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Error in Personam: Confusion in Indonesia’s Environmental Corporate Criminal Liability

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Abstract

Since 1997, various provisions have been incorporated into Indonesia’s environmental law which relate to corporate criminal liability. Other laws relating to natural resource management have also had provisions on corporate criminal liability inserted into them. These laws are problematic because they often fail to distinguish between corporate criminal liability and corporate officers’ criminal liability, and as do the courts in their interpretation and application of them. Currently in Indonesia, an officer may be held liable for a crime committed by their corporation, even without being at fault or appearing as a defendant in the trial. Indonesia’s environmental law can therefore be said to be applying a rather extreme version of individual vicarious liability in environmental cases, in which a corporate officer is punished merely because of their position as a high-ranking officer of a corporation. This practice seems to be the result of an erroneous interpretation of corporate criminal liability. We argue that the Indonesian interpretation of environmental corporate criminal liability is not only ineffective but also harmful and inconsistent with theories of corporate criminal liability. We also argue that corporate criminal liability should be distinguished from the liability of corporate officers. While corporate criminal liability places criminal liability on the corporation as a legal entity, officers' criminal liability places the criminal liability on the corporate officers as individuals. A corporate officer should only be criminally liable if they can be blamed for an environmental crime committed by the corporation.

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Notes

  1. Law No. 41 of 1999 concerning Forestry, LN of 1999 No. 167, TLN No. 3888, as amended by Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2004 concerning the Amendment of Law No. 41 of 1999, LN of 2004 No. 29, TLN No. 4374 [hereinafter referred to as the 1999 Forestry Law].

  2. Law No. 31 of 2004 concerning Fishery, LN of 2004 No. 118, TLN No. 4433 [hereinafter referred to as the 2004 Fishery Law].

  3. Law No. 32 of 2009 concerning Environmental Protection and Management, LN of 2009 No. 140, TLN No. 5059 [hereinafter referred to as the 2009 EPMA].

  4. Law No. 18 of 2013 concerning the Prevention and Eradication of Forest Destruction, LN of 2013 No. 130, TLN No. 5432 [hereinafter referred to as the 2013 PEFD Law].

  5. Law No. 39 of 2014 concerning Plantation, LN of 2014 No. 308, TLN No. 5613 [hereinafter referred to as the 2014 Plantation Law].

  6. The Draft Criminal Code, the draft version of September 2019 [hereinafter referred to as the Draft Criminal Code].

  7. The 2009 EPMA, Art. 116, par. 1.

  8. The 2009 EPMA, Art. 116, par. 2.

  9. Pursuant to the Attachment of Law Number 12 of 2011 concerning the Formulation of Laws and Regulations, an elucidation serves as an official interpretation of the body of a law. An elucidation contains descriptions of words, phrases, sentences, or foreign terms and can be accompanied by examples.

  10. The 2009 EPMA, Elucidation of Art. 118.

  11. The 1999 Forestry Law, Art. 78, par. 14.

  12. The 2004 Fishery Law, Art. 101.

  13. The 2013 PEFD Law, Art. 83, par. 3. Similar provisions on criminal liability can also be found in Arts. 83-103 of the 2013 PEFD Law.

  14. The 2013 PEFD Law, Art. 109, par. 5.

  15. The 2013 PEFD Law, Art. 109, par. 1.

  16. The 2013 PEFD Law, Art. 109, par. 2.

  17. The 2014 Plantation Law, Art. 113, par. 1.

  18. Regarding provisions on sentences for individuals, see: The 2014 Plantation Law, Arts. 103-112.

  19. Republic of Indonesia v. Kim Young Woo (Supreme Court Cassation) [2010], Decision No. 882 K/Pid/Sus/2010, pp. 1–2. The term “PT” stands for “Perseroan Terbatas”, which refers to a limited liability company.

  20. Id., p. 19. Art. 41(1) reads: “Any person who in contravention of the law intentionally carries out an action which results in environmental pollution and/or damage, is criminally liable to a maximum imprisonment of 10 (ten) years and a maximum fine of IDR 500 million.

  21. Id., pp. 19–80.

  22. Id., p. 15.

  23. Id., p. 71.

  24. Id., p. 95.

  25. Republic of Indonesia v. PT. Adei Plantation & Industry (District Court of Palawan) [2013] Decision No. 228/Pid.Sus/2013/PN.PLW, pp. 1–2.

