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The Occupation of Niels Bohr’s Institute: December 6, 1943–February 3, 1944

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Physics in Perspective Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Truths would be tales

Where now half-tales be truths

Antony and Cleopatra II:2.141

Abstract

The occupation of the Niels Bohr Institute by German authorities in war-time Denmark has hitherto not been described or analyzed in detail, leaving a number of questions open, such as the background and purpose of the occupation, the lack of planning of the operation, formation, mandate and actual work of the “Expert Commission,” and the justification of release without conditions. These questions are addressed and answers suggested compatible with all relevant facts available.

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References

  1. The Institute of Theoretical Physics (Institut for Teoretisk Fysik) of Copenhagen University, was founded by Niels Bohr in 1921. Abraham Pais, Niels Bohr’s Times in Physics, Philosophy, and Polity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 166ff. It was often referred to as Niels Bohr’s Institute. This nomenclature was used in many of the German documents relevant to the occupation. For practical reasons, the acronym NBI will be used in the present paper. In spite of the original name, NBI built up laboratory facilities for experimental research. At the time of the occupation, the equipment included advanced apparatus for experimental basic and applied atomic and nuclear research. Funds for a small cyclotron and a high-tension accelerator of the Cockroft–Walton type had been allocated by 1935. They became operational in in 1938 and 1939 respectively. A van de Graaf-accelerator, begun in 1939 and an isotope separator were under construction at the time of the occupation (Niels Ove Lassen, “Lidt af historien om cyklotronen på Niels Bohrs Institut,” Fysisk Tidskrift 60 (1962), 90–119; Torkild Bjerge, Karl Jakob Kjærböling Brostrøm, Jørgen Koch, and T. Lauritsen, “A High Tension Apparatus for Nuclear Research,” Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskab. Mathematisk-fysiske Meddelelser 18, no. 1 (1940), 1–36. For biophysical applications see Hilde Levi, “Isotoper og biologi på Niels Bohrs Institut,” Fysisk Tidsrift 60 (1962), 76–84. The university’s Institute for Mathematics had been built with funds provided by the Carlsberg Foundation in direct connection to NBI and was inaugurated in 1934. Auditoria and lecture rooms were used jointly by the two institutes, and the basement was used for laboratories. Kurt Ramskov, Matematikeren Harald Bohr (Århus, Denmark: Århus Universitet, 1995), 279, 285, 351. The occupation therefore also included the Mathematics Institute, a fact often left out in contemporary documents, although the relevant subfile of the Copenhagen University: Konsistorium records in the National Archives has the title “The Requisition of the Institute for Theoretical Physics and the blocking of the Mathematics Institute by the German Armed Forces” [Den tyske Værnemagts Beslaglæggelse af Institutet for Teoretisk Fysik og Afspærring af Matematisk Institut].

  2. Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (1912–2007) was a German physicist and philosopher. He had met Heisenberg when still at school in Copenhagen and later became his friend and protégé. After studies in Leipzig he worked in Berlin with Lise Meitner and Peter Debye. He joined the German nuclear energy and weapons program from its inception in September 1943. In 1942 he became professor of physics at the new Reichsuniversität in Strasbourg, a characteristically NS-oriented institution.

  3. Jacob C. Jacobsen and Christian Møller, Rapport over Begivenhederne under Besættelsen af Universitetets Institut for teoretisk Fysik fra den 6th December 1943 til den 3 Februar 1944 [typescript, 6p.], RA/KU Kons.J.385/43, Danish National Archives, Copenhagen, Denmark (hereafter DNA). This document is undated and unsigned, but the copy in the National Archives has a handwritten comment: “Indkom 29/6 1944” (received June 29, 1944). It was probably written by Jacobsen and Møller for the university rector, who had been responsible, though mostly in the background, for the negotiations with the German authorities after the expropriation of the NBI. It contains Heisenberg’s revised strategies and his “Report,” probably the report of the expert commission. The document originally included, as appendices, an account of ongoing research at NBI, compiled to facilitate clearance from the occupation authorities. Jacob C. Jacobsen and Christian Møller, Übersicht über die wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten, die im letzten Jahr am Institut für Theoretische Physik ausgeführt worden sind [typescript], RA/KU Kons.J.185/43, DNA. There is a shorter version: “Oversigt over det Arbejde, der er udført på Institutet for Teoretisk Fysik i Løbet af det sidste års tid” [typescript], RA/KU Kons.J.385/43, DNA, and Holger W. Olsen, “Report on Interrogation,” 1944, Besøg den 11/12 1943 kl. 12.15 i Vestre Fængsel Celle Nr. 170 af 2 tyske Civilpersoner [typescript], RA/KU Kons.J.385/43, DNA. Olsen’s report is quoted in extenso in Jens Nørregaard, Københavns Universitet i Besættelsesaarene (Copenhagen: Copenhagen University, 1947), 54–55.

