing my own views in some respects.

Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 57 , Issue 3 , September 2021 , pp. 532 - 552
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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