  26. Id., p. 6.

  27. Id., p. 213. In Indonesian criminal law, the substitution sentence is the imprisonment imposed on a person who failed to pay the determined fine.

  28. Id., p. 226.

  29. Id.

  30. Republic Indonesia v. Kosman Siboro (High Court of Pekanbaru) [2015], Decision No.186/Pid.Sus/2015/PTPBR., p. 1.

  31. Id., p. 19.

  32. Id., p. 5.

  33. Id., 2–5.

  34. Id., p. 3.

  35. Id., p. 48.

  36. Id., pp. 45–46.

  37. Republic Indonesia v. Kosman Siboro (Supreme Court Cassation) [2017], Decision No. 1275 K/PID.SUS/2016, p. 86.

  38. Id.

  39. Republic Indonesia v. PT Karawang Prima Sejahtera Steel (Supreme Court Cassation) [2013], Decision No.1450K/Pid.Sus/2013, p. 1.

  40. Id., p. 3.

  41. Id., pp. 3–4.

  42. Id., p. 10.

  43. Id., p. 5.

  44. Id., pp. 15–16.

  45. See generally for an excellent overview of the theories of corporate criminal liability, David Roef, “Corporate Criminal Liability”, in Johannes Keiler and David Roef (eds.), Comparative Concepts of Criminal Law, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, 2019), pp. 333–339.

  46. Cristina de Maglie, “Models of Corporate Criminal Liability in Comparative Law”, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, Vol. 4:3 (2005), pp. 553–560.

  47. Id.

  48. See Mark Pieth and Radha Ivory, “Emergence and Convergence: Corporate Criminal Liability Principles in Overview”, in Mark Pieth and Radha Ivory (eds.), Corporate Criminal Liability: Emergence, Convergence, and Risk (Dordrecht, 2011), pp. 21–22.

  49. See James Gobert, “The Evolving Legal Test of Corporate Criminal Liability”, in: John Minkes and Leonard Minkes (eds.), Corporate and White-collar Crime (London, 2008), p. 79.

  50. It is the theory of corporate criminal liability in England and Wales. See Roef, supra note 45, pp. 341.-344.

  51. One could, for instance, refer to Part 2.5 section 12.2 of the Australian Criminal Code Act which stipulates that: “[i]f a physical element of the offence is committed by an employee, agent or officer of a body corporation acting within the actual or apparent scope of his or her employment, or within his or her apparent authority, the physical element must also be attributed to the body corporate.”

  52. Roef, supra note 45, p. 343.

  53. Amanda Pinto and Martin Evans, Corporate Criminal Liability (London, 2003), p. 39; Cristina de Maglie, supra note 46, p. 556; Roef, supra note 45, pp. 346–352.

  54. The explanation of identification theory can be seen in Lord Reid's decision in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v Nattrass, which states that, “A living person has a mind which can have knowledge or intention or be negligent and he has hands to carry out his intentions. A corporation has none of these: it must act through living persons, though not always one or the same person. Then the person who acts is not speaking or acting for the company. He is acting as the company and his mind which directs his acts is the mind of the company. There is no question of the company being vicariously liable. He is not acting as a servant, representative, agent or delegate. He is an embodiment of the company or, one could say, he hears and speaks through the persona of the company, within his appropriate sphere, and his mind is the mind of the company. If it is a guilty mind then that guilt is the guilt of the company.” See: [1972] A.C. 153 (1971). The Identification theory was first applied in D.P.P. v Kent & Sussex Contractors, Ltd [1944] 1 K.B. 146, R. v I.C.R. Haulage Co Ltd 1944] K.B. 551, and Moore v I Bresler Ltd [1944] 2 K.B. 515. Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v Nattrass reiterates that the individuals whose actions can be regarded as the actions of the company are high-ranking officers who act and speak for the company and are involved in the management of the corporation.