  4. Among Germans placed in Denmark, notably: Werner Best (Reichsbevollmächtigt from 5 Nov. 1942, SS general); Günter Pancke (SS general, Höherer SS-und- Polizeiführer from 2 Nov. 1943; Rudolf Mildner (SS-Standartenführer, Head of Security Police, September 19, 1943–January 4, 1944); Otto Bovensiepen (SS-Standartenführer, Head of Security Police from January 14, 1944); Hans Wäsche (Studienrat, section leader in SD). In Danish postwar courts, Best and Bovensiepen received death sentences (converted to prison), Pancke and Wäsche twenty years in prison, but all were released after few years, on request from BRD. None was ever sentenced for their role in mass deportation and mass murder. Mildner appeared as witness in the Nuremberg tribunal and managed to escape to South America. Ulrich Herbert, Best—Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft (Bonn: Dietz, 1996); Hans Kirchhoff, John T. Lauridsen, and Aage Trommer, eds., Hvem var hvem 1940–1945 [Gads Lexikon] (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 2005), 248, n7, n9; Henrik Lundtofte, Gestapo! Tysk politi og terror i Danmark 1940–45 (Copenhagen: Gad, 2003), 218, n7, n9; Højesteretstidende 14 (1950), 1–64.

  5. Beschlagnahmeverfügung Nr. 150 auf Grund der Verordnung des Wehrmachtsbefehlhabers Dänemark vom 4.12.1943 betreffend beschlagnahme von Gebäuden und Liegenschaften. This is a transcript of the document presented at the military intervention on December 6, 1943. The letter head says: “Intendant beim Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber Dänemark.” The transcript has no signature. It only states “I.A.” [Im Auftrag]. RA/KU Kons.J.385/43, DNA.

  6. Nørregaard, Københavns Universitet (ref. 3).

  7. Jørgen K. Bøggild, Untitled and undated account of personal experiences during the occupation of NBI [Typescript (9pp.)]. Probably written soon after the events. It contains a detailed reconstruction of interrogations. Copy available at NBA; Olsen, “Report on Interrogation” (ref. 3).

  8. Werner Best (1903–89) had been Reinhart Heydrich’s deputy and head of Amt 1 (Organisation, Verwaltung, Recht) in the security police and RSHA (Herbert, Best (ref. 4), 580, n171 and diagram). He advanced to SS general. He had developed the idea of the Grossraumordnung to be implemented in occupied territories by the Führungsvolk, including Flurbereinigung: “It was Best’s basic conviction that it be necessary and right to expel or destroy all Jews from the German domain of power, a faith that he had not only advocated eloquently and defended theoretically, but had also, since 1935, implemented in practice with formidable energy at any opportunity.” Herbert, Best (ref. 4), 271, 371. Best maintained that this policy expressed a historical necessity and that it should be implemented without sentimentality. For this purpose, the Einsatzgruppen were created to follow behind the advancing Wehrmacht in the east, murdering civilians in the hundreds of thousands. Placed in France (1940–42) Best was responsible for the mass deportation of citizens classified as Jews. From November 5, 1942, he was Reichsbevollmächtigt (plenipotentiary) in Denmark.

  9. Nørregaard, “Kæbenhavns Universitet” (ref. 3), 53. Neither this protest note nor a reply have been found. To all appearance, the action against the NBI was instigated by the German security police, using the military branch only for the practical management. The third arm of the occupation power, the administration of the Reischsbevollmächtigte, was passive right up to the events January 25–26, leading to the unconditional release of the Institute.

  10. Alf Ross, Udtalelse om “Beschlagnahmeverfügung Nr. 150...,” 1943 [legal analysis of the requisition document, dated December 7, 1943], RA/KU Kons.J.385/43, DNA. The author claims that the requisition cannot be justified by reference to the “Verordnung” quoted, nor is it compatible with generally accepted international law (the Hague Convention). He supplies references to current German regulations supporting his conclusions.

  11. Mark Walker, “Copenhagen Revisited” in Intellectual Collaboration with the Third Reich—Treason or Reason, ed. Maria Björkman, Patrik Lundell, and Sven Widmalm (London: Routledge, 2019), 230–47; Frank-Rüdiger Hausmann, “Das Deutsche wissenschaftliche Institut in Kopenhagen,” in Auch im Kriege schweigen die Musen nicht—Die Deutschen Wissenschaftliche Institute im zweiten Weltkrieg (Göttingen: Van der Hoek & Ruprecht, 2001), 183–210; Anna Maria Hirsch-Heisenberg, ed., Meine liebe Li – Der Briefwechsel 1937–1946 [Werner und Elisabeth Heisenberg] (Salzburg: Residenz Verlag, 2011). Werner Heisenberg writes from Copenhagen on September 19, 1941 (p. 195) “Tomorrow begin the talks in the German Scientific Institute [DWI]. The first talk is mine, tomorrow night. Sadly, the members of Bohr’s Institute will not attend, for political reasons.”

  12. Olsen, “Report on Interrogation” (ref. 3).

  13. Bøggild, Untitled and undated account (ref. 7).

  14. Hans O. R. Wäsche (1903–79) was Studienrat and section leader in the security police (Copenhagen). His assignment included espionage, infiltration, and actions against resistance groups, including “Gegenterror,” that is, retaliation, torture, deportation, and “clearing murder,” where he selected victims to produce a deterrent effect. His superior in the SS hierarchy was Rudolf Mildner (see refs. 62 and 85), who strangely does not appear in the records of the NBI case, but who might have instigated the action on direct order from Gestapo headquarters in Berlin.

  15. Bähr (also spelled Baer or Bär) was presented at the interrogation as physicist. He later surfaced as a member of the expert commission. His affiliation was the Planungsamt of the Reichsforschungsrat, the national research council. Sören Flachowsky, Von der Notgesellschaft zum Reichsforschungsrat: Wirtschaftspolitik im Kontext von Autarchie, Aufrüstung und Krieg, Studien zur Geschichte der DFG im Nationalsozialismmus, vol. 3 (Stuttgart: Fritz Steiner Verlag, 2008), 446–59; Anhang 1, 45, 55).

