Abstract
Most contemporary accounts of moral responsibility take desert to play a central role in the nature of moral responsibility. It is also assumed that desert is a backward-looking concept that is not directly derivable from any forward-looking or consequentialist considerations, such as whether blaming an agent would deter the agent from performing similar bad actions in the future. When determining which account of moral responsibility is correct, proponents of desert-based accounts often take intuitions about cases to provide evidence either in favor of or against a proposed theory. In this paper, I discuss two experiments that test whether folk intuitions accord with what desert-based accounts would predict. Results suggest that moral responsibility intuitions are sensitive to forward-looking considerations, thus posing a problem for desert-based accounts of moral responsibility. If appealing to intuitions about cases is a valid method of discovering the nature of moral responsibility and desert, it seems either desert is not entirely backward-looking or moral responsibility is not exclusively desert-based. These experimental results also suggest that consequentialist accounts of moral responsibility, which have largely been abandoned due to their counterintuitive nature, are perhaps not so counterintuitive after all.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
If we were to find out about A’s murdering B because A confesses this at t2, then this confession and our learning of this confession would be forward-looking considerations. However, the thing that we learn at t2 – the fact that A murdered B – would be a backward-looking consideration.
Note that there are forward-looking considerations that are not consequentialist considerations. Facts pertaining only to states and events that occur after an action but before the agent is praised or blamed for that action fall in this category.
Although “consequentialist” can take on different meanings in different normative spheres, I intend only to pick out accounts that take the consequences that would follow from praise and blame to determine whether an agent is morally responsible. I do not here employ the term narrowly enough to pick out which specific types of consequences are relevant for justifying a moral responsibility practice, nor do I take “consequentialism” to necessarily require that an action bring about consequences that are maximal or optimal in some sense.
For Pereboom’s understanding of moral responsibility, see Pereboom 2014: 2.
For the purposes of this paper, I will treat both contractarian and consequentialist considerations similarly and refer to them as consequentialist considerations. Though the two views are different, they are not relevantly different for my purposes, and alternatives to desert-based moral responsibility are largely consequentialist, and not contractarian, in nature.
The motivation for merging responses into a composite score was to follow the same methods Mele (2019) used when testing moral responsibility intuitions for radical reversal cases.
For a defense of these concerns, see Strohminger and Nichols 2014.
The questions, presented in a random order to each participant, asked 1) whether Jones spends a day hurting/helping people in the story described above, 2) whether Jones will likely hurt/help people again, 3) how likely it is that Jones will hurt/help people in the future, 4) whether it is likely or unlikely that Jones will hurt/help people in the future, 5) whether Jones is morally responsible for the bad/good things he does on the day described in the story above, 6) whether Jones deserves blame/credit for the bad/good things he does on the day described in the story above, 7) whether Jones is blameworthy/praiseworthy for the bad/good things he does on the day described in the story above, 8) whether Jones values the wellbeing of others, 9) whether Jones cares more about others than himself, and 10) what Jones’ values and attitudes are towards those in his community.
A reliability coefficient of .70 or higher is normally considered acceptable.
Some philosophers (some inspired by Hume’s view) argue that moral judgments depend, at least in part, on deeper or more stable characterological dispositions, traits, or desires (Frankfurt 1971; Arpaly and Schroeder, 1999; Sripada 2010, 2015a, b; Sher 2006; Smith 2004, 2005, 2007a, b; Shoemaker 2011, 2013, 2015a, b). There is also empirical work that suggests that these features drive moral intuitions (Sripada 2010, 2012; Sripada and Konrath 2011)
Roughly, given a data set with corresponding variables, GES evaluates possible models that might explain the data. GES first assigns an information score to the model in which the variables are not connected at all (the null model). Second, GES considers adding arrows between the different variables that would improve the information score. Third, GES considers deletions that would further increase the information score. This process is repeated until no additional changes would increase the information score. Orientation of the arrows is always determined by the edge-orientation rules discussed in Meek (1997). This method has been demonstrated to provide the best fitting causal model for a set of data insofar as the data set is large enough (Chickering 2002) and is commonly used to explain intuitions (for some examples, see Rose and Nichols 2013; Turri et al. 2016; Rose 2017).
Asymmetrical intuitions as a result of either differing moral valence or direction of change (improving or deterioration) have been widely documented (Knobe and Roedder 2009; Phillips et al., 2011; Phillips et al. 2014; May and Holton 2012; Pizarro et al. 2003; Newman et al., 2015; Molouki and Bartels 2017; Tobia 2015, 2016; Earp et al. 2018)
For more on why philosophers should care about folk intuitions, see Nahmias 2011.