  55. Roef, supra note 45, p. 349.

  56. James Gobert (2008), supra note 49, p. 71. One could see the aggregation model in the following passage of the Court in United States v. Bank of New England, N.A. (1st Cir 1987), “If Employee A knows one facet of the currency reporting requirement, B knows another facet of it, and C a third facet of it, the bank knows them all. So, if you find that an employee within the scope of his employment knew that CTRs had to be filed, even if multiple checks are used, the bank is deemed to know it. The bank is also deemed to know it if each of several employees knew a part of that requirement and the sum of what the separate employees knew amounted to knowledge that such a requirement existed.” See: United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, p. 855 (1st Cir 1987). The Court further explains the collective action in the following passage, “A collective knowledge instruction is entirely appropriate in the context of corporate criminal liability...The acts of a corporation are, after all, simply the acts of all of its employees operating within the scope of their employment. The law on corporate criminal liability reflects this.... Similarly, the knowledge obtained by corporate employees acting within the scope of their employment is imputed to the corporation.... Corporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific duties and operations into smaller components. The aggregate of those components constitutes the corporation's knowledge of a particular operation. It is irrelevant whether employees administering one component of an operation know the specific activities of employees administering another aspect of the operation.” See: United States v. Bank of New England, N.A. (1st Cir 1987), p. 856.

  57. Cristina de Maglie, supra note 46, p. 556.

  58. Id.

  59. Id., p. 558.

  60. Id., p. 558.

  61. Id.

  62. Id., p. 559. Also see: Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime, and Accountability, (Cambridge, 1993), p. 48. This model can be found in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines section 8B2.1(a)(6)(B), which hold corporations liable "for failing to take reasonable steps to prevent or detect criminal conduct.

  63. Cristina de Maglie, supra note 46, p. 559.

  64. See, for example: Muladi and Dwidja Priyatno, Pertanggungjawaban Pidana Korporasi, 3rd ed. (Jakarta:, 2015); Sutan Remy Sjahdeini, Ajaran Pemidanaan: Tindak Pidana Korporasi dan Seluk-Beluknya, 2nd ed. (Jakarta, 2017); Dwidja Priyatno, Sistem Pertanggungjawaban Pidana Korporasi dalam Kebijakan Legislasi (Depok, 2017).

  65. In Republic Indonesia v. Eddy Sutjahyo Busiri, et al., the court relied both on vicarious liability and the  identification theory as the basis of attributing criminal liability to the defendants. See: Republic Indonesia v. Eddy Sutjahyo Busiri, et al. (Supreme Court Cassation) [2016], Decision No. 2634 K/Pid.Sus.LH/2016, 279.

    Meanwhile, the appeal court in Republic Indonesia v. Kosman Siboro clearly mentioned vicarious liability as the basis for the defendant’s criminal liability. See: Republic Indonesia v. Kosman Siboro, supra note 30, pp. 45–46.

  66. None of the Indonesian literature on corporate liability mentioned earlier has made a clear distinction between corporate liability and the liability of corporate officers. Failure to make such an important distinction can also be seen in, for example, a seminal paper of Reksodiputro, who states that in the case of a corporate crime, liability can be attributed to the corporation itself, or the corporate officers, or both the corporation and its officers. See: Mardjono Reksodiputro, “Tindak Pidana Korporasi dan Pertanggungjawabannya: Perubahan Wajah Pelaku Kejahatan di Indonesia,” speech at the anniversary of Indonesian College of Police Science, 1993, pp. 15–16. A different opinion is given by Sjahdeini, who argues that corporate officers or both the corporation and corporate officers can be held liable, but the corporation alone cannot be held criminally liable. See: Sutan Remy Sjahdeini, supra note 64, pp. 256–261. The Draft Criminal Code seems to take a position similar to Reksodiputro’s opinion in attributing liability of a corporate crime. See discussion in Section V.

    As one can see later, the problem with these possibilities of attribution of liability lies primarily in its failure to specify conditions under which a corporate officer might be held liable. Without such conditions, the Indonesian experience shows that a corporate officer could be held criminally liable simply because of the officer’s position in the corporation, regardless of his role in the criminal conduct.

  67. See Michael Faure, “Environmental Crimes” in: Nuno Garoupa (ed.), Criminal Law and Economics, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Second Edition, Vol. 3 (Cheltenham, UK, 2009), p. 331.

  68. Wallace P. Mullin and Christopher M. Snyder, “Corporate Crime”, in: Nuno Garoupa (ed.), Criminal Law and Economics, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Second Edition, Vol. 3 (Cheltenham, UK, 2009), p. 226.

