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Causation in International Crimes Cases: (Re)Concenptualizing the Causal Linkage

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Abstract

This article evaluates and (re)conceptualizes the notion of causation in international criminal law by using insights from legal theory and domestic criminal law. The article draws a distinction between empirical and normative causality and shows that in international case law emphasis has thus far been on empirical causality, whilst the meaning normative causality remains rather undefined and elusive. This is unfortunate, since normative causality is particularly important in international crimes cases, where the empirical linkage with the crimes is often remote and therefore uncertain. In an attempt to outline was normative causality means in relation to international crimes, the article draws upon legal theory and domestic criminal law to identify several factors that can be used to establish normative causation, in particular taking into account the specific nature of international crimes (as system criminality that is committed by groups), and the remote involvement of accused in such crimes.

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Notes

  1. A. Von Hirsch, “Extending the Harm Principle: ‘Remote’ Harms and Fair Imputation”, in A. Simester & A. Smith, Harm and Culpability, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1996), p. 270.

  2. The terms “causation” and “causality” are used interchangeably in this article. Both terms refer to the relation of cause and effect, i.e. the connection between the accused’s behavior and a crime. A. Simester, “Causation in (Criminal) Law”, 133 Law Quaterly Review (2017), p. 416.

  3. E.g. J. Gadirov, “Casual Responsibility in International Criminal Law”, 15 International Criminal Law Review 970 (2015), p. 971; C. Stuckenburg, “Causation” in: M.D. Dubber & T. Hörnle, The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law, OUP 2014, p. 2; G. Mettraux, The Law of Command Responsibility (OUP, 2009), p. 82; I. Bantekas, “On Stretching the Boundaries of Responsible Command”, 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2009), p. 1199; D. Robinson, “How Command Responsibility Got so Complicated: A Culpability Contradiction, its Obfuscation and a Simple Solution”, 13 Melbourne Journal of International Law (2012), p. 41; D. Robinson, Justice in Extreme Cases: Criminal Law Theory Meets International Criminal Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2020), pp. 178, 186–187. See also ICTR, Kayishema, Trial Chamber II, Case No ICTR-95-1, 21 May 1999, para. 199; ICC, Bemba, Trial Chamber III, 21 March 2016, ICC-01/05-01-08, para. 211. An important group of scholars limits causality to harm-type crimes and rejects causality as a necessary element for so-called conduct-type crimes (Formaldelikte) Moreover, the requirement of causation has been rejected in relation to crimes of omission. A minority of scholars even rejects causality as a necessary element completely, thinking that “persons should be responsible only for what they are able to control, that is, mainly their mental states, motives, and intentions”. See, e.g. Stuckenburg, “Causation” in: M.D. Dubber & T. Hörnle, The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law, Oxford University Press (2014), p. 3” J.G. Stewart, “Overdetermined Atrocities”, Public Law & Legal Theory research Paper Series Working Paper No. 12-53, pp. 9–10; G.P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, Oxford University Press (1998), pp. 60–61; M. Moore, Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals and Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009), pp. 20–33.

  4. ICTR, Kayishema, Trial Chamber, Judgement, ICTR-95-1T, 21 May 1999, para. 199.

  5. Admittedly, the requirement of genocidal intent does not necessarily entail that violence is committed on a large scale or in a systematic way. Nevertheless, in practice, genocide has so far always entailed collective violence. On this issue, see M. Cupido, “The Contextual Embedding of Genocide: A Casuistic Analysis of the Interplay between Law and Facts”, 15 Melbourne Journal of International Law (2014), pp. 387–413.

  6. C. Burchard, “Ancillary and Neutral Business Contributions to “Corporate-Political Core Crimes”. Initial Enquiries Concerning the Rome Statute”, 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2010), p. 923.

  7. E.g. G. Mettraux, The Law of Command Responsibility (OUP, 2009); I. Bantekas, “On Stretching the Boundaries of Responsible Command”, 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2009); D. Robinson, “How Command Responsibility Got so Complicated: A Culpability Contradiction, its Obfuscation and a Simple Solution”, 13 Melbourne Journal of International Law (2012); D. Robinson, Justice in Extreme Cases: Criminal Law Theory Meets International Criminal Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2020).

  8. The importance of comparative research in this field has been stressed by J. Stewart, “Complicity” in M. Dubber & T. Hornle (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law, Oxford University Press (2014); G. Fletcher, “Causation versus Background Events” in G. Fletcher, The Grammar of Criminal Law: Volume Two: International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press (2020), p. 104.

  9. In Anglo-American literature, the term “legal causation” has been used instead of “normative causation”. In this article, I prefer to use the term “normative, which – in my view – more aptly describes causality as a non-ontological concept that entails a process of attribution (Zurechnung). Moreover, in the limited jurisprudence on causality in international criminal law, international courts and judges have also used the term “normative” rather than “legal” causality. See e.g. ICC, Bemba, Separate opinion Judge Sylvia Steiner, 21 March 2016, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343-AnxI, para. 18; ICC, Mbarushimana, Decision on the confirmation of charges, Separate opinion Judge Fernandez de Gurmendi; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Orić, Judgment, 30 June 2006, IT-03-68-T, 30 June 2006, para. 305, fn. 863. See also ICC, Mbarushimana, Defence Written Submissions Pursuant to the Oral Order of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 September 2011, ICC-01/04–01/10, 21 October 2011, para. 28.

  10. C. Kutz, “Causeless Complicity”, Criminal Law and Philosophy (2007) 1:289–305, p. 4.

  11. A detailed discussion of causation expands the scope of this article. As Beebee explains, there is a sheer number of causation theories, which give expression to theoretical disagreement about what causation means. H. Beebee, “Introduction” in H. Beebee, C. Hithcock & P. Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009), p. 1.

  12. Compare C. Steer, Translating Guilt. Identifying Leadership Liability for Mass Crimes, T.M.C. Asser Press (2017), pp. 60–63, 87–90; E. van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law, Oxford University Press (2012), p. 128.

  13. De Jong and Sikkema argue that empirical causality is not a type of causality at all. In their view, empirical causality does not relate to the meaning of causality, but rather concerns how causality is established in terms of evidence. F. de Jong & E. Sikkema, “Zeven Stellingen over Causaliteit in het Strafrecht”, DD 2016/72, p. 3.

  14. V. Tadros, Criminal Responsibility, Oxford University Press (2005), p. 158; J. Keiler, Actus Reus and Participation in European Criminal Law, Intersentia (2013), p. 114; A. Simester, “Causation in (Criminal) Law, 133 Law Quaterly Review (2017), p. 425; H. Bavli, “Counterfactual Causation”, SMU Dedman School of Law Legal Studies Research Papers No. 409, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3244109, pp. 884–885.