  16. Niels Bohr’s brother, prominent member of the Mathematics Institute, Copenhagen University.

  17. On October 9, three days after Bohr’s arrival in London, the New York Times published an article with the headline “DR N. H. D Bohr, Dane, has a new atomic blast invention. Pais, Niels Bohr’s Times (ref. 1), 491. This must surely have been picked up by German intelligence.

  18. August Krogh, memorandum, December 6, 1943, RA/KU Kons.J.385/43, DNA. It describes current radiobiological research at the NBI, a continuation of work started by Georg de Hevesy (Nobel laureate 1943). The author requests the release of working material, including data and manuscripts. He also requests the release of counters and radioactive sources (including radium) needed for the work, which might be continued in the Zoophysiological Laboratory of the university. August Krogh, Nobel laureate 1920, was a pupil of Niels Bohr’s father.

  19. Børge Jesse, letter to Jens Nørregård, 1943, RA/KU Kons.J.385/43, DNA, concerning private property left in the Mathematics Institute, which had been occupied along with NBI.

  20. K. Zerahn, letter to Jens Nørregård, 1943, RA/KU Kons.J.385/43, DNA, requesting permission from the German authorities to collect “books, manuscripts and table silver” belonging to Professor Hevesy.

  21. Hans von Euler-Chelpin (professor at Stockholms Högskola (later called Stockholm University) was an ardent supporter of NS Germany. Helmut Maier, Chemiker im Dritten Reich—Die Deutsche Chemische Gesellschaft und der Verein Deutscher Chemiker im NS-Herrschaftsapparat (Weinheim: Wiley/VCH, 2015); Sven Widmalm, “Selbstpoträt eines Weggefährten: Hans von Euler-Chelpin (1873–1964) und das Dritte Reich,” in Fremde Wissenschaftler im Dritten Reich, ed. Dieter Hoffmann and Mark Walker, 438–59 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2011). Hevesy worked in Euler’s institution after his escape from Copenhagen in late September 1943.

  22. David C. Cassidy, Uncertainty: The Life and Science of Werner Heisenberg (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1991), 468; Stefan Rozental, “Fyrrerne og halvtredserne” in Niels Bohr, ed. Stefan Rozental (Copenhagen: J. H. Schultz Forlag, 1964) 145–83, on 167; Pais, Niels Bohr’s Times (ref. 1), 490.

  23. J. Højrup, letter to Finn Aaserud, October 17, 2000, Niels Bohr Archive, Copenhagen, remembering a conversation with Gelius Lund, allegedly a participant in preparing a bomb for the Danish resistance to destroy the NBI. The claim is consistent with a rumor circulated at the time of the occupation of the NBI, which might have triggered the German intervention.

  24. Jacobsen and Møller, Rapport (ref. 3).

  25. See Hans Christofer Børresen, “Flawed Nuclear Physics in the Campaign to Deny Norwegian Heavy Water to Germany 1942–1944,” Physics in Perspective 14, no. 4 (2012), 471–97, on 490. At Farm Hall, where ten German physicists were detained after the war, Harteck told Otto Hahn about a miracle invention for producing unlimited amounts of heavy water. Jeremy Bernstein, ed., Hitler’s Uranium Club: The Secret Recordings at Farm Hall (New York: Springer, 2001), 249. This is one evident example of pseudo-conversations choreographed only to be picked up by the surveillance system, showing that the detainees not only knew that conversations were recorded, but used this knowledge for their own benefit.

  26. Kurt Diebner (1905–64) was a German physicist and member of NSDAP. From 1934 he was employed by the PTR (Physikalisch-Technische Reichsanstalt), which was led by Physics Nobelist Johannes Stark (co-founder of the anti-Semitic Deutsche Physik movement) who directed PTR’s activities toward military applications. Diebner participated in the German Uranium Project from its inception on September 16, 1939. When KWI-P was taken over by HWA (Heereswaffenamt), he was placed as director of the institute and with a key role in the uranium program. After reorganization, KWI-P having been returned to KWG, now directed by Heisenberg, Diebner continued to direct the remaining fission studies funded by HWA, but controlled by RFR (Reichsforschungsrat). Diebner was among the ten scientists detained at the English mansion Farm Hall the second half of 1945. Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club (ref. 25).

  27. Werner Heisenberg, Die Physik der Atomkerne (Brunschweig: Vieweg, 1943)

  28. Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, letter to Werner Heisenberg, January 18, 1944, Exhibit “H,” ALSOS Strassburg Mission, December 15, 1944, ALSOS’s translation, National Archives, Washington, DC.

  29. Wolf Schäfer, “Negative Charge—What Strained the Relationship between Two of Germany’s Most Respected Scientific Thinkers?,” Journal of the American Academy, Berlin, 25 (2013), 8–11; Stephan Schwarz, “Dramatik kring ett Heisenberg-brev från krigstidens Berlin,” KOSMOS 1914/15, Uppsala, Sweden, 2015, 109–123. English version available from the author.

  30. Werner Heisenberg, letter to Annie Wecklein Heisenberg, January 23, 1944, in Anna Maria Hirsch-Heisenberg, ed., Werner Heisenberg: Liebe Eltern—Briefe aus kritischer Zeit (Munich: Langen Müller, 2003), 331.