  69. Michael G. Faure and Marjolein Visser, “Law and Economics of Environmental Crime: a Survey”, May 2003, available at: <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.549.9704&rep=rep1&type=pdf>, accessed in August 2016, p. 20.

  70. K. Segerson and T. Tietenberg, “Defining efficient sanctions”, in: T.H. Tietenberg (ed.), Innovation in Environmental Policy (Aldershot, UK, 1992), pp. 63–65.

  71. Wallace P. Mullin and Christopher M. Snyder, supra note 68, pp. 229–230 and Faure, supra note 67, p. 331.

  72. Steven Shavell, “Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent”, Columbia Law Review, 85:6(1985), pp. 1236–1237. Also: Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Cambridge, Ma., 2004), p. 510. It should be noted here that the references above are actually Shavell’s explanation on cases where non-monetary sanctions are preferable to monetary sanctions. This paper, however, borrows the explanation for the justification of corporate criminal liability because it also explains conditions where assets of a criminal agent are less than the necessary monetary sanctions.

  73. Wallace P. Mullin and Christopher M. Snyder, supra note 68, pp. 230–231.

  74. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, “The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law”, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (eds.), Handbook of Law and Economics, Vol. 1 (Amsterdam, 2007), p. 435.

  75. See also L. Friedman, “A defense of corporate criminal liability”, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 23 (2000), pp. 833–858 and D.M. Kahan, “Social meaning and the economic analysis of crime”, Journal of Legal Studies, 27 (1998), pp. 609–622.

  76. The point has been made extensively by A.M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, “Should employees be subject to fines and imprisonment given the existence of corporate liability?” International Review of Law and Economics, 13 (1993), pp. 239–257.

  77. L.A. Kornhauser, “An economic analysis of the choice between enterprise and personal liability for accidents”, California Law Review, 70 (1982), pp. 1345–1392.

  78. Roef, supra note 45, p. 340.

  79. Amanda Pinto and Martin Evans, supra note 53, p. 20–21.

  80. See: Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, “Personal Liability for Corporate Fault: Report”, p. 13; Personal Liability for Corporate Fault - Guidelines for Applying the COAG Principle, p. 2 https://arp.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/Personal_Liability_for_Corporate_Fault_-_Guidelines_for_Applying_the_COAG_Principles.pdf, accessed on 26 April 2017.

  81. S.M. Solaiman and Lars Bo Langsted, supra note 97, p. 12.

  82. Peter S. Gillies, The Law of Criminal Complicity (Sydney, 1980), p. 2.

  83. The interpretation of the terms aids, abets, counsels or procures can be found in Attorney-General’s Reference No. 2 Year 1975, which approaches “...s. 8 of the 1861 Act on the basis that the words should be given their ordinary meaning, if possible. We approach the section also on the basis that if four words are employed here 'aid abet counsel or procure' the probability is that there is a difference between them, because if there were no such difference, then Parliament would be wasting time in using four words where two or three would do.”

  84. An example of the implementation of this theory can be found in Hamilton v Whitehead (1988) 166 CLR 121, p. 128.

  85. Robert Cryer, “Imputation and Complicity in Common Law States: A (Partial) View from England and Wales”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 12 (2014), p. 8; Joachim Dietrich, “The Liability of Accessories under Statute, in Equity, and in Criminal Law: Some Common Problems and (Perhaps) Common Solutions”, Melbourne University Law Review, 34:1 (2010), p. 128; Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473 p. 487–588; Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661 p. 667; ASIC v Adler (2002) 41 ACSR 72.

  86. Solaiman analysed the following decisions: Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473, 491; R v Stokes and Difford (1990) 51 A Crim R 25, 37–8, 41; R v Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534 p. 557; R v Mills (1985) 17 A Crim R 411, 440; R v Phan (2001) 53 NSWLR 480; R v McCarthy (1993) 71 A Crim R 395, 409; R v Buckett (1995) 79 A Crim R 302, 309.

  87. S.M. Solaiman and Lars Bo Langsted, supra note 97, p. 11.

  88. Id.

  89. Amanda Pinto and Martin Evans, supra note 53, pp. 81–82.

  90. Dan K. Webb, Steven F. Molo and James F. Hurst, “Understanding and Avoiding Corporate and Executive Criminal Liability”, The Business Lawyer, 49:2 (1994), pp. 627–629.