  15. J. Keiler, Actus Reus and Participation in European Criminal Law, Intersentia (2013), pp. 116–117; H. Bavli, “Counterfactual Causation”, SMU Dedman School of Law Legal Studies Research Papers No. 409, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3244109, p. 881. Another theory of empirical causation is the theory of adequate causation, which entails that a condition is the adequate cause of a harm if it has a tendency, in the ordinary course of events, to be followed by a harm of this sort. J. Keiler, Actus Reus and Participation in European Criminal Law, Intersentia (2013), pp. 119–120; H. Hart & T. Honore, Causation in the Law, Oxford University Press (2002), pp. 465–497; F. G’sell, “Causation, Counterfactuals and Probabilities in Philosophy and Legal Thinking”, 2 Chicago-Kent Law Review (2016), pp. 515–516.

  16. F. G’sell, “Causation, Counterfactuals and Probabilities in Philosophy and Legal Thinking”, 2 Chicago-Kent Law Review (2016), pp. 513–514.

  17. M. Ferrante, “Causation in Criminal Responsibility”, New Criminal Law Review (2008), p. 497; F. G’sell, “Causation, Counterfactuals and Probabilities in Philosophy and Legal Thinking”, 2 Chicago-Kent Law Review (2016), p. 512.

  18. M. Moore, “Causation in the Law”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/causation-law/>.

  19. M. Moore, “Causation in the Law”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/causation-law/>.

  20. F. de Jong & E. Sikkema, “Zeven Stellingen over Causaliteit in het Strafrecht”, DD 2016/72, p. 12; J. Keiler, Actus Reus and Participation in European Criminal Law, Intersentia (2013), p. 116; D. J. Karp, “Causation in the Model Penal Code”, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1249 (1978), pp. 1261–1262; F. G’sell, “Causation, Counterfactuals and Probabilities in Philosophy and Legal Thinking”, 2 Chicago-Kent Law Review (2016), p. 514.

  21. J.G. Stewart, “Overdetermined Atrocities”, Public Law & Legal Theory research Paper Series Working Paper No. 12-53, p. 19.

  22. M. Moore, “Causation in the Law”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/causation-law/; J. Keiler, Actus Reus and Participation in European Criminal Law, Intersentia (2013), p. 116; J.G. Stewart, “Overdetermined Atrocities”, Public Law & Legal Theory research Paper Series Working Paper No. 12-53; F. G’sell, “Causation, Counterfactuals and Probabilities in Philosophy and Legal Thinking”, 2 Chicago-Kent Law Review (2016), pp. 512–513; H. Bavli, “Counterfactual Causation”, SMU Dedman School of Law Legal Studies Research Papers No. 409, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3244109, pp. 881–882, 885–886.

  23. M. Moore, “Causation in the Law”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/causation-law/; D. J. Karp, Causation in the Model Penal Code, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1249 (1978), pp. 1261–1262.

  24. C. Stuckenburg, “Causation” in: M.D. Dubber & T. Hörnle, The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law, OUP 2014, p. 6. See also, R. Wright, “Causation in Tort’, 73 California Law Review (1985), pp. 1735–1828; F. G’sell, “Causation, Counterfactuals and Probabilities in Philosophy and Legal Thinking”, 2 Chicago-Kent Law Review (2016), pp. 516–519; H. Bavli, “Counterfactual Causation”, SMU Dedman School of Law Legal Studies Research Papers No. 409, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3244109, pp. 888–889, 915.

  25. M. Moore, “Causation in the Criminal Law”, in J. Deigh & D. Dolinko (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 170.

  26. Stapleton refers to this type of causation as “historical involvement. J. Stapleton, “Cause in Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences”, 119 Law Quarterly Review (2003), p. 392.

  27. J. Keiler, Actus Reus and Participation in European Criminal Law, Intersentia (2013), p. 130; J. Keiler, “Causation”, in J. Keiler & D. Roef (eds.), Comparative Concepts of Criminal Law, Intersentia (2016), p. 112.

  28. J. Keiler, Actus Reus and Participation in European Criminal Law, Intersentia (2013), p. 130; C. Stuckenburg, “Causation” in: M.D. Dubber & T. Hörnle, The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law, Oxford University Press (2014), pp. 473–474.

  29. J. Keiler, Actus Reus and Participation in European Criminal Law, Intersentia (2013), p. 132; J. Keiler, “Causation”, in J. Keiler & D. Roef (eds.), Comparative Concepts of Criminal Law, Intersentia (2016), pp. 117, 120–121.

  30. J. Geneuss, “German report on Individual Liability for Business Involvement in International Crimes”, S. Manacorda et al. (eds.), Individual Liability for Business Involvement in International Crimes, RIDP (2017), p. 276. In the academic literature, this broad conception of aiding has been criticized, and it is argued that a causal link – at least a “concurrent causation” (Mit-Ursächlichkeit) – to the completion of the offence is required.

  31. K. Ambos & S. Bock, “Germany” in A. Reed & M. Bohlander, Participation in Crime: Domestic and Comparative Perspectives, Routledge (2016), p. 334.

  32. M. Moore, “Causing, Aiding and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 156 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (2007), p. 421. See also D. J. Karp, “Causation in the Model Penal Code”, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1249 (1978), pp. 1264–1265. Other scholars have regarded accessorial liability as necessarily non-causal. This premise follows from a particularly strict interpretation of causation as either conditio sine qua non, or direct causation (causa proxima), thus dismissing non-necessary and remote contributions as causal.

  33. D. J. Karp, “Causation in the Model Penal Code”, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1249 (1978), pp. 1264–1266.

  34. R. Weisberg, “Reappraising Complicity”, 4 Buffalo Criminal Law Review (2000), pp. 237–238.

  35. State v. Tally, 15. So. at 722, 738–739 (Ala. 1894). More generally, there is literature that perceives accessorial liability an inchoate crime similar to attempt. Pursuant to this view, “the quintessence of complicity lies in the risk-enhancing character of the accomplice’s act, meaning that the only real inquiry is whether the accomplice’s actions were “of the type to make a difference”’. J. Stewart, “Complicity” in M.D. Dubber & T. Hörnle, The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law, Oxford University Press (2014), p. 538. Also see, C. Kutz, “The Philosophical Foundations of Complicity Law” in J. Deigh and D.Dolinko (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Criminal Law (2011), 5–6 ff.; C. Kutz, “Causeless Complicity”, 1 Criminal Law & Philosophy (2007) 289–305 ff.

  36. State v. Tally, 15. So. at 722, 738–739 (Ala. 1894). Also see, J. Kreutzer, “Causation and Repentance: Reexamining Complicity in Light of Attempts Doctrine”, 3 New York Journal of Law and Liberty, p. 162–163; C. Steer, Translating Guilt. Identifying Leadership Liability for Mass Crimes, T.M.C. Asser Pres, 2017, p. 129; R. Weisberg, “Reappraising Complicity”, 4 Buffalo Criminal Law Review (2000), p. 233–235.

