Abstract
In the philosophy of religion, ‘no-fault unbelief’ represents the view that a person can fail to believe that God exists through no fault of their own. On the other hand, ‘flawed unbelief’ says a person is always culpable for failing to believe that God exists. In a recent article in Sophia, Roberto Di Ceglie argues that some might find the usual reasons for rejecting ‘no-fault unbelief’ (i.e. intellectual or moral failure) to be offensive. In light of this, he proposes an alternative rejection of ‘no-fault unbelief’ based on the consequences it entails for both non-believers and believers. I argue that Di Ceglie does not do nearly enough to establish these consequences. I conclude that his rejection of ‘no-fault unbelief’ is at best incomplete or at worst false.
References
Di Ceglie, R. (2020). No-fault unbelief (pp. 1–11). Sophia: Online First.
Schellenberg, J. L. (2015). The hiddenness argument: Philosophy’s new challenge to belief in God. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Lougheed, K. No-fault Unbelief Defended: a Reply to Roberto Di Ceglie. SOPHIA 60, 473–479 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-020-00817-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-020-00817-1