  91. Amanda Pinto and Martin Evans, supra note 53, p. 81.

  92. Environmental Protection Act 1990 section 157. The same wording can also be found in section 52 Clean Air Act 1993, section 41 Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010, section 217 Water Resources Act 1991, and section 22A Water Industries Act 1991.

  93. POEO Act, section 169 A, par. 1 lists some sections in which corporate crimes could be conducted. Section 169 of the POEO Act does contain a provision which holds corporate officers liable for corporate crimes without requiring any elements to be proven; this section is only applicable for certain environmental crimes. However, unlike the provisions contained in Indonesian regulations, corporate officers may prove that they are either, “a) not in a position to influence the conduct of the corporation in relation to its contra version of the provision, or; b. they persons, if in such a position, used all due diligence to prevent the contravention by the corporation.” Therefore,, they will not automatically be punished for the crimes of their corporation and have the chance to satisfy the court that they are not guilty.

  94. POEO Act, section 169 A, par. 2.

    This type of liability can also be found in section 98 of the Contaminated Land Management Act 1997 No. 140 and section 53 of the Environmentally Hazardous Chemicals Act 1986 No. 14.

  95. James Gobert, “Squaring the Circle: The relationship between Individual and Organizational Fault”, in: James Gobert and Ana-Maria Pascal, (eds.), European Developments in Corporate Criminal Liability, (London, 2011), pp. 141–143.

  96. Rick Sarre, “Penalising Corporate ‘Culture’: The Key to Safer Corporate Activity?”, in James Gobert and Ana-Maria Pascal (eds.), European Developments in Corporate Criminal Liability (London, 2011), p. 86.

  97. S.M. Solaiman and Lars Bo Langsted, “Crimes Committed by Directors Attributed to Corporations - Why Should Directors be Accessory?: Viewing through the Complicity Rules in Common Law”, Criminal Law Forum, 28:1 (2007), p. 19.

  98. Amanda Pinto and Martin Evans, supra note 53, p. 75.

  99. Id.

  100. Supreme Court Decision No.2560K/Pid.Sus/LH/2015, p. 1.

  101. Id., p. 4.

  102. Id., p. 2.

  103. Id.

  104. Id., pp. 7–8.

  105. Id.

  106. Id., p. 11. For comments on Republic Indonesia v. PT KPSS (2013), see discussions in Section III.

  107. Id., p. 13.

  108. Attorney General Regulation of RI No. Per-028/A/JA/10/2014 on Guidelines for Handling Criminal Cases with Legal Subject of Corporation, Appendix, pp. 3–4.

  109. Attorney General Regulation of RI No. Per-028/A/JA/10/2014 on Guidelines for Handling Criminal Cases with Legal Subject of Corporation, Appendix, p. 4.

  110. Attorney General Regulation of RI No. Per-028/A/JA/10/2014 on Guidelines for Handling Criminal Cases with Legal Subject of Corporation, Appendix, p. 5.

  111. The 2016 SC Regulation, Art. 11, par. 1.

  112. The 2016 SC Regulation, Art. 12.

  113. The 2016 SC Regulation, Art. 18.

  114. The 2016 SC Regulation, Art. 19, par. 1.

  115. The 2016 SC Regulation, Art. 23, par. 1.

  116. The 2016 SC Regulation, Art. 23, par. 2.

  117. https://hukum.tempo.co/read/1057807/setengah-abad-lebih-melahirkan-rkuhp.

  118. Draft Criminal Code, Art.46. The Article reads as follows: “Tindak Pidana oleh Korporasi adalah Tindak Pidana yang dilakukan oleh pengurus yang mempunyai kedudukan fungsional dalam struktur organisasi Korporasi atau orang yang berdasarkan hubungan kerja atau berdasarkan hubungan lain yang bertindak untuk dan atas nama Korporasi atau bertindak demi kepentingan Korporasi, dalam lingkup usaha atau kegiatan Korporasi tersebut, baik secara sendiri-sendiri maupun secara bersama-sama.”