  37. S. Girgis, “The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability: Supporting Intentions”, 123 Yale Law Journal (2013), pp. 465–466; S. Kadish, “Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine”, 73 California Law Review (1985), p. 359; D. Robinson, Justice in Extreme Cases: Criminal Law Theory Meets International Criminal Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2020), p. 183. For a critical assessment of this approach, see M. Moore, Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals and Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009), p. 95–96.

  38. S. Kadish, “Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine”, 73 California Law Review (1985), p. 358. See also D. Robinson, Justice in Extreme Cases: Criminal Law Theory Meets International Criminal Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2020), p. 183.

  39. K. Kinports, “Rosemond, Mens Rea, and the Elements of Complicity”, 52 San Diego Law Review (2015), p. 137; J. Kreutzer, “Causation and Repentance: Reexamining Complicity in Light of Attempts Doctrine”, 3 New York Journal of Law and Liberty, p. 168. For a critique on this approach in relation to complicity in international criminal law, see T. Weigend, “How to Interpret Complicity in the ICC Statute”, at http://jamesgstewart.com/how-to-intepret-complicity-in-the-icc-statute/.

  40. Model Penal Code § 2.06 cmt. at 312 (Official Draft and Revised Comments (1980).

  41. The purpose standard has been interpreted in different ways by scholars and courts. On this issue, see A. Greenawalt, “Foreign Assistance Complicity”, 54 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2016), p. 565–576; R. Weisberg, “Reappraising Complicity”, 4 Buffalo Criminal Law Review (2000). J.G. Stewart, “Overdetermined Atrocities”, Public Law & Legal Theory research Paper Series Working Paper No. 12-53, p. 14.

  42. C. Steer, Translating Guilt. Identifying Leadership Liability for Mass Crimes, T.M.C. Asser Press (2017), p. 129.

  43. United States v Peoni 1938, p. 402.

  44. K. Kinports, “Rosemond, Mens Rea, and the Elements of Complicity”, 52 San Diego Law Review (2015), p. 136. On this issue in relation to UK law on Joint Enterprise liability, see R. Williams, “What Is the Theoretical Basis of Accomplice Liability?” in B. Krebs (ed.), Accessorial Liability after Jogee, Oxford: Hart Publishing (2019), pp. 29–52.

  45. C. Kutz, “Causeless Complicity”, Criminal Law and Philosophy (2007), pp. 9–10.

  46. BGH, judgement of 20 February 1969 (Auschwitz), LG Frankfurt, judgement of 19/20 August 1965). I am grateful to Malte Stedtnitz for his helpful research assistance into the German case law.

  47. Regional Court of Munich II, judgment of 12 May 2011, 1 Ks 115 Js 12496/08.

  48. Federal Court of Justice of Germany, Order of 20 September 2016, 3 StR 49/16, available (in German) at http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de

  49. On this matter, see also J. Geneuss, “German report on Individual Liability for Business Involvement in International Crimes” in S. Manacorda et al. (eds.), Individual Liability for Business Involvement in International Crimes, RIDP (2017), p. 276.

  50. L. Schuldt, “Decision Review: German Federal Court of Justice Approves Conviction of Ex- Auschwitz Officer”, available online: http://www.cpg-online.de/2016/11/01/decision-review-german-federal-court-of-justice-approves-conviction-of-ex-auschwitz-officer/.

  51. This construction reminds us of the second category of Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) liability. One may question whether this type of reasoning is expansive, considering the possibility of “virtuous accomplices”, i.e. individuals who are right to contribute to the crimes of a criminal regime. On this point, see M. Jackson, “Virtuous Accomplices in International Criminal Law”, 4 International and Comparative Law Quaterly (2019), pp. 817–835.

  52. E.g. Lubanga Appeal judgment, para. 469.

  53. ICC, Bemba et al., Appeals Chamber, Judgment, ICC-01/05-01/13, 8 March 2018 (hereinafter Bemba et al. Appeal judgment), para. 820. By thus expanding the scope of the essential contribution requirement, it becomes doubtful whether there is a principled difference between the essential contribution for co-perpetration and the substantial and significant contribution for aiding and abetting, and common purpose liability, respectively. On this point, also see M. Cupido, “Common Purpose Liability Versus Joint Perpetration: A Practical View on the ICC’s Hierarchy of Liability Theories”, 29 Leiden Journal of International Law (2016).

  54. For a critique on this approach, see J.G. Stewart, “Overdetermined Atrocities”, Public Law & Legal Theory research Paper Series Working Paper No. 12-53, p. 29.

  55. ICC, Lubanga, Judgment, Trial Chamber, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, 14 March 2012, Separate Opinion of Judge Fulford (hereinafter Lubanga Trial Judgment, Separate Opinion of Judge Fulford), para 17; ICC, Chui, Judgment, Trial Chamber, ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tENG, 18 December 2012, Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert (hereinafter Chui Trial Judgment, Concurring Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert), para 42.

  56. J. Ohlin, E. van Sliedregt & T. Weigend, “Assessing the Control-Theory”, 26 Leiden Journal of International Law (2013), p. 731.

  57. E. van Sliedregt & L. Yanev, “Co-Perpetration based on Joint Control over the Crime”, in J. Hemptinne, R. Roth & E. van Sliedregt (eds.), Modes of Liability in International Criminal Law, Cambridge University Press, 2020, para. 44; Lubanga Trial judgment, Separate opinion Judge Fulford, para. 17; Chui Trial judgment, dissenting opinion Van den Wyngaert, para. 42. For a different – more positive view – see, J.G. Stewart, “Overdetermined Atrocities”, Public Law & Legal Theory research Paper Series Working Paper No. 12-53, pp. 14–15.

  58. ICTY, Simić, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, IT‐95‐9‐A, 28 November 2006, para. 86; ICTY, Vasiljević, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, IT-98-32-A, 25 February 2004, para. 102; ICTY, Blaškić, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, IT-95-14-A, 29 July 2004, para. 45; ICTY, Alekosvski, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, IT‐95‐14/1‐A, 24 March 2000, para. 162; ICTY, Krnojelac, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, IT‐97‐25‐A, 17 September 2003, para. 52.

  59. Case law does include more incidental references to specific relevant facts. For example, as the Taylor Appeals Chamber has explained that the effect of a contribution may be assessed differently where it concerns isolated crimes than in cases relating to widespread and systematic attacks. Taylor Appeal judgment, para. 391. Moreover, scholars have suggested that the accused’s position of authority and his ability to act independently can influence the judicial assessment of the substantial contribution. A Heyer, “Corporate Complicity under International Criminal Law”, 6 Human Rights & International Legal Discourse (2012), p. 30.

  60. ICTY, Blagojevic & Jokic, Judgment, Trial Chamber, IT-02-60-T, 17 January 2005, para. 726; ICTY, Limaj et al., Judgment, Trial Chamber, IT-03-66-T, 30 November 2005, para. 517.