  31. Elizabeth Heisenberg, letter to Werner Heisenberg, n.d., in Anna Maria Hirsch-Heisenberg, ed., “Meine liebe Li.” Der Briefwechsel 1937–1946 (Salzburg: Residenz Verlag, 2011), 230.

  32. Cassidy, Uncertainty (ref. 22), 464; Mark Walker, “Werner Heisenberg’s Visit to Cracow November 1943,” in Lebenswerk Welterbe — Festschrift für Helmut Albrecht, ed. Norman Pohl (Berlin: Diepholz/GNT-Verlag, 2020), 147–53, on 151.

  33. Deutsche Physik was an anti-Semitic movement launched by Nobel laureates Philipp Lenard and Johannes Stark. Cassidy, Uncertainty (ref. 22), 351ff. Its epistemological foundation was the antithesis of pragmatic (experimental, creative, Aryan) and dogmatic (speculative, destructive, Jewish) physics. Heisenberg had been attacked in 1937 in the SS journal Das Schwarze Korps for being a “white Jew,” but was cleared by none less than Himmler, albeit with the ominous argument “we cannot afford to lose or kill (verlieren oder totmachen) this man who is relatively young and can contribute new blood (Heinrich Himmler, letter to Reinhard Heydrich, July 21, 1938, in Klaus Hentschel, ed., Physics and National Socialism: An Anthology of Primary Sources (Basel: Birkhäuser Verlag, 1996), Dok. 63.

  34. Hentchel, Physics and National Socialism (ref. 33), Dok. 73, 195–96.

  35. Bøggild, Report (ref. 7).

  36. Best’s meeting diary (Kalenderaufzeichnungen 1943–45) was published in 1990 in three volumes by Historisk Samling fra Besættelsestiden, Esbjerg, providing facsimiles of Best’s handwritten note, and typed transcriptions. They are available on-line at http://bibliotek.dis-danmark.dk/bib/355175. Note that Wäsche was not present. Nor was there any representative of the Wehrmacht. SD was represented by Otto Bovensiepen, the new head of the security police from January 1, 1944. Diebner was not in OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) but in Heereswaffenamt (Army Ordnance, HWA) which was controlled by OKW. Bähr was in the planning division (Planungsamt) of the Reichsforschungsrat, the national research funding agency, recently placed under Reichsmarschall Göring. The Planungsamt was created in June 1943 to keep track of scientific and technical expertise and to further armament-related research and development. Its director was Werner Osenberg; Flachowsky, Von der Notgesellschaft (ref. 15), 432–46). In August 1944, Bähr was assigned to organize a new RFR division, the Wehrforschungs-Gemeinschaft, coordinating and enhancing military applications of research and development (Flachowsky, Von der Notgesellschaft (ref. 15), 446–59). Osenberg apparently had an interest in the prospects of the NBI occupation, since he sent Bähr to Copenhagen before the expert commission had been launched. As member of the commission, Bähr seems to have been passive, like Diebner. Bähr was also responsible for the disappearance and later reappearance of the NBI cyclotron Protokollbuch, which was apparently thought to hide secret experiments (Werner Heisenberg, letter to Gesandtchaftsrat Schacht, May 18, 1944). Heisenberg asks Schacht to return the book to Jacobsen, attaching a report from a visit on April 19 to the Copenhagen Deutsches Wissenschaftliches Institut for a lecture. (See also, letter to Jacobsen, same date.)

  37. Werner Heisenberg, (?) Report (unsigned, probably to be regarded as the expert commission’s report or an abstract thereof. Only the Danish translation is available. It is included in Jacobsen and Møller, Rapport (ref. 3). It is reproduced and discussed in the sequel.

  38. Günther Pancke (1899–73): NSDAP 1930; SS 1931. SS-Sturnhauptführer January 30, 1933; SS Obergruppenführer (General); Head of SS Rasse-und-Siedlungsamt (RuSHA) 1938–40; planning “radical measures” for extending the German Lebensraum; Höherer SS-und Polizeiführer (HSSPF) in Denmark October 6, 1943; placed directly under Himmler, to fight resistance with counter-terror and “clearing murders.” “Pancke’s name keeps resurging among individuals deeply involved with the Endlösung and extermination” (Lundtofte, Gestapo! (ref. 4), 56). RuSHA was the object of the eighth subsidiary Nuremberg tribunal. Pancke escaped indictment in Nuremberg.

  39. Otto Bovensiepen (1905–79): NSDAP 1925, Gestapo 1933; Head of Gestapo Berlin 1941–43, with assignment to deport the city’s Jewish population (ca 50.000). In Denmark, as head of Security Police (replacing Diebner) from January 4, 1944, he organized the sharpening of measures against the resistance movement by counterterror (Gegenterror) ordered by the Führer headquarters, including torture, deportation, and murder. Bovensiepen was never held accountable for his part in the Holocaust. Otto Bovensiepen, Interrogation of Otto Bovensiepen, former chief of the German security police in Denmark, born July 8, 1905 in Duisburg in Kastell, Copenhagen, August 20, 1945. The interrogation was carried out by the Civilian Interrogation Center (CIC), British Military Mission, with co-operation of the Danish police authority. The documentation is available in the State Archives, the Regional Archives for Sealand, on the case against Best, Pancke, and Bovenbsiepen. (Message from Henrik Lundtofte, Director of the Historical Collections from the Occupation Years, Esbjerg, Denmark); Herbert, Best (ref. 4); Kirchhoff et al., Hvem var hvem (ref. 4), 248, n7, n9; Lundtofte, Gestapo! (ref. 4), 218, n7, n9; Højesteretstidende 14 (1950), 1–64.

