Abstract
In a peer to peer (P2P) network, users should cooperate (share resources) for effective operation. To enforce cooperation, incentive mechanisms are employed, which provide preference in service to more cooperative peers. Most of these incentive mechanisms are designed for the networks where upload and download capacities are independent of each other. In a wireless network, there are scenarios where upload and download capacity are not independent: increasing the upload capacity decreases the download capacity and vice-versa. We have demonstrated that some of the existing incentive mechanisms may not be as effective in such a setting. Therefore, we propose a new incentive mechanism for this setting. Using game theory and simulation, we also ascertain the effectiveness of the new mechanism w.r.t the existing ones in fostering cooperation.
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Notes
If a user x sends a packet at the rate of 8 Mb/s, but download capacity of i is 5 Mb/s, then x will receive acknowledgment from i at the speed of 5 Mb/s. User x will estimate download capacity of i as 5 Mb/s.
We could assume any threshold value. It will have no effect on the final state attained by the system .
The demand of user is in proportion to its download capacity. For details refer Section 3.
In other mechanisms since the capacity allocated for lower capacity peers is very less compared to the capacity shared by them; they may leave the network.
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Singha, N., Singh, Y. New incentive mechanism to enhance cooperation in wireless P2P networks. Peer-to-Peer Netw. Appl. 14, 1218–1228 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12083-021-01086-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12083-021-01086-6