  61. ICTY, Orić, Judgment, Trial Chamber, IT-03-68-T, 30 June 2006, para 282; ICTY, Furundžija, Judgment, Trial Chamber, IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998, para 231; ICTY, Šainović et al., Judgment, Appeals Chamber, IT-05-87-T, 23 January 2014 (hereinafter Šainović et al. Appeal judgment), para 1647.

  62. ICTY, Tadic, Judgment, Trial Chamber, IT-94-1-T, 14 May 1997, para. 688. If the ICC decides to follow this interpretation, the distinction between complicity and co-perpetration in terms of the level of the accused’s involvement becomes blurred. After all, co-perpetration similarly requires that the crime could not have been committed in the same way without the accused’s contribution.

  63. A Heyer, “Corporate Complicity under International Criminal Law”, 6 Human Rights & International Legal Discourse (2012), p 30.

  64. J.D. Ohlin, 'Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise', 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007), p. 79.

  65. In theory, the requirement of a significant contribution sets a lower threshold than the substantial contribution requirement for aiding and abetting. See M. Cupido, “Group Acting with a Common Purpose”, in J. Hemptinne, R. Roth & E. Van Sliedregt, Modes of Liability in International Criminal Law, Cambridge University Press (2019), p. 452.

  66. ICC, Katanga, Judgment, Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/04-01/07, 7 March 2014 (hereinafter Katanga Trial judgment), paras. 1632–1633.

  67. Katanga Trial judgment, para. 1635.

  68. Katanga Trial judgment, para. 1635.

  69. Kadish raises the question in what sense a contribution can be said to have mattered if it what not a necessary condition for the primary party to decide if and how he will commit the crime. S. Kadish, “Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine”, 73 California Law Review (1985), p. 358.

  70. Katanga Trial judgment, para. 1632.

  71. ICC, Mbarushimana, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/04-01/10, 16 December 2011 (hereinafter, Mbarushimana Decision on the confirmation of charges), para. 277. This argument has been rejected by Judge Fernandez de Gurmendi. ICC, Mbarushimana, Pre-Trial Chamber, Separate opinion of Judge Sylvia Fernandez de Gurmendi, ICC-01/04–01/10 OA4, 30 May 2012 (hereinafter, Mbarushimana Decision on the confirmation of charges, Separate opinion Judge Fernandez de Gurmendi), para. 10.

  72. Katanga Trial judgment, para. 1632.

  73. Mbarushimana Decision on the confirmation of charges, paras. 295–340.

  74. Mbarushimana Decision on the confirmation of charges, paras. 295–340.

  75. Katanga Trial judgment, para. 1672.

  76. Katanga Trial judgment, para. 1679.

  77. Katanga Trial judgment, para. 1677.

  78. Mbarushimana Decision on the confirmation of charges, para. 292.

  79. M. Cupido, “Common Purpose Liability Versus Joint Perpetration: A Practical View on the ICC’s Hierarchy of Liability Theories”, 29 Leiden Journal of International Law (2016), p. 909.

  80. Supra fn. 7.

  81. ICC, Bemba, Appeals Chamber, Concurring separate opinion Judge Eboe-Osuji, 8 June 2018, para. 167–185.

  82. ICTY, Mucic et al., Trial Chamber., Judgement, 16 November 1998, para. 398. See also ICTY, Blaškić, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 29 July 2004, paras 75–77; ICTY, Halilović, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 16 November 2005, paras. 77–78; ICTY, Orić, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 30 June 2006, para. 338.

  83. ICC, Bemba, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, 15 June 2009, para. 425; ICC, Bemba, Trial Chamber, Judgment, ICC-01/05-01/08, 21 March 2016, paras. 211–212.

  84. ICC, Bemba, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, 15 June 2009, para. 425.

  85. ICC, Bemba, Trial Chamber, Separate Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner, ICC-01/05-01/08, 21 March 2016, para. 23. This interpretation follows the test formulated by the Pre-Trial Chamber in Bemba. ICC, Bemba, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009, ICC-01/05-01/08, para. 425.

  86. ICC, Bemba, Trial Chamber, Separate Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner, ICC-01/05-01/08, 21 March 2016, para. 24.

  87. ICC, Bemba, Appeals Chamber, Separate opinion Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert and Judge Howard Morrison, ICC-01/05-01/08, 8 June 2018, para. 56.

  88. ICC, Bemba, Appeals Chamber, Separate opinion Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert and Judge Howard Morrison, ICC-01/05-01/08, 8 June 2018, para. 55.

  89. F. de Jong & E. Sikkema, “Zeven Stellingen over Causaliteit in het Strafrecht”, DD 2016/72, p. 3; A. Simester, “Causation in Criminal Law”, 133 Law Quaterly Review (2017), p. 416.

  90. F. de Jong & E. Sikkema, “Zeven Stellingen over Causaliteit in het Strafrecht”, DD 2016/72, p. 3; J. Keiler, “Causation”, in J. Keiler & D. Roef (eds.), Comparative Concepts of Criminal Law, Intersentia 2016, p. 105.

  91. F. de Jong & E. Sikkema, “Zeven Stellingen over Causaliteit in het Strafrecht”, DD 2016/72, pp. 3–4.

  92. J. Keiler, “Causation”, in J. Keiler & D. Roef (eds.), Comparative Concepts of Criminal Law, Intersentia 2016, p. 105.

  93. V. Tadros, Criminal Responsibility, Oxford University Press (2005), pp. 159, 161, Ashworth principles in criminal law, p. 121.

  94. J. Keiler, Actus Reus and Participation in European Criminal Law, Intersentia (2013), pp. 119–121; C. Stuckenburg, “Causation” in: M.D. Dubber & T. Hörnle, The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law, OUP 2014, pp. 484–489; J. Keiler, “Causation”, in J. Keiler & D. Roef (eds.), Comparative Concepts of Criminal Law, Intersentia 2016, p. 109; J. Stapleton, “Cause in Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences”, 119 Law Quarterly Review (2003), p. 388; V. Tadros, Criminal Responsibility, Oxford University Press (2005), p. 162; P. Ruy, “Causation in Criminal Law”, 106 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1958), p. 793; U. Murmann, “Problems of Causation with Regard to (Potential) Actions of Multiple Protagonists”, 12 JICJ (2014), p. 284

  95. C. Stuckenburg, “Causation” in: M.D. Dubber & T. Hörnle, The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law, Oxford University Press (2014), p. 13; P. Ruy, “Causation in Criminal Law”, 106 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1958), p. 796.

  96. V. Tadros, Criminal Responsibility, Oxford University Press (2005), p. 162 quoting Stapleton “Perspectives on causation”, p. 82. Similarly, P. Ruy, “Causation in Criminal Law”, 106 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1958), pp. 783–785.