  40. Niels Alkil, ed., Besættelsestidens Fakta: Dokumentarisk Haaandbok med Henblik paa Lovene af 1945 om Landskadelig Virksomhed, vol. 2 (Copenhagen: Udgivet af Sagførerraadet. I kommission hos J. H. Schultz Forlag, 1945–46), 867. It is reproduced here as appendix 3 (in English translation).

  41. “Übergabeverhandlung,” Wehrmachtintendant Dänemark, letter to Jens Nørregård, February 1, 1944, RA/KU Kons.J.385/43, DNA, acknowledging the reinstatement of NBI under the University, and signed by Møller, Jacobsen, and two illegible names for the German side. The document is reproduced in Rozental, “Fyrrerne” (ref. 22), 162.

  42. Walker “Werner Heisenberg’s Visit” (ref. 32).

  43. Elisabeth Heisenberg, Inner Exile—Recollections of a life with Werner Heisenberg (Basel: Birkhäuser, 1984), 82 [Das politische Leben eines Unpolitischen (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1980].

  44. Heisenberg, letter to Jacobsen (ref. 37). Heisenberg states that he has sent the “Zyklotronenbuch” by diplomatic mail to Schacht for transmission to the NBI. He thanks for “die netten Tage in Copenhagen” (the April 1944 visit). Available in the Heisenberg Archive of the Max Planck Institute, Munich.

  45. Jacobsen and Møller, Rapport (ref. 3)

  46. Walther Bothe (1891–1957) German physicist: employed by PTR (Physikalisch-Technische Reichsanstalt) 1913–30; head of physics department of KWI for Medical Research in Heidelber, 1934; in charge of the construction of the first German cyclotron, operational in December 1943; participating in the German nuclear energy and weapons program (Uranverein); Nobel laureate, 1954.

  47. Mark Walker, German National Socialism and the Quest for Nuclear Power 1939–1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 19ff; Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club (ref. 25), xxii.

  48. Walker, German National Socialism (ref. 48), 52ff.

  49. Bjørn Rosengreen, Dr. Werner Best og tysk besættelsespolitik i Danmark 1943–45 (Odense, Denmark: Odense University Press, 1982); Herbert, Best (ref. 4).

  50. Werner Best, telegram to Joachim von Ribbentrop, September 8, 1943, in Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945, Serie E, Bd. 6 (Mai 1 bis September 30, 1943) (Göttingen: Vanderhoek & Ruprecht, 1979), 287. On the Judenaktion, he wrote that its aim was: “Um etwa 6000 Juden (einschliesslich der Frauen und Kinder) schlagartig festzunehmen und abtransportieren” [To abruptly arrest and transport around 6,000 Jews (including women and children)].

  51. Franz Alfred Six (1909–75): NSDAP 1930, SA 1932; SS/SD 1937; SS Brigadenführer (general) January 1945; Dr.Phil 1934; Professor (Berlin) 1940 in Auslandspolitik und Auslandskunde (foreign policy and international studies); in 1939, Head of SD Div. Gegnerforschung und Weltanschaungsforschung, upgraded to Amt VII in 1939, when SD was absorbed in RSHA; organizer (with Best) of Einsatzgruppen for eliminating elites and undesired population groups in occupied areas; leading Vorkommando Moskau (part of Einsatzgruppe B) in summer 1941; from 1943 leader of section Kulturpolitik in AA (including research cooperation within the German power sphere); actively participating in implementing the Endlösung by promoting the interests of RSHA in AA, remaining closely attached to his old Amt VII. “Six made a major contribution relative to Jewish and racial policy as well as anti-Semitic persecution by the SD. His role in this was largely suppressed after the war, with his subordinate A. Eichmann much more visible.” Paul E. Bartrop and Eve Grimm, Perpetrating the Holocaust: Leaders, Enablers and Collaborators (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC–CLIO, 2019), 257; Lutz Hachtmeister, Der Gegnerforscher – Die Karriere des SS-Führers Franz Alfred Six (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1998).

  52. Herbert, Best (ref. 4), 370.

  53. Joachim von Ribbentrop, letter to Werner Best, October 1, 1943; Werner Best, report on the Judenaktion, October 2, 1943, in Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945: Serie E, Bd. 7, Oktober 1, 1943 bis April 30, 1944 (Göttingen: Vanderhoek & Ruprecht, 1979). Ribbentrop’s letter references a telegram of August 31 on Hitler’s Führerentscheidung concerning the Judenaktion.

  54. Rosengreen, Dr. Werner Best (ref. 49), 59.

  55. Herbert, Best (ref. 4), 619n152. The threatening connotation of the apparently benevolent advice of this phrase can hardly be conveyed in translation.

  56. Herbert by mistake gives the date December 5. Herbert, Best (ref. 4), 620n157. See also Rosengreen, Dr. Werner Best (ref. 49), 77. The date is important for the account of the action against the NBI on December 6, 1943. J. T. Lauridsen, private correspondence with the author.