References
Arneson, R.J. 2003. The Smart theory of moral responsibility and desert. In Desert and justice, ed. Serena Olsaretti, 233–258. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Arpaly, N., and T. Schroeder. 1999. Praise, blame, and the whole self. Philosophical Studies 93 (2): 161–188.
Ayer, A.J. 1980. Free will and rationality. In Philosophical subjects, ed. Z. van Straaten. Oxford University Press.
Bennett, J. 1980. Accountability. In Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to P. F. Strawson, ed. Z. van Straaten, 59–80. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brandt, R. 1969. A utilitarian theory of excuses. The Philosophical Review 78: 337–361 Reprinted in Morality, Utility, and Rights, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Buckwalter, W. 2016. Intuition fail: Philosophical activity and the limits of expertise. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2): 378–410.
Buckwalter, W., and S. Stich. 2013. Gender and Philosophical Intuition. In Experimental Philosophy, Vol. 2, ed. J. Knobe and S. Nichols, 307–346. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cappelen, H. 2012. Philosophy without intuitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chickering, D. 2002. Optimal structure identification with greedy search. Journal of Machine Learning Research 3: 507–554.
Dennett, D. 1984. Elbow room: The varieties of free will worth wanting. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Dworkin, G. 1986. Review of Elbow Room. Ethics 96 (2): 423–425.
Earp, B., J. Skorburg, J. Everett, and J. Savulescu. 2018. Addiction, identity, morality. AJOB: Empirical Bioethics. Morality. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/evm84.
Feinberg, J. 1970. Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Fischer, J.M. 2007. Compatibilism. In Four Views on Free Will. Malden: Blackwell.
Fischer, J.M., and M. Ravizza. 1998. Responsibility and control: a theory of moral responsibility. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Frankfurt, H. 1971. Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1): 5–20.
Frankfurt, H. 1988. The importance of what we care about. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frankfurt, H. 2002. Reply to John Martin Fischer. In Contours of agency, ed. S. Buss and L. Overton, 27–31. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Kane, R. 1996. The significance of free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
Knobe, J., and E. Roedder. 2009. The ordinary concept of valuing. Philosophical Issues 19: 131–147.
Kupperman, J. 1991. Character. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lenman, J. 2006. Compatibilism and contractualism: The possibility of moral responsibility. Ethics 117: 7–31.
Liao, S.M., A. Wiegmann, J. Alexander, and G. Vong. 2012. Putting the trolley in order: Experimental philosophy and the loop case. Philosophical Psychology 25: 661–671.
Machery, E., R. Mallon, S. Nichols, and S. Stich. 2004. Semantics, cross-cultural style. Cognition 92: B1–B12.
Magill, K. 1997. Freedom and experience: Self-determination without illusions. New York: St. Martins Press.
May, J., and R. Holton. 2012. What in the world is weakness of will? Philosophical Studies 157: 341–360.
McKenna, M. 2012. Conversation and responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.
McKenna, M. 2019. Basically deserved blame and its value. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (3): 255–282.
McKenna, M. 2019. The free will debate and Basic Desert. The Journal of Ethics 23: 241–255.
Meek, C. 1997. Graphical Models: Selecting Causal and Statistical Models. PhD Thesis, Carnegie Mellon University.
Mele, A. 1995. Autonomous agents: From self control to autonomy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mele, A. 2006. Free will and luck. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mele, A. 2009a. Moral responsibility and agents’ histories. Philosophical Studies 142: 161–181.
Mele, A. 2009. Moral responsibility and history revisited. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12: 463–475.
Mele, A. 2013. Moral responsibility, manipulation, and minutelings. The Journal of Ethics 17: 153–166.
Mele, A. 2013b. Manipulation, moral responsibility, and bullet biting. The Journal of Ethics 17: 167–184.
Mele, A. 2019. Manipulated agents: A window to moral responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Molouki, S., and D.M. Bartels. 2017. Personal change and the continuity of identity. Cognitive Psychology 93: 1–17.
Nado, J. 2014. Philosophical expertise. Philosophy Compass 9 (9): 631–641.
Nahmias, E. 2011. Intuitions about free will, determinism, and bypassing. In The oxford handbook of free will: 2nd edition, ed. R. Kane, 555–575.
Nelkin, D. 2011. Making sense of freedom and responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.
Newman, G.E., J. De Freitas, and J. Knobe. 2015. Beliefs about the true self explain asymmetries based on moral judgment. Cognitive Science. 39: 96–125.
Oshana, M. 1997. Ascriptions of Responsibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 34: 71–83.
Pereboom, D. 2001. Living without free will. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Pereboom, D. 2007. Hard Incompatibilism. In Four Views on Free Will. Malden: Blackwell.
Pereboom, D. 2014. Free will, agency, and meaning in life. Oxford University Press.