  97. G. Williams, “Fini for Novus Actus”, The Cambridge Law Journal Vol. 48, No. 3 (Nov., 1989), p. 398; S. Kadish, “Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine”, 73 California Law Review (1985), p. 360. Kadish describes how policy reasons have pulled the law towards a broader view in which foreseeable interventions by a third person do not break the chain of causation: “[c]ausal responsibility can be established when the result was within the risk of which the defendant should have been aware”. Similarly, C. Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2010), p. 155.

  98. J. Keiler, “Causation”, in J. Keiler & D. Roef (eds.), Comparative Concepts of Criminal Law, Intersentia (2016), pp. 108–109.

  99. P. Ruy, “Causation in Criminal Law”, 106 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1958), p. 774.

  100. P. Ruy, “Causation in Criminal Law”, 106 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1958), p. 784.

  101. V. Tadros, Criminal Responsibility, Oxford University Press (2005), p. 175. Also see, A. Simester, “Causation in Criminal Law”, 133 Law Quaterly Review (2017), p. 417.

  102. M. Moore, “Causation in the Criminal Law”, J. Deigh and D. Dolinko, The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 170.

  103. M. Moore, “Causation in the Criminal Law”, in J. Deigh and D. Dolinko (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 180–181.

  104. M. Moore, “Causation in the Criminal Law”, in J. Deigh and D. Dolinko (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 181.

  105. M. Moore, “Causation in the Criminal Law”, in J. Deigh and D. Dolinko (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 181–182.

  106. D. J. Karp, “Causation in the Model Penal Code”, 78 Columbia Law Review (1978), p. 1266.

  107. M. Moore, “Causation in the Criminal Law”, in J. Deigh and D. Dolinko (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 182–183; M. Moore, Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 99–100.

  108. G.P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, Oxford University Press (1998), p. 65.

  109. M.D Dubber & T. Hornle, Criminal Law: A Comparative Approach, Oxford University Press (2014), p. 299. In relation to tort law, Stapleton has expressed the critique that the concepts of causation and proximate cause are ambiguous and have been applied in an obscure way. J. Stapleton, “Cause in Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences”, 119 Law Quarterly Review (2003), p. 388.

  110. U. Murmann, “Problems of Causation with Regard to (Potential) Actions of Multiple Protagonists”, 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2014), p. 287; C. Stuckenburg, “Causation” in: M.D. Dubber & T. Hörnle, The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law, OUP 2014, p. 473.

  111. K. Ambos, “The ICC and Common Purpose – What is Required under Article 25(3)d)?” in C. Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court, Oxford University Press (2015), p. 603; H. Hart & T. Honore, Causation in the Law, Oxford University Press (2002), p. 476.

  112. J. Keiler, Actus Reus and Participation in European Criminal Law, Intersentia (2013), p. 133.

  113. C. Stuckenburg, “Causation” in: M.D. Dubber & T. Hörnle, The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law, Oxford University Press (2014), p. 489.

  114. The American debate on this issue primarily concerns the notion of conspiracy. However, the arguments put forward equally apply to accomplices and have been used by the MPC drafters in their definition of a complicity.

  115. United States v. Paglia, Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 19 July 1951. See also United State v. Peoni, Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 12 December 1938. This reasoning was strongly opposed by Judge Parker, who supported a knowledge standard for accomplice liability: “[o]ne who sells a gun to another knowing that he is buying it to commit a murder would hardly escape conviction as an accessory to the murder by showing that he received full price for the gun” (emphasis added). United States v. Backun, Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 10 June 1940. The literature and jurisprudence on the mental element for complicity can be understood in light of the conflict between Judges Parker and Hand. For a more elaborate discussion of this issue, see T. Schmidt, Crimes of Business in International Law. Concepts of Individual and Corporate Responsibility for the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Nomos (2015), pp. 179–186.

  116. In an earlier draft of the MPC, it had been submitted that knowing and substantial facilitation is a proper object of preventive effort by the penal law. R. Weisberg, “Reappraising Complicity”, 4 Buffalo Criminal Law Review (2000), pp. 237–238.

  117. There is extensive debate in American literature about the scope and meaning of the purpose standard. One school of thought argues that the purpose standard only applies to the act of assistance, not to the crime. See e.g. J. Stewart, “Overdetermined Atrocities”, Public Law & Legal Theory research Paper Series Working Paper No. 1, pp. 21–22. Yet, this debate does not negate the fact that the MPC drafter included the purpose standard to limit criminal liability for business conduct by heightening the mens rea threshold. See E. van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2012), pp. 112–116.

  118. K. Kinports, “Rosemond, Mens Rea, and the Elements of Complicity”, 52 San Diego Law Review (2015), p. 137. See also, J.G. Stewart, “Overdetermined Atrocities”, Public Law & Legal Theory research Paper Series Working Paper No. 12–53.

  119. A. Greenawalt, “Foreign Assistance Complicity”, 54 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2016), p. 564. Greenawalt derives from A. Duff, “Can I Help You – Accessorial Liability and the Intention to Assist”, 10 Legal Studies (1990), p. 178.

  120. Whilst the German debate on this point is most extensive and well-known, the idea of stressing or even heightening the mens rea requirement in case of dual-use contribution has also been applied by other domestic systems of criminal law, including. Russia, Italy and Slovenia. See S. Manacorda, “Introduction” in S. Manacorda et al. (eds.), Individual Liability for Business Involvement in International Crimes, RIDP (2017), pp. 47–49.

  121. BGH NStZ 2000, 34, at 2; BGH NJW 2001, 2409, 2410, at 2.

  122. BGH NStZ 2000, 34, at 2.

  123. BGH NStZ 2000, 34, at 2; BGH NJW 2001, 2409, 2410, at 2; BGH NJW 2000, 3010, 3011. On this matter see also, H. Vest, “Business Leaders and the Modes of Individual Criminal Responsibility under International Law, 8 JICJ 2010, p. 864. Some authors even require that the agent aims to have this effect, i.e. acts with an explicit “Tatförderwillen” (dolus directus first degree)

  124. BGH NJW 2000, 3010, 3011.

  125. BGH NJW 2000, 3010, 3011. On this issue, see also, J. Geneuss, “German report on Individual Liability for Business Involvement in International Crimes” in S. Manacorda et al. (eds.), Individual Liability for Business Involvement in International Crimes, RIDP (2017), pp. 285–286.

  126. BGH NJW 2000, 3010, 3011; BGH NStZ 2000, 34, at 2.

  127. J. Geneuss, “German report on Individual Liability for Business Involvement in International Crimes”, S. Manacorda et al. (eds.), Individual Liability for Business Involvement in International Crimes, RIDP (2017), p. 287.

  128. BGH NStZ 2000, 34, at 2. On this point, see also, J. Geneuss, “German report on Individual Liability for Business Involvement in International Crimes” in S. Manacorda et al. (eds.), Individual Liability for Business Involvement in International Crimes, RIDP (2017), p. 285.