  57. Rosengreen, Dr. Werner Best (ref. 49), 108; Herbert, Best (ref. 4), 379.

  58. Herbert, Best (ref. 4), 380.

  59. Rudolf Mildner (1902–?): NSDAP 1931; SS-Standartenführer (Colonel) 1943; head of Gestapo in Katowice with jurisdiction over Auschwitz, where Mildner was head of the police tribunal (Martial Court), where he operated “both as a brutal interrogator and judge in the infamous ‘Block 11.’” Lawrence Rees, Auschwitz (London: BBC Books/Random House, 2005), 59. Mildner was head of the security police in Denmark (September 19, 1943–January 4, 1944) with the assignment to deport the entire Jewish population in Denmark (in NS-taxonomy) and to ruthlessly fight the Danish resistance. Regarded by Himmler, after the failed Judenaktion in late September 1943, as “a man with bourgeois inhibitions” (Rosengreen, Dr. Werner Best (ref. 50), 78), he was replaced by Otto Bovensiepen in January 1944. The judgment is contradicted by Best’s report to Ribbentrop on December 14, 1943. Apart from the death sentences (presumably from Wehrma ht court-martials outside Best’s jurisdiction), Mildner must have acted on a general mandate, reporting regularly (daily?) to Best: 169 Festnahmen wegen Sabotage; 424 Festnahmen concerning illegal activities, mainly Communists, of which 184 were sent to German concentration camps; 11 death sentences; 8 killed in action or trying to escape; massive weapons depots seized. Werner Best, report to Joachim von Ribbentrop on Mildner’s activities of September 15–December 14, 1943, December 14, 1943, in Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945: Serie E, Bd. 7, Oktober 1, 1943 bis April 30, 1944 (Göttingen: Vanderhoek & Ruprecht, 1979). Mildner ended his NS career as head of security police in Vienna. It is strange that Mildner is not visible in the events of the NBI occupation, other than through his statements in Nuremberg. Yet, Wäsche’s interrogations of NBI staff must have been carried out on orders from Mildner.

  60. Lundtofte, Gestapo! (ref. 4), 161; Rosengreen, Dr. Werner Best (ref. 49), 79.

  61. B. Cameron Reed, “From Fission to Censorship—18 Months on the Road to the Bomb,” Annalen der Physik 530, no. 6 (2018), 1700455. Of direct importance is also Werner Heisenberg, “Research in Germany on the Technical Applications of Atomic Energy,” reprinted in Hentschel, Physics and National Socialism (ref. 33), doc. 115, 361–79, in particular Hentschel’s comments. The English version, dated August 16, 1947, was published in Nature 160, no. 4059 (1947), 211–15, and the German original was published in Die Naturwissenschaften 33 (1946), 325–29.

  62. Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club (ref. 25), 128, 130–31, 195.

  63. Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club (ref. 25), 191ff.

  64. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 404.

  65. Niels Bohr and John Archibald Wheeler, “The Mechanism of Nuclear Fission,” Physical Review 56, no. 5 (1939), 426–50.

  66. Michael Frayn, Copenhagen (London: Methuen Drama, 1998); Matthias Dörries, ed., Michael Frayn’s ‘Copenhagen’ in Debate—Historical Essays and Documents on the 1941 Meeting between Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg (Berkeley: University of California Office for the History of Science, 2005)¸ Pais, Niels Bohr’s Times (ref. 1), 481ff,; Walker, “Copenhagen Revisited” (ref. 11).

  67. Archive of the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, Berlin, here quoted from Walker, Copenhagen Revisited (ref. 11), 237.

  68. Walker, “Copenhagen Revisited” (ref. 11), 243.

  69. Walker, “Copenhagen Revisited” (ref. 11), 245.

  70. Stephan Schwarz, “Science, Technology, and the Niels Bohr Institute in Occupied Denmark,” Physics in Perspective 13, no. 4 (2011), 401–32, on 425.

  71. Niels Bohr,” two catalogue cards from Gestapo in Kiel, Germany, from microfilm archive, Washington D.C. (photocopy provided by J. T. Lauridsen).

  72. Kevin Lindemann had joined the Danish resistance. On September 30, 1943, the day after the Danish government crisis, the whole edition of his recently published novel To Those Who Will Defend Freedom was confiscated. In February 1944, he fled to Sweden after having escaped an attempt of murder.

  73. Kirchhoff et al., Hvem var hvem (ref. 4).

  74. Pais, Niels Bohr’s Times (ref. 1), 489.

  75. Eberhard von Thadden (1909–64): Dr. Jur. 1933; NSDAP 1933; SS 1936; Sturmbannführer (major) 1945; head of Amt Inland-II in AA (Auswärtiges Amt) 1943–45. Thadden worked as “Judenreferent” (succeeding Franz Rademacher), with the assignment to implement and encourage actions (Judenmassnahmen) against the Jewish population in the entire German power sphere, implying massive deportation to death camps. Thadden was for example directly involved with the deportation to death camps of several hundred thousand Hungarian Jews in 1944. He escaped prosecution for crimes against humanity.

  76. John T. Lauridsen, ed., Die Korrespondenz von Werner Best mit dem Auswärtigen Amt und andere Akten zur Besetzung von Dänemark 1942–1945, 10 vols. (Copenhagen: The Royal Library, 2012), 4:274.