Phillips, J., L. Misenheimer, and J. Knobe. 2011. The ordinary concept of happiness (and others like it). Emotion Review 3: 320–322.
Phillips, J., S. Nyholm, and S. Liao. 2014. The good in happiness. Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy 1: 253–293.
Pizarro, D.A., E. Uhlmann, and P. Salovey. 2003. Asymmetry in judgments of moral blame and praise: The role of perceived metadesires. Psychological Science 14: 267–272.
Rawls, J. 1955. Two concepts of rules. The Philosophical Review 64 (1): 3–32.
Rose, D. 2017. Folk intuitions of actual causation: A two-pronged debunking explanation. Philosophical Studies 174: 1323–1361.
Rose, D., and S. Nichols. 2013. The lesson of bypassing. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4: 599–619.
Sartorio, C. 2016. Causation and free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scanlon, T.M. 1998. What we owe to each other. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Scanlon, T.M. 2008. Moral dimensions. Cambridge: Belknap Harvard Press.
Scanlon, T.M. 2013. Giving desert its due. Philosophical Explorations 16: 1–41.
Schlick, M. 1966. When is a man responsible. In Free Will and Determinism, ed. B. Berofsky. New York: Harper and Row.
Sher, G. 2006. In praise of blame. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shoemaker, D. 2011. Attributability, answerability, and account ability: Toward a wider theory of moral responsibility. Ethics 121 (2011): 602–632.
Shoemaker, D. 2013. Qualities of will. Social Philosophy and Policy 30: 95–120.
Shoemaker, D. 2015a. Responsibility from the margins. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shoemaker, D. 2015b. Ecumenical Attributability. In The nature of moral responsibility, ed. Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna, and Angela Smith, 115–140. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smart, J.J.C. 1961. Free will, praise, and blame. Mind 70: 291–306.
Smith, A. 2004. Conflicting attitudes, moral agency, and conceptions of the self. Philosophical Topics 32 (1 and 2): 331–352.
Smith, A. 2005. Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life. Ethics 115 (2): 236–271.
Smith, A. 2007a. On being responsible and holding responsible. The Journal of Ethics 11 (4): 465–484.
Smith, A. 2007b. Control, responsibility, and moral assessment. Philosophical Studies 138: 367–392. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9048-x.
Sripada, C.S. 2010. The deep self model and asymmetries in folk judgments about intentional action. Philosophical Studies 151: 159–176.
Sripada, C.S. 2012. Mental state attributions and the side-effect effect. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (1): 232–238.
Sripada, C.S. 2015a. Moral responsibility, reasons, and the self in David Shoemaker, Oxford studies in agency and responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sripada, C.S. 2015b. Self-expression: A deep self theory of moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies 173 (5): 1203–1232.
Sripada, S., and S. Konrath. 2011. Telling more than we can know about intentional action. Mind and Language 26 (3): 353–380.
Strawson, P.F. 1962. Freedom and resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy 48: 1–25.
Strawson, G. 1994. The impossibility of moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies 75: 5–24.
Strohminger, N., and S. Nichols. 2014. The essential moral self. Cognition 131: 159–171.
Swain, S., J. Alexander, and J. Weinberg. 2008. The instability of philosophical intuitions: Running hot and cold on Truetemp. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76: 138–155.
Tobia, K.P. 2015. Personal identity and the Phineas gage effect. Analysis 75: 396–405.
Tobia, K.P. 2016. Personal identity, direction of change, and Neuroethics. Neuroethics 9 (1): 37–43.
Turri, J., W. Buckwalter, and D. Rose. 2016. Actionability judgments cause knowledge judgments. Thought 5: 212–222.
Vargas, M. 2007a. Revisionism. In Four Views on Free Will. Malden: Blackwell.
Vargas, M. 2007b. Response to Fischer, Kane, and Pereboom. In Four Views on Free Will. Malden: Blackwell.
Vargas, M. 2013. Building better beings: A theory of moral responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.
Vargas, M. 2019. Responsibility, methodology, and desert. Journal of Information Ethics 28 (1): 131–147.
Wallace, R.J. 1994. Responsibility and the moral sentiments. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Watson, G. 1996. Two Faces of Responsibility. Philosophical Topics 24: 227–248.
Weatherson, B. 2003. What good are counterexamples? Philosophical Studies 115: 1–31.
Weinberg, J., S. Nichols, and S. Stich. 2001. Normativity and Epistimic intuitions. Philosophical Topics 29: 429–460.
Zimmerman, M. 1988. An essay on moral responsibility. Totowa: Roman and Littlefield.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Spitzley, J. The Future of Moral Responsibility and Desert. Rev.Phil.Psych. 12, 977–997 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00522-5
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00522-5