  129. J. Geneuss, “German report on Individual Liability for Business Involvement in International Crimes” in S. Manacorda et al. (eds.), Individual Liability for Business Involvement in International Crimes, RIDP (2017), p. 286. Though the debate about neutral acts in German law stems from the discussion of whether the persons loading Jews on the trains to concerntrationcamps are liable as accomplices for genocide. H. Rudolphi, Die Gleichstellungsproblematik der unechten Unterlassungsdelikte und der Gedanke der Ingerenz (Göttingen, 1966), at 136. In the US, the issue of neutral acts has also appeared in decisions of courts based on the Aliens Torts Acts (ATS). See e.g. Presbyterian Church of Sudan et al. v. Talisman Energy Inc. and Republic of Sudan, Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 07-0016, 2 October 2009; Lungisile Ntsebeza et al. v. Citigroup Inc. et al., District Court for the Southern District of New York, 1499 (JES), 8 April 2009. Whilst these decisions concern international crimes, they are less relevant for this study, since they are decided based on international law, rather than domestic American law.

  130. BGH NJW 2001, 2409, 2410.

  131. Mbarushimana Decision on the confirmation of charges, Separate opinion Judge Fernandez de Gurmendi. See also K. Ambos, “The International Criminal Court and Common Purpose: What Contribution is Required Under Article 25(3)(d)?” in C. Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court, Oxford University Press (2015), pp. 603–607; ICC, Mbarushimana, Defence Written Submissions Pursuant to the Oral Order of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 September 2011, ICC-01/04–01/10, 21 October 2011, para. 28.

  132. Mbarushimana Decision on the confirmation of charges, Separate opinion Judge Fernandez de Gurmendi, para. 12.

  133. See ICC, Bemba, Separate opinion Judge Sylvia Steiner, 21 March 2016, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343-AnxI, para. 18.

  134. See also Robinson, who argues that the normative concept of causation accords with legal doctrine in international criminal law. D. Robinson, Justice in Extreme Cases: Criminal Law Theory Meets International Criminal Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2020), pp. 179–180.

  135. ICC, Mbarushimana, Pre-Trial Chamber Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/04–01/10, 16 December 2011, para. 287.

  136. ICTY, Perišić, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, IT-04-81-A, 28 February 2013 (hereinafter Perišić Appeal judgment).

  137. Perišić Appeal judgment, para 52.

  138. See e.g. L. Sadat, “Can the ICTY’s Šainović and Perišić Cases be Reconciled?”, 108 American Journal of International Law (2014), pp. 475–485.

  139. Šainović et al. Appeal judgment, para 1650. See critically J. Stewart, Judicial Rejection of “Specific Direction” is Widespread”, 23 December 2015, http://jamesgstewart.com/judicial-rejection-of-specific-direction-is-widespread/

  140. Taylor Appeal judgment, para. 395, 480.

  141. A. Greenawalt, “Foreign Assistance Complicity”, 54 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2016), pp. 539–540, 579–580; E. van Sliedregt & A. Popova, “Interpreting “for the purpose of facilitating” in Article 25(3)(c)?”, blogpost at: https://cicj.org/2014/12/interpreting-for-the-purpose-of-facilitating-in-article-253c/; K.J. Heller, in “Milestones in International Criminal Justice: Recent Legal Controversies at the UN Yugoslav Tribunal”, Chatham House International Law Summary, 1 October 2013, at 7–8, available at <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Meetings/Meeting%20Transcripts/161013Yugoslav1.pdf>, last consulted 16 April 2018. Differently, J. Stewart, “An Important New orthodoxy on Complicity in the ICC Statute”, 21 January 2015, available at http://jamesgstewart.com/the-important-new-orthodoxy-on-complicity-in-the-icc-statute/.

  142. ICC, Katanga, Judgment, Trial Chamber, Minority Opinion Judge Christine van den Wyngaert, ICC-01/4-01/07, 7 March 2014 (hereinafter, Katanga Trial judgment, Minority opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert), para. 287. See also, M. Jackson, “Virtuous Accomplices”, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 26/2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3393347 p. 13.

  143. Katanga Trial judgment, Minority opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, para. 287.

  144. On the meaning of legality in international criminal law, see, e.g., B. Broomhall, “Article 22: Nullum Crimen sine Lege,” in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observer’s Notes, Article by Article, Verlag C.H. Beck, 2008, pp. 713–729; K.S. Gallant, The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law, Cambridge University Press, 2010; M. Boot, Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen sine Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court , Intersentia, 2002.

  145. A. Greenawalt, “Foreign Assistance Complicity”, 54 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2016), p. 598.

  146. M. Cupido, “Facing Facts in International Criminal Law: A Casuistic Model of Judicial Reasoning”, 14 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2016), pp. 1–20; M. Cupido, Facts Matter: A Study into the Casuistry of Substantive International Criminal Law, Eleven International Publishers (2015); M. Cupido, “Pluralism in Theories of Responsibility: Joint Criminal Enterprise versus Joint Perpetration” in: E. van Sliedregt, & S. Vasiliev (eds.), Pluralism in International Criminal Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 128–158; M. Cupido, “The Casuistry of International Criminal Law: Exploring a New Field of Research”, 44 Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy (2015), pp. 116–132; M. Cupido, “The Contextual Embedding of Genocide: A Casuistic Analysis of the Interplay between Law and Facts”, 15 Melbourne Journal of International Law (2014), pp. 387–413; M. Cupido, “The Policy underlying Crimes against Humanity: Practical Reflections on a Theoretical Debate”, 22 Criminal Law Forum (2011), pp. 275–309.

  147. A. Greenawalt, “Foreign Assistance Complicity”, 54 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2016), p. 598.

  148. J. Keiler, Actus Reus and Participation in European Criminal Law, Intersentia (2013), pp. 119–121; C. Stuckenburg, “Causation” in: M.D. Dubber & T. Hörnle, The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law, OUP 2014, pp. 484–489; J. Keiler, “Causation”, in J. Keiler & D. Roef (eds.), Comparative Concepts of Criminal Law, Intersentia 2016, p. 109; J. Stapleton, “Cause in Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences”, 119 Law Quarterly Review (2003), p. 388; V. Tadros, Criminal Responsibility, Oxford University Press (2005), p. 162; P. Ruy, “Causation in Criminal Law”, 106 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1958), p. 793; U. Murmann, “Problems of Causation with Regard to (Potential) Actions of Multiple Protagonists”, 12 JICJ (2014), p. 284

  149. Since conducting a war is in itself not illegal, the assessment should here be specifically concern the illegal elements of warfare.