  77. Lauridsen, Korrespondenz von Werner Best (ref. 76), 4:281.

  78. Paul Reichelt “Wissenschaftliches Material in dem Gebäude des Sysisk [sic] Kemisk Institut in Kopenhagen,” January 12, 1944, internal memorandum from AA found in the residual archives of the Wehrmacht (Denmark). Photocopy provided by John T. Lauridsen: Inland 1(I) An Inland 2(II,3) z.Hd.v.MVR Dr. ReicheltBetr. 1 Wissenschaftliches Material in dem Gebäude des Sysisk [sic!] KemiskInstitut in Kopenhagen. Betr. 2 Schr, Ausld (2/III) v: 6.1.1944.Nach Vortrag bei Herrn Chef Inland wird das o.a. Vorgangsschreiben zur weiteren Veranlassung dorthin übersandt. Da vermutlich eine Sichtung des Materials weder von dort durchgeführt 27arden kann, noch zu den Aufgaben von Inland 2 gehören dürfte, erscheint es notwendig, eine andere Dienststelle - gedacht ist an das Heereswaffenamt—zur durchführung der Aufgbe einzuschalten. Es wird gebeten, Ausld. (2/III) über die von dort veranlasten Massnahmen einen Zwischenbescheid zu erteilen, (Illegible signature)

  79. In NS Germany, the medieval term was revived to justify the punishment of kin (relatives, spouse) for alleged offence by a family member.

  80. Leon Goldensohn, The Nuremberg Interviews (New York: A. Knopf, 2004), 367–85. The notes were taken during interviews. As Goldensohn’s proficiency in German was limited; the questions and answers are filtered trough an interpreter. The respondents were uncertain about the prospective use of their responses. Goldensohn notes have not been available to academic research. Almost sixty years later, the texts were selected, arranged, and edited for publication by Robert Gellately. Mildner exonerates himself as a moderate agent with high integrity, speaking up against his superiors (including Himmler), while systematically blaming his superiors for atrocities ordered and committed, including his role in Auschwitz. In the process, he distorts facts and ties himself up in inconsistencies and contradictions, partly noted by Goldensohn.

  81. Goldensohn, Nuremberg Interviews (ref. 80), 375–77.

  82. Walther Gerlach (1889–1979): Professor of Physics (Munich); from January 1, 1944, (decided on December 2, 1943) head of physics section in RFR, Generalbevollmächtigt for nuclear physics and “Gesamtleiter aller physikalischen Forschungsfragen,” a powerful coordinating role for funding the German nuclear fission program. Gerlach took numerous initiatives, to coordinate all physics research in Germany, in particular research with military applications, by a) determining directions for research programs, b) creating cohesion between research and the needs of the Wehrmacht, and c) following up many war-related development tasks. Sören Flachowsky, Notgemeinschaft (ref. 15), 305, 308, Anhang 1, 5, 8. Gerlach was involved with nuclear-weapons research until the end of World War. Rainer Karlsch, Hitlers Bombe: Die geheime Geschichte der deutschen Kernwaffenversuche (Munich: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 2005). An evaluation performed by SS in summer 1944 concluded that Gerlach “gilt als fachlich hervorragend” [is considered technically excellent] and “muss als politisch zuverlässlich angesehn warden” [should be regarded as politically reliable]. Flachowsky, “Notgemeinschaft” (ref.15), Anhang 1, 56.

  83. Cassidy, Uncertainty (ref. 22), 468, 90n24, referring to an interview with David Irving, December 5, 1965.

  84. Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club (ref. 25), xxv.

  85. Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club (ref. 25), 316.

  86. Dieter Hoffmann and Mark Walker, eds., Physiker zwischen Autonomie und Anpassung (Weinheim: Wiley/VC, 2007). Ramsauer’s Eingabe is reproduced in toto on pp. 594–617.

  87. Hoffmann and Walker, Physiker (ref. 86), 600; Hentschel, Physics and National Socialism (ref. 34), Doc. 91; Walker, German National Socialism (ref. 47), 75.

  88. Hoffmann and Walker, Physiker (ref. 86), 595.

  89. Werner Osenberg (1900–1974): NSDAP 1933; SS 1936; Professor of Materials Science at Hannover University of Technology 1938; head of RFR planning department, June 1943 for coordinating resources and personnel for armament-related R&D. A staff member was Dr. Baer, one of the members of the “Expert Commission.” After the war, Osenberg was engaged by the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) for the Project Paperclip, whereby some 1,500 scientists and engineers, some deeply tainted by war crimes, were offered positions in United States, including Wernher von Braun.

  90. Cassidy, Uncertainty” (ref. 22), 468, 630n24:89, referring to document dated December 28, 1943.

  91. Walker, German National Socialism (ref. 47), 147, 149, and related notes.

  92. Jacobsen and Møller, Rapport (ref. 3), 6.

  93. Niels Bohr, letter to Werner Heisenberg, August 30, 1946, Niels Bohr Archive, Copenhagen, Bohr Scientific Correspondence no. 28. Also Available in the microfilm Archive for the History of Quantum Mechanics.

  94. J. C. Jacobsen, “Muligheder, der kunde tænkes efter første samtale med Professor Heisenberg” [“Options that could be considered after first discussions with Professor Heisenberg (January 24, 1944)”], handwritten memorandum, in Jacobsen’s handwriting, RA/KU Kons.J385/43, DNA.

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Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Drs. K. Hentschel, J. T. Lauridsen, H. Lundtofte, R. Sime, and M. Walker for important documents, comments and advice, and Mrs. Felicity Pors for guidance in the collections of the Niels Bohr Archive, Copenhagen. Thanks to Dr J. Martin for many suggestions for improvement of the text. The author is responsible for statements, interpretations, and arguments, and for the selection of material used.