  119. Draft Criminal Code, Elucidation of Art.46.

  120. A clearer position or tendency of the drafters of the Draft Criminal Code toward identification theory can be found in General Elucidation, par. 5, which states that: “...Dalam hal ini kesalahan korporasi diidentifikasikan dari kesalahan pengurus yang memiliki kedudukan fungsional (mempunyai kewenangan untuk mewakili korporasi, mengambil keputusan atas nama korporasi dan mempunyai kewenangan menerapkan pengawasan terhadap korporasi), yang melakukan tindak pidana dengan menguntungkan korporasi, baik sebagai pelaku, sebagai orang yang menyuruhlakukan, sebagai orang yang turut serta melakukan, sebagai penganjur maupun sebagai pembantu tindak pidana yang dilakukan bawahannya di dalam lingkup usaha atau pekerjaan korporasi tersebut, termasuk pengendali korporasi.” [In this regard, the corporate’s fault can be identified from the fault of corporate officers, namely those with functional position (having the authority to represent the corporation, take decisions on behalf of the corporation, and authority to control the corporation), which committed a crime benefitting the corporation, or involved in a crime as the perpetrator, as the person who did procure, order, or give aid to the crime committed by the employees within the scope of business or work of the corporation]. By deriving the corporate’s fault from the fault of corporate officers, the Draft clearly understood corporate liability within the identification doctrine. The Draft failed to see the possibility of implementing corporate liability on the grounds of corporate vicarious liability or the organization model.

  121. The Draft Criminal Code, Art. 48, reads that: “Tindak Pidana oleh Korporasi sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pasal 46 dan Pasal 47 dapat dipertanggungjawabkan jika: a. perbuatan tersebut termasuk dalam lingkup usaha atau kegiatan sebagaimana ditentukan dalam anggaran dasar atau ketentuan lain yang berlaku bagi Korporasi; menguntungkan Korporasi secara melawan hukum; dan c. diterima sebagai kebijakan Korporasi.”

  122. The Draft Criminal Code, Art. 49, states “Tindak Pidana oleh Korporasi , pertanggungjawaban pidana dikenakan terhadap Korporasi dan/atau pengurusnya, pemberi perintah, atau pemegangkendali Korporasi”.

  123. The Draft Criminal Code, Elucidation of Art. 48, reads: “Mengenai kedudukan sebagai pembuat tindak pidana dan sifat pertanggungjawaban pidana dari korporasi terdapat kemungkinan sebagai berikut:

    1. a.

      Dalam ketentuan ini “lingkup usaha atau kegiatan” termasuk juga kegiatan usaha yang pada umumnya dilakukan oleh Korporasi. ;

    2. b.

      korporasi sebagai pelaku tindak pidana dan pengurus yang bertanggung jawab; atau

    3. c.

      korporasi sebagai pelaku tindak pidana dan juga sebagai yang bertanggung jawab.

    “Oleh karena itu, jika suatu tindak pidana dilakukan oleh dan untuk suatu korporasi maka penuntutannya dapat dilakukan dan pidananya dapat dijatuhkan terhadap korporasi sendiri, atau korporasi dan pengurusnya, atau pengurusnya saja.”

  124. Pursuant to Law on the Formulation of Laws and Regulations No. 12 of 2011, every proposed law should be accompanied by an academic paper. The paper is an official study explaining particular problems under the proposed law.

  125. The 2009 Academic Paper of the Draft Criminal Code, pp. 94–95; The 2015 Academic Paper of the Draft Criminal Code, pp. 34–35.

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  1. Faculty of Law, Universitas Indonesia, Jl. Prof. Mr. Djokosoetono, Kampus Universitas Indonesia, Depok, 16424, Indonesia

    Andri G. Wibisana & Raisya Majory

  2. Faculty of Law, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Michael G. Faure

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*Andri G. Wibisana and Raisya Majory, Faculty of Law, Universitas Indonesia, Jl. Prof. Mr. Djokosoetono, Kampus Universitas Indonesia, Depok 16424, Indonesia. e-mail: andri.gunawan@ui.ac.id. Michael G. Faure, Faculty of Law, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands.

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Wibisana, A.G., Faure, M.G. & Majory, R. Error in Personam: Confusion in Indonesia’s Environmental Corporate Criminal Liability. Crim Law Forum 32, 247–284 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10609-021-09412-6

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