  150. Compare A. Smeulers, “A Criminological Approach to the ICC’s Control Theory” in J. Heller et al. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of International Criminal Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2020); Heyer, “Corporate Complicity under International Criminal Law”, 6 Human Rights & International Legal Discourse (2012), p. 48; P. Robinson, “Imputed Criminal Liability”, 93 Yale Law Journal (1984), pp. 630, 633–634, 642–643. Robinson’s analysis makes clear that in cases of “creating the situation in which crimes occur” liability is still based on causality.

  151. K. Ambos, K. Ambos, “Article 25” in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Oxford: Beck/Hart (2008), p. 754.

  152. Taylor Appeals judgment, para. 391.

  153. A. Heyer, “Corporate Complicity under International Criminal Law”, 6 Human Rights & International Legal Discourse (2012), p. 52.

  154. Katanga Trial Judgment, para. 1627. Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, para 344; Lubanga Appeal Judgment, para 445; Bemba et al. Trial Judgment, para 66.

  155. K. Ambos, “The First Judgment of the International Criminal Court (Prosecutor v. Lubanga): A Comprehensive Analysis of the Legal Issues”, 2 International Criminal Law Review (2012), p. 140. This view complies with German and English scholarship in which it is argued that liability for co-perpetration requires that the common plan entails a more or less concrete criminal offence. See M. cupido. T. Kooijmans & L. Yanev, “De Grondslag en Reikwijdte van Medeplegen: Hoe het Nederlandse Strafrecht Inspiratie Kan Putten uit het Internationale Strafrecht”, 29 Delikt & Delinkwent (2018), p. 401, fn. 104.

  156. Compare P. Robinson, “Imputed Criminal Liability”, 93 Yale Law Journal (1984), p. 663. According to Robinson, when the causal link is assessed in relation to a dangerous situation, it is logical to limit criminal liability to situations which are in fact dangerous.

  157. Gbagbo Decision on the confirmation of charges, para. 146.

  158. ICC, Gbagbo, Decision on the Conformation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-02/22-01/11, 12 June 2014 (hereinafter Gbagbo Decision on the confirmation of charges), para.142.

  159. Gbagbo Decision on the confirmation of charges, para. 145.

  160. Gbagbo Decision on the confirmation of charges, para. 144–146.

  161. In the case against Ngudjolo Chui, the Trial Chamber also seems to have used the essential contribution standard in a restrictive way. In particular, the Trial Chamber held that the accused's high social status, extensive military experience, regular contacts with various regional officials and his position as colonel during various meetings cannot prove that he commanded the physical perpetrators during their commission of crimes, nor that the accused had issued military orders to that account. ICC, Chui, Judgment, Trial Chamber II, ICC-0l/04-02/12, December 2012, para. 50.

  162. Bemba et al. Appeal judgment, para. 825.

  163. Bemba et al. Appeal judgment, para. 824.

  164. Bemba et al. Appeal judgment, para. 825.

  165. Sepinwall emphasizes the importance of the distinction between role and status (with respect to the parent-child relationship). A. Sepinwall, “Faultless Guilt: Towards a Relationship-Based Account of Criminal Liability”, 54 American Criminal Law Review (2017), p. 17.

  166. In relation to liability more generally, C. Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2010), pp. 158–159. Sepinwall goes even further by arguing that “participating with others in a shared endeavor, under the aegis of an entity that subsumes the identities of each individual into a unified whole, provides value and meaning. This kind of group experience requires members to recognize that the group acts on their behalf; that its acts are theirs”. A. Sepinwall, “Faultless Guilt: Towards a Relationship-Based Account of Criminal Liability”, 54 American Criminal Law Review (2017), p. 53, Accordingly, Sepinwell holds that corporate directors “must take himself to deserve blame for the corporation’s crimes because he must see that his agency is reflected in the corporation’s acts, and he must see this not because he wrongly contributed to the corporation’s crime but just because his seeing this is what the norms and obligations of his role require”. A. Sepinwall, “Faultless Guilt: Towards a Relationship-Based Account of Criminal Liability”, 54 American Criminal Law Review (2017), p. 55.

  167. J. ten Voorde, “Prohibiting Remote Harms: On Endangerment, Citizenship and Control, 10 Utrecht Law Review (2014), p. 172. Ten Voorde draws on work of Simester and Von Hirsch, in particular A. Simester & A. von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs: On the Principles of Criminalization, Hart Publishing (2011), pp. 64,68.

  168. A. Von Hirsch, “Extending the Harm Principle: “Remote” Harms and Fair Imputation” in A. Simester & A. Smith, Harm and Culpability, OUP 1996, pp. 270, 272. For a more far-reaching argument on how criminal liability can be grounded on one’s position and on the nature of the relation between the defendant and the wrong(doer), see A. Sepinwall, “Faultless Guilt: Towards a Relationship-Based Account of Criminal Liability”, 54 American Criminal Law Review (2017), pp. 521–570.

  169. E.g. C. Schliemann, and L. Bryk, Arms Trade and Corporate Responsibility: Liability, litigation and Legislative Reform, November 2019, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/15850.pdf

  170. P. Robinson, “Imputed Criminal Liability”, 93 Yale Law Review (1984), p. 671.

  171. A. Von Hirsch, “Extending the Harm Principle: “Remote” Harms and Fair Imputation” in A. Simester & A. Smith, Harm and Culpability, Oxford University Press (1996), pp. 266-268.

  172. See also, A. Greenawalt, “Foreign Assistance Complicity”, 54 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2016), p. 594; A Heyer, “Corporate Complicity under International Criminal Law”, 6 Human Rights & International Legal Discourse (2012), p. 30.

  173. Lubanga Appeal judgment, para. 436.

  174. This view is also reflected in the findings of the Trial Chamber in Ntganda, which explicated that the accused’s contribution was to be assessed in light his key position within the UPC/FPLC as Deputy Chief of Staff in charge of Operations and Organisation. ICC, Ntaganda, Judgment, Trial Chamber IV, ICC-01/04-02/06-2359, 8 July 2019 (hereinafter Natganda Trial judgment), para. 829. O this issue, also see M. Cupido, “Common Purpose Liability Versus Joint Perpetration: A Practical View on the ICC’s Hierarchy of Liability Theories”, 29 Leiden Journal of International Law (2016), pp. 909–910. See also A. Gil Gil & E. Maculan, “Current Trends in the Definition of “Perpetrator” by the International Criminal Court: From the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges in the Lubanga Case to the Katanga Judgment”, 28 Leiden Journal of International Law (2015), p. 357. On the notion of risk-taking in tort law see, J. Stapleton, “Cause in Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences”, 119 Law Quarterly Review (2003), pp. 396, 417. Other than in criminal law, tort law allows judges to connect the percentage of recovered damages to the percentage of risk aggravation: when the accused aggravated the risk of harm with 25%, he will be held liable for 25% of the damages.