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    Present address: , Strandvejen 649, DK-2930, Klampenborg, Denmark

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    S. Schwarz: Retired from CERN, Geneva. The author studied mathemtics and physics at Stockholm University (Fil.Dr. 1967). He has held employments at the Swedish Research Institute for National Defense and the Royal Institute of Technology (Stockholm), and CERN (Geneva).

    Appendices

    Appendix 1: Werner Heisenberg’s Annotations

    On reverse of letter (dated January 8, 1944) from Hans von Euler (abbreviations and punctuation as in the original manuscript).

    1) Übernahme des Instituts durch Deutsche Physiker

    Einsatz für Kriegswichtige Forschung

    Schwierigkeit der praktischen Verwirklichung; Sabotageakte Ständige Bewachung nötig

    2) Völlige Freigabe unter Voraussetzung: Veröffentlichung der Resultate, Gelegentliche Kontrolle etc

    Die Ergebnisse der wissensch. Arbeit können unmittelbar übernommen werden u. indirekt nutzbar werden

    Zu geringer Nutzeffekt; Sabotage nicht ausgeschlossen Verrat ins Ausland nicht ausgeschlossen. Prestigefrage

    3) Vollständiges ausschlachten des Instituts in bezug auf Apparate

    Gewinn an Wertvollen Apparate für Deutschland

    Die wissensch. Arbeiten des Instituts nicht nützbar, die grossen Apparate nicht zu transp.

    Kompromissvorschl. zwischen 2) u. 3): Freigabe des Instituts das arbeitsfähig bleiben soll, aber Ablieferung von Apparaten, die hier nicht unbed. nötig sind u. die in Deutschland dringend gebraucht werden

    Wissensch Arbeit, u Apparate

    Störung der Wissensch Arbeit, nur teilweise Ausnützung der Apparate

    Translation

    1) The Institute is commandeered and managed by German physicists

    Reoriented for important war-related research

    Difficulties in practical realization. Sabotage [likely]. Permanent guard duty necessary

    2) Complete release on condition that all research is published. Occasional controls, etc

    The results of scientific work are available immediately and can subsequently be useful in applications

    Too slight profitability. Sabotage not exluded. Treason abroad not excluded. Question of prestige

    3) Total butchering of the Institute with respect to equipment

    Compromise between 2) and 3)

    The advantage of aquiring valuable research equipment for Germany

    Further research at the Institute not useful. The big apparatus not transferable

    The Institute is released to remain functional, but equipment not in use and urgently required in Germany is removed

    Scientific work [continues] and equipment [gained]

    Some restriction on research. Equipment only partially exploited

    Appendix 2: Muligheder, der kunde tænkes efter første samtale med Professor Heisenberg

    (Options that seem possible after first consultation with Professor Heisenberg)

    Memorandum in Jacobsen’s handwriting, apparently written after meeting with Heisenberg on January 24, 1943, in preparation of discussion with Nørregaard the following morning, before the official inspection of the NBI.94 Words in italics are added later, perhaps after Jacobsen and Møller had compared notes and perceptions. Heisenberg’s item 3 has been weakened, substituting “part of the equipment” for his “complete butchering.” In this wording, there is no practical difference between items 3 and 4, unless item 4 is meant to open for negotiations. Nørregaard has a much weaker point 3, similar to Heisenberg’s point 2 (appendix 1) but eliminating the control—this would be the only option acceptable to the university. Actually, there never came any opportunity for negotiations.

    1. I.

      The Institute is not released. German scientists will use the Institute, possibly in cooperation with Danish scientists.

    2. II.

      The Institute is released. The Danish scientists have to accept a level of cooperation on non-war-oriented research, for example providing radioactive samples etc. for German research.

      Possible release assuming all research results are published.

    3. III.

      The Institute is released. The Danish scientists return after part of the equipment, now not available in Germany, has been removed.

    4. IV.

      The Institute is released. Equipment not needed for the Institute’s work is removed.

    Appendix 3: Press Release February 1, 1944

    Professor Niels Bohr’s Institute again released

    Niels Bohr’s flight was not justified.—Scientific investigations at the Institute have led to revocation of requisition.

    Ritzau’s bureau communicates:

    Few months ago the well-known Physicist and Atomic Scientist, Professor Niels Bohr fled from Denmark. The reason for his flight was not known, and it could not be explained from the Professor’s earlier conduct. However, when Niels Bohr had arrived in England, where his scientific research was officially characterized as important for warfare, there must, on the part of German authorities, arise suspicion that the Professor had planned and carried out, in Copenhagen, work of importance for warfare, intended for use against German interests. This issue could be settled only by an exhaustive scientific investigation of his past place of work, the Institute for theoretical Physics and the laboratory for Atomic Research, Blegdamsvej 15. Therefore the Institute was seized and placed under guard. Subsequently, German Atomic scientists arrived to ascertain, whether it was possible, with the equipment at the Institute, to carry out work of any kind whatsoever with application to warfare. The result was fairly evident that the Institute can function as a basis for purely scientific research only. Accordingly, once this had been determined, the confiscation is revoked and the Institute is returned to Copenhagen University.

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    Schwarz, S. The Occupation of Niels Bohr’s Institute: December 6, 1943–February 3, 1944. Phys. Perspect. 23, 49–82 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00016-021-00270-8

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