Abstract
Light is the most important (if not the only) analogy for the Vijñānavādin in proving self-awareness (svasaṃvedana), namely the cognition that cognizes itself. Recent studies show that two opponents of the doctrine of self-awareness, Kumārila (ca. 530–600) and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta (ca. 850–910) alleged that the Vijñānavādin has also used light as an analogy for the view that cognition must be perceived before the object is perceived. However, this is a modification of the actual view of the Vijñānavāda that cognition must be perceived in order for it to perceive its object. Based on Kumārila’s such modified restatement, Taber argues that “Kumārila’s Buddhist” fails to establish the light as a valid analogy in their theory. Taber’s argument is subsequently referred to by Watson and Kataoka in their works, in which they defend Vijñānavāda’s light-analogy against Taber. However, their defence is also based on a similarly modified restatement by Jayanta and the defence is set out in the view of Naiyāyika philosophy. This paper examines all these arguments and shows that Watson’s and Kataoka’s thought of the light-analogy might still be problematic. It also goes back to the original view of the Vijñānavāda and observes to what extent the light-analogy serves as a strong support for the establishment of the self-awareness.
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Notes
Cf. PSṬ: atreti pūrvokte pratyakṣe / (p. 69, l. 7.)
Cf. PV 3.426cd, 3.428abc1, 3.439c2d, 3.443ab, 3.446, 463cd, 475. For the English translation of these verses, cf. Lo (2018), Part II.
Cf. PVinṬd: gang nyams su myong bar ’gyur ba de nyid nyams su myong ba las tha snyad du bya ba zhes bya ba yin na ni / don gyi rang bzhin ’ba’ zhig nyams su myong la / de yang khyad par med pa yin pa’i phyir khyad par gyi tha snyad gang las ’gyur / don nyams su myong bar gyur pa’i tha snyad thams cad ni myong ba bo’i khyad par nges pa la brten pa yin te / de’i phyir gang zhig rgyur gyur bas don rig pa’i tha snyad ’di khyad par la brten par gsal bar ’gyur ba rig pa de yang nyams su myong ba yin no // bya ba’i khyad par ’ga’ zhig rig pa byed pa po la mi brten par ’gyur ba myong ba’i tha snyad gzhan ni yod pa ma yin no // (D 161b2-4) and PVinṬj: / shes pa de yang rang rig pa’i tsad mas grub pa ma yin pas bden pa’i rgyu mtsan can te / tsad ma’i rgyu can gyi yul dmigs pa’i tha snyad mi ’grub bo / (D 200b6.)
Cf. PVinṬd: / gsal ba ma rig na ni gsal ba’i khyad par can gyi gsal bar bya ba’i don rig par mi ’gyur te / dbyig pa ma rtogs par dbyig pa can du mi rtogs pa bzhin no / (D 161b7.)
jñānākhye prakāśyo ŚVN, ŚVK [Part 2]: jñānākhyaprakāśe ŚVT. Watson and Kataoka read jñānākhye prakāśe and make their translation: “[A]nd if the light of cognition is not perceived, its object is not apprehended because [the object's] illumination is dependent on that [cognition], just like a pot [is not apprehended] if the light of the lamp [is not perceived].” (Watson and Kataoka 2010: 304, n. 25. And the version of ŚV Śūnyavāda they used is explained in p. 346.)
Taber (2010): 284.
Watson and Kataoka (2010): 304 and NM, p. 13.
Watson (2014): 406, n. 16 and NM, p. 25.
Watson and Kataoka (2010): 308.
Taber (2010): 286.
Watson and Kataoka (2010): 304 and NM, p. 13.
It is worth mentioning here that Watson also agrees that this is not the view held by the Vijñānavādin, but he considers it as an unwanted consequence (prasaṅga) that Jayanta put in the Vijñānavādin’s mouth. (See Watson 2014: 405.) Details presented in section 4 of this paper.
Taber (2010): 284.
Cf. Watson and Kataoka (2010): 305.
Cf. Watson (2014): 407.
The part “(A)” begins on Watson (2014): 408.
One might find it a bit ambiguous to determine whether the possessive pronoun “its” here should be related to “our faculty” or “this light”. Different understandings of this word have occurred between editors of this paper. I am grateful for Professor Watson clarifying this point for me, together with some other points in his arguments, in his several emails to me.
Watson (2014): 410.
Cf. Watson and Kataoka (2010): 306.
I am grateful for Professor K. Preisendanz’s kindness and thoroughness in helping me to understand the eye’s ray described in the Naiyāyika, which helps me a lot in forming the following arguments.
This assumption is confirmed by Prof. Watson. Cf. footnote no. 17 on page 8.
Cf. Watson (2014): 409–410.
Watson and Kataoka (2010): 305.
Cf. PVV: evaṃ tarhy arthasyāprakāśātmanaḥ kathaṃ prakāśatā ity āha / (p. 260, l. 21.)
Cf. Watson (2014): 411–412.
Watson (2014): 405. Cf. also footnote 12, on page 6.
On the contrary, as shown above, in PSV1.9bcd, Dignāga has claimed that even for those who accept the existence of external object, such as the Sautrāntika, they would also accept that the establishment of the cognition of the object is due to the cognition having the appearance of that object. Therefore, the following explanation as to how light can be an analogy for Vijñānavāda would also be suitable for them.
Cf. NM, pp. 13–14 and Watson and Kataoka (2010): 304–308.
Cf. NM, p. 13. 3 and its translation in Watson and Kataoka (2010): 304.
Watson and Kataoka (2010): 304.
NM, p. 14, 8–9.
Watson and Kataoka (2010): 307.
Cf NM, p. 14, 9-10.
NM, p. 14–15.
Watson and Kataoka (2010): 308.
Cf. PSV 1.11d: … na hy asāv avibhāvite (“… because it (i.e., the memory) does not arise for an unexperienced thing”) and PSV 1.12b2: tatrāpi hi smṛtiḥ, yena hi jñānena taj jñānam anubhūyate, tatrāpy uttarakālaṃ smṛtir dṛṣṭā. (“There is also memory in relation to that (cognition of the object-cognition). (To explain:) It is observed, at a later time, that there is the memory in relation to that cognition too by which the cognition (of the object) is experienced.”) For details, cf Lo (2018).
Abbreviations
D The Tibetan Tripiṭaka (Bstan ’Gyur, Sde Dge edition). Sources from Buddhist Digital Resource Center. Source: https://www.tbrc.org/#!footer/about/newhome (Last accessed 15/01/2019)
Ed. Editor or Edited.
P The Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking Edition. D.T. Suzuki (Ed.). Tokyo – Kyoto: Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Institute, 1957.
Tr. Translator or Translated.
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Watson, A. (2014). Light as an Analogy for Cognition in Buddhist Idealism (Vijñānavāda). Journal of Indian Philosophy, 42, 401–421.
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Lo, K.C. Light as an Analogy for Cognition in the Vijñānavāda. J Indian Philos 48, 1005–1018 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-020-09452-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-020-09452-z