  175. J. Keiler, Actus Reus and Participation in European Criminal Law, Intersentia (2013), p. 133; D. Robinson, Justice in Extreme Cases: Criminal Law Theory Meets International Criminal Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2020), p. 184; K. Ambos, “Article 25” in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Oxford: Beck/Hart (2008), pp. 758–759.

  176. D. Robinson, Justice in Extreme Cases: Criminal Law Theory Meets International Criminal Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2020), pp. 184–185.

  177. Whilst Judges Steiner, Monageng and Hofmanski require a “high degree of probability”, Judge Ozaki adopted a standard of “reasonable foreseeability” of crimes. ICC, Bemba, Trial Chamber, Separate Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner, 21 March 2016, para. 23; ICC, Bemba, Trial Chamber, Separate opinion of Judge Kuniko Ozaki, 21 March 2016, para. 23.

  178. A. Heyer, “Corporate Complicity under International Criminal Law”, 6 Human Rights & International Legal Discourse 14 2012, pp. 42–44.

  179. A Heyer, “Corporate Complicity under International Criminal Law”, 6 Human Rights & International Legal Discourse (2012), p. 44. See e.g.

  180. Compare the judgments of the Nuremberg Tribunal in the Ministries case and the Zyklon B case. United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsäcker, et al. (Ministries case), US Military Court, 11–13 April 1949; Trial of Bruno Tesch and two others (Zyklon B. case), British Military Court, 1–8 March 1946. Whereas Bruno Tesch – the owner of the company that sold the poisonous Zyklon B gas that was used in the gas chambers of the concentration camps – was found guilty of aiding and abetting crimes against humanity, the US Military Court acquitted Karl Rasche because, “[l]oans or sale of commodities to be used in an unlawful enterprise may well be condemned from a moral standpoint (…) but the transaction can hardly be said to be a crime” (para. 622).

  181. A. Greenawalt, “Foreign Assistance Complicity”, 54 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2016), pp. 595–596.

  182. Compare M. Jackson, “Virtuous Accomplices”, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 26/2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3393347, pp. 8–9. Jackson makes this argument in relation to humanitarian actors, but it seems to be applicable more broadly.

  183. P. Robinson, “Imputed Criminal Liability”, 93 Yale Law Journal (1984), pp. 638–639. Also see A. Greenawalt, “Foreign Assistance Complicity”, 54 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2016), p. 593; W. Huisman & E. van Sliedregt, “Rogue Traders. Dutch Businessman, International Crimes and Corporate Complicity, 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2010), p. 824; J. ten Voorde, “Prohibiting Remote Harms: On Endangerment, Citizenship and Control”, 10 Utrecht Law Review (2014), p. 176. Critically, J. Stewart, “An Important New orthodoxy on Complicity in the ICC Statute”, 21 January 2015, available at http://jamesgstewart.com/the-important-new-orthodoxy-on-complicity-in-the-icc-statute/; C. Stuckenburg, “Causation” in: M.D. Dubber & T. Hörnle, The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law, Oxford University Press (2014), p. 15; T. Weigend, “How to Interpret Complicity in the ICC Statute”, at http://jamesgstewart.com/how-to-intepret-complicity-in-the-icc-statute/.

  184. A. Greenawalt, “Foreign Assistance Complicity”, 54 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2016), p. 593.

  185. Huisman and Van Sliedregt present a similar view in relation to JCE and aiding and abetting. Since JCE entails a high mens rea requirement (“shared intent”), the causality threshold can be lowered. By contrast, since aiding and abetting entails a rather low mens rea requirement (knowing contribution to crime), the causality threshold needs to be bolstered. W. Huisman & E. van Sliedregt, “Rogue Traders. Dutch Businessman, International Crimes and Corporate Complicity, 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2010), 803–828.

  186. Katanga Trial judgment, para. 1632.

  187. E. van Sliedregt & L. Yanev, “Co-Perpetration based on Joint Control over the Crime”, in J. Hemptinne, R. Roth & E. van Sliedregt (eds.), Modes of Liability in International Criminal Law, Cambridge University Press, 2020, p. 55. ICTY, Brđanin, Trial Chamber Judgment, IT-99-36-T, 1 September 2004, para 430.

  188. C. Burchard, “Ancillary and Neutral Business Contributions to “Corporate-Political Core Crimes”. Initial Enquiries Concerning the Rome Statute”, 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2010), p. 938.

  189. A similar idea has been presented by the ICJ, which has considered that “[s]ometimes, even though the provision of goods or services may be an integral factor in a chain of causation, criminal and civil courts may hesitate to find a company in this situation legally accountable, because the misuse of their generic goods or services is considered to be beyond their control. However, the Panel believes that this hesitation will and should decrease substantially where there is evidence that a company knows of the likelihood that its goods or services will be used to perpetrate gross human rights abuses”. Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability. Vol. II: Criminal Law and International Crimes. Report of the International Commission of Jurists Expert Panel on Corporate Complicity for International Crimes: https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Vol.2-Corporate-legal-accountability-thematic-report-2008.pdf, p. 37. The ICJ’s reference to “knowledge of a likelihood” seems to reflect a less stringent mens rea requirement than the German notion of direct intent.

  190. Compare A. Von Hirsch, “Extending the Harm Principle: ‘Remote’ Harms and Fair Imputation” in A. Simester & A. Smith, Harm and Culpability, Oxford University Press (1996), p. 267.

  191. Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability. Vol. II: Criminal Law and International Crimes. Report of the International Commission of Jurists Expert Panel on Corporate Complicity for International Crimes: https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Vol.2-Corporate-legal-accountability-thematic-report-2008.pdf, p. 37. Likewise, Greenawalt refers to the relevance of whether an accessory engaged in normal (business) practice, or whether he deviated from his ordinary course of (business) conduct. A. Greenawalt, “Foreign Assistance Complicity”, 54 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2016), pp. 573, 594.

  192. A Heyer, “Corporate Complicity under International Criminal Law”, 6 Human Rights & International Legal Discourse (2012), pp. 41–42.

  193. M. Cupido, “Common Purpose Liability Versus Joint Perpetration: A Practical View on the ICC’s Hierarchy of Liability Theories”, 29 Leiden Journal of International Law (2016), p. 909.

  194. C. Kutz, “Causeless Complicity”, 1 Criminal Law and Philosophy (2007), pp. 11–12.

  195. M. Jackson, “Virtuous Accomplices in International Criminal Law”, 4 International and Comparative Law Quaterly (2019), p. 824.

  196. Similarly, though on different grounds, P. Hassett, “Absolutism in Causation”, 38 Syracuse Law Review (1987), p. 715.

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Marjolein Cupido, Fellow Center for International Criminal Justice, VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands and also Franklinstraat 94, 2562 CJ, The Hague, The Netherlands. e-mail: m.cupido@vu.nl.

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Cupido, M. Causation in International Crimes Cases: (Re)Concenptualizing the Causal Linkage. Crim Law Forum 32, 1–50 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10609-020-